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SUMMARY 
  
 The influence of the European Union has been an area of continuing debate 
among academics.  While there is general agreement regarding the importance of the 
European Union to its member states, candidate states, and some other actors in the 
world, disagreement remains regarding the extent of the European Union’s ability to have 
an impact on a world power such as the United States.  This is true at a time when the 
United States has engaged in highly controversial practices relating to human rights, 
particularly with regard to the death penalty and War on Terror.  While the death penalty 
and the War on Terror involve extremely important issues of democracy, justice, and 
security for the United States, the European Union has criticized the United States for 
violating human rights and advocated for the United States to change its laws, policies, 
and behaviors concerning the death penalty and the War on Terror.  With regard to these 
areas in particular, scholars have expressed doubts and disagreement on the European 
Union’s ability to influence the United States. 
Accordingly, this research examines the European Union’s impact on the United 
States on human rights issues, focusing in particular on the death penalty and arbitrary 
detention, extraordinary rendition, torture and ill treatment, and drone killings within the 
context of the War on Terror.  Roy H. Ginsberg provides one of the most developed 
frameworks for analyzing the European Union’s external impact in particular, and this 
research expands upon that framework in terms of time frame, receiving United States 
governmental levels (federal and state) and branches (executive, legislative, and judicial) 
examined, by explicitly including diffusion mechanisms, and by explicitly adding the 
impact on laws to the impact on policies, behavior, or interests. 
In doing so, this research answers important questions regarding whether the 
United States takes the European Union seriously in its human rights policy, whether the 
European Union is able to have significant impact on a world power like the United 
States, and the extent that the European Union has had an impact on the United States on 
human rights issues.  This dissertation concludes that for human rights issues, while the 
European Union does not have a perfect record, the United States at least sometimes 
 Samuel R. Layton, Page 4
takes the European Union seriously and the European Union has sometimes had a 
significant impact on the United States. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Today, European governments, whether as individual countries or in the context 
of international organizations such as the Council of Europe or the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, frequently speak up about moral issues.1  In 
particular, the European Union, of which the impact on the United States in the area of 
human rights is the focus of this research, promotes several normative principles that 
within the United Nations system are generally acknowledged as universally applicable, 
including human rights, among several others.2  The European Union’s efforts have 
extended across the globe on various human rights issues. 
For example, the European Union has prioritized the abolition of the death 
penalty.  Abolition of the death penalty is a precondition for membership to the European 
Union, and the European Union has advocated for worldwide elimination of the death 
penalty since 1998.3  Specifically, the European Union has frequently targeted the United 
States in its efforts because it is one of the only advanced industrial democracies that 
continues to practice the death penalty.4  By 2010, and even today, the only two 
retentionist states (i.e.  states which retain the death penalty in times of peace in law and 
practice) in the OSCE area were the United States and Belarus.5 
Despite the European Union’s efforts, the United States continues to have one of 
the highest execution rates in the world.6  Such efforts by the European Union suggest 
that Roy H.  Ginsberg’s inquiry into the extent of the European Union’s impact on third 
countries in the 1990s remains relevant today.7  In the years since Ginsberg’s research on 
                                                 
1 Schmidt, J. (2007). The EU Campaign Against the Death Penalty. Survival. 49(4), p. 124. 
2 Manners, I. (2008). The Normative Ethics of the European Union. International Affairs. 84(1), p. 46. 
3 Schmidt, J. (2007). The EU Campaign Against the Death Penalty. Survival. 49(4), p. 124. 
4 Ibid.; see Delegation of the European Union to the United States (2016). Death Penalty Archive. 
Retrieved from http://www.euintheus.org/what-we-do/policy-areas/democracy-and-human-rights/torture-
and-capital-punishment/death-penalty/. 
5 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2010). The Death Penalty in the OSCE 
Area: Background Paper 2010, p. 2. Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/odihr/71484. 
6 Ibid. p. 13. 
7 Ginsberg, H. (2001). The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire. Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
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the European Union’s external impact, political scientists continue to debate the ability of 
the European Union to have an influence on the world stage.8 
The United States’ human rights practices in relation to the War on Terror have 
also come under question in the European Union in recent years.  As some examples, the 
European Union has expressed its concerns regarding United States’ practices and 
policies in its fight against terrorism in consultations with the United States9 and the 
European Parliament has taken up human rights issues in hearings and resolutions on 
Guantanamo Bay.10  European Union leaders have called for the closure of the prison at 
Guantanamo Bay, arguing that holding suspected terrorists without trial at Guantanamo 
Bay violates human rights.11 
Although the European Union’s human rights policy towards the United States 
covers a variety of human rights issues, the decade of the 2000s is particularly important 
with the War on Terror beginning after the September 11, 2001 attacks and the 
development of the European Union’s guidelines on the death penalty a few years earlier 
(and revised in 2008),12 setting off an era of advocacy towards the United States for its 
abolition by the European Union.  As the United States has sometimes regarded itself as a 
leader in promoting Western values and remains an important power in world politics 
today, some questions remain as to whether the European Union’s human rights foreign 
policy is taken seriously by the United States and is able to have significant impact on a 
world power like the United States.  Specifically, to what extent, if any, does the 
European Union have impact on the United States on human rights issues? Which outputs 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Schunz, S. (2010). How to Assess the European Union’s Influence in International Affairs: 
Addressing a Major Conceptual Challenge for EU Foreign Policy Analysis’, Journal of Contemporary 
European Research. 6(1), p. 24-25; Keukeleire, S., & MacNaughtan, J. (2008). The Foreign Policy of the 
European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.; Smith, K. (2010). The European Union at the Human 
Rights Council: Speaking with One Voice but Having Little Influence. Journal of European Public Policy. 
17(2), p. 224-241. 
9 European Union (2008). EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2008, p. 19. Retrieved from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/169233_02_2008_2971_EN_INT.pdf. 
10 Ibid. p. 19, 38. 
11 Ibid.; Landberg, E. (2006). EU Puts Closing of Guantanamo Bay on Agenda for Talks with Bush. 
Bloomberg. Retrieved from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aBZk08Vr3Sec&refer=europe. 
12 European Union External Action Service (2008). Revised EU Death Penalty Guidelines. Retrieved from 
http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/adp/index_en.htm. 
 Samuel R. Layton, Page 9
and diffusion mechanisms has the European Union used towards human rights violations 
in the War on Terror and the continued use of death penalty executions in the United 
States? Which outputs and diffusion mechanisms have had the most impact on the United 
States? 
This doctoral research examines such issues, focusing in particular on human 
rights issues within the War on Terror and the continued use of the death penalty, 
utilizing a modified version of Ginsberg’s analytical framework13 for analyzing the 
external impact of the European Union. 
 
 
1.1 Background on the Death Penalty 
 
Compared to the (renewed) threat of terrorism that has spawned a debate about 
balancing security, justice, and human rights, the European Union has been more uniform 
and consistent in its abolitionist position on the death penalty since 1998.  The modern 
abolitionist movement, however, has roots dating back to the late eighteenth century, 
when Italian criminologist Cesare Beccaria argued that the death penalty is inhumane and 
should be abolished.14  Beccaria’s 1764 book, Dei Delitti e delle pene, influenced 
important statesmen of the time about “the uselessness and inhumanity of capital 
punishment.”15 Although the abolitionist movement expanded over the next few decades, 
death penalty practices varied across individual European countries for much of modern 
history.16  Some European countries abolished the death penalty in the nineteenth 
century, but most did not do so until after the middle of the twentieth century.17  
Nevertheless, there was a general decrease in the kinds of people, such as juveniles and 
pregnant women, and types of crimes subject to the death penalty in the nineteenth and 
                                                 
13 Discussed in Chapter 2. 
14 Demleitner, N. (2002). The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead? Oregon 
Law Review. 81, p. 132. 
15 Schabas, W. (1996). The Death Penalty as Cruel Treatment and Torture. Northeastern University Press: 
Boston. p. 18. 
16 Demleitner, N. (2002). The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead? Oregon 
Law Review. 81, p. 133. 
17 Ibid. 
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the beginning of the twentieth centuries throughout much of Europe.18  The abolitionist 
trend experienced a setback, however, with the rise in Europe of fascist regimes and new 
criminological theories after World War I and an increase in the number of executions 
during World War II and its aftermath.19 
 After this increase in executions, capital punishment was again on the decline 
over the next decades, with many European countries de facto or de jure significantly 
limiting or ending executions by the 1970s.20  In 1947, Italy abolished the death penalty, 
except during war time.21  West Germany abolished the death penalty in 1949.22  In 1965, 
the United Kingdom ended capital punishment for murder, but retained it for other 
crimes, including treason.23  Countries de facto ending capital punishment during this 
time include Belgium (1950), Denmark (1950), the Netherlands (1952), Spain (1975), 
and France (1977).24 
The Sixth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, open for 
signature since 1983, forbids capital punishment except in times of war or threat of war.25  
Although then current members of the Council of Europe were not required to sign the 
sixth protocol, it is important to emphasize that the Council of Europe was very important 
in Europe’s turn against the death penalty, and states are expected to sign the Sixth 
Protocol before admission to the Council of Europe.26  By 1985, Portugal, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, France, and the Netherlands abolished capital punishment as a matter of 
law.27  Many communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, however, continued 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. p. 133-134; Yorke, J. (2010). Inhuman Punishment and Abolition of the Death Penalty in the 
Council of Europe. Towards Universal Abolition of the Death Penalty. p. 82-83. Retrieved from 
http://www.academicsforabolition.net/repositorio/ficheros/361_135.pdf. 
21 Schmidt, J. (2007). The EU Campaign Against the Death Penalty. Survival. 49(4), p. 125. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 European Convention on Human Rights (1950). Retrieved from 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf; Demleitner, N. (2002). The Death Penalty in 
the United States: Following the European Lead? Oregon Law Review. 81, p. 137. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Schmidt, J. (2007). The EU Campaign Against the Death Penalty. Survival. 49(4), p. 126. 
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capital punishment under totalitarian regimes.28 Protocol No. 13, Article 1, to the 
European Convention on Human Rights forbids capital punishment in all circumstances, 
and, except for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, all of the members of the Council of 
Europe signed (between 2002 and 2004) and ratified the protocol.29 The European Court 
of Human Rights has been particularly important in the judicial protection of 
international human rights within the Council of Europe,30 including with regard to 
multiple cases dealing with the death penalty.31 
Popular opinion on the death penalty in most European countries continued in 
favor of capital punishment during most of these decades, however, and it was not until 
the 1990s that popular opinion became abolitionist in at least some European states.32  
Nonetheless, many Europeans continued to support the death penalty in at least some 
circumstances, and abolition of the death penalty in Europe was largely driven by elites.33  
The European elites seeking abolition did not, however, have negative reactions to their 
plans, perhaps because “ordinary Europeans .  .  .  do not have really strong feelings on 
the issue.”34  Amnesty International and the European Parliament also played an 
important role in pressuring European Union member state governments into accepting 
abolition.35  The Treaty of Maastricht36 in 1992 generally set the stage for eventually 
furthering an abolitionist policy in the EU as a whole.  As explained by Schmidt: 
 
“One of the key goals of Maastricht was to set in motion a process that 
would, over time, establish ‘an ever closer union’.  As part and parcel of 
                                                 
28 Ibid. p. 125. 
29 Council of Europe Treaty Office (2016). Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 187. Retrieved 
from http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/187/signatures. 
30 Lauren, P. (2011). The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen. 3rd ed. University of 
Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphis. p. 268. 
31 See, e.g., European Court of Human Rights (2015). Death Penalty Abolition. Retrieved from 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Death_penalty_ENG.pdf. (listing and summarizing European 
Court of Human Rights cases from 1989 to 2015). 
32 Demleitner, N. (2002). The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead? Oregon 
Law Review. 81, p. 134. 
33 Schmidt, J. (2007). The EU Campaign Against the Death Penalty. Survival. 49(4), p. 128. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Treaty on European Union (1992). Retrieved from http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf. 
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this, the EU sought to create common policies in selected areas across the 
full spectrum of governance.  In the area of human rights, the death 
penalty provided an issue ready to hand that potentially involved both 
foreign and domestic policy.”37 
 
Attempting to move in this direction, the European Union set its sight on acceding 
to the European Convention on Human Rights, but the European Court of Justice ruled 
that, as the European Union was not a state, “it did not have standing under international 
law to ‘adopt rules or conclude international agreements on human rights.’”38  The 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights,39 however, was created as a response to 
this setback, and forbid the death penalty, torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment, as well as extradition to states where there is a serious risk of their 
occurrence.40  During the time that the charter was under negotiation, the death penalty 
was abolished by the last three European Union member states to have it, ending with the 
United Kingdom in 1998.41 
With the last member states abolishing the death penalty, the European Union 
turned from internal abolition to a foreign policy seeking abolition world-wide, 
promulgating the “Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on the Death 
Penalty” in 1998, revised in 2008. 42 
 These guidelines state that the European Union’s objectives include: 
 
                                                 
37 Schmidt, J. (2007). The EU Campaign Against the Death Penalty. Survival. 49(4), p. 126. 
38 Ibid.; European Court of Justice (1996). Opinion 2/94 of 28 March 1996. Retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:3645916a-61ba-4ad5-84e1-
57767433f326.0002.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 
39 The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights did not, however, become legally binding until 2009 
when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. European Commission (2016). EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm.  
40 Schmidt, J. (2007). The EU Campaign Against the Death Penalty. Survival. 49(4), p. 128.; Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2010). Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2010.083.01.0389.01.ENG. 
41 Schmidt, J. (2007). The EU Campaign Against the Death Penalty. Survival. 49(4), p. 126. 
42 Ibid.; European Union External Action Service (2008). Revised EU Death Penalty Guidelines. Retrieved 
from http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/adp/index_en.htm. 
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 “To work towards universal abolition of the death penalty as a strongly 
held policy view agreed by all EU member states; if necessary with the 
immediate establishment of a moratorium on the use of the death penalty 
with a view to abolition. 
 Where the death penalty still exists, to call for its use to be progressively 
restricted and to insist that it be carried out according to minimum 
standards .  .  .  while seeking accurate information about the exact number 
of persons sentenced to death, awaiting execution and executed.”43 
 
The minimum standards enumerated in the guidelines include, among other things, limits 
on the types of crimes and persons subject to the death penalty as well as procedural 
safeguards, such as a right to appeal and postponing execution while international 
procedures are ongoing, in capital cases.44  In the pursuit of the European Union’s 
objectives, the guidelines call for, in appropriate circumstances, the use of general and 
specific demarches, human rights reporting, encouraging the accession to and compliance 
with international agreements against the death penalty, and raising the issue in 
multilateral fora.45  According to Manners, “since 1998, the EU’s promotion of the 
international abolition of the death penalty .  .  .  has been part of a global movement that 
has met with considerable success.  In the [first] ten years since the 1998 EU abolitionist 
policy was launched, thirty-two states have moved to abolish the death penalty for 
ordinary or all crimes, bringing the total number of abolitionist states to 135 against 
sixty-two retentionist states,”46 a general trend that has continued in recent years.47 
Even after the death penalty was abolished in many European Union member 
states, however, some public opinion polls continued to indicate support for the death 
                                                 
43 European Union External Action Service (2008). Revised EU Death Penalty Guidelines. Retrieved from 
http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/adp/index_en.htm. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Manners, I. (2009). The EU’s International Promotion of the Rights of the Child. The European Union 
and the Social Dimension of Globalization: How the EU Influences the World, eds. Jan Orbie and Lisa 
Tortell. Routledge. p. 236. 
47 United Nations Economic and Social Council (2015). Capital punishment and implementation of the 
safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty: Report of the Secretary-
General. E/2015/49, p. 15-16. 
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penalty.48  This has changed overtime, however, with popular support in some countries 
leaning against the death penalty.49  Today, membership in the European Union is 
conditioned upon abolition of the death penalty, and the European Union has turned its 
efforts towards the United States as one of the only advanced industrialized democracies 
retaining capital punishment in law and practice.50 
 In the past, the United States followed a generally similar path to Europe until the 
1970s.51  Capital punishment existed in the United States from its beginning, with the 
first documented execution in 1608.52  The framers of the Constitution were conscious of 
capital punishment53 and refer to capital crimes in the Fifth Amendment.54  While the 
Framers did not intend for the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment to forbid capital punishment at that time, United States courts have 
interpreted the prohibition as an evolving standard, and abolitionists cite the Eighth 
Amendment to support their arguments for the unconstitutionality of the death penalty 
today.55 
The Michigan Territory abolished capital punishment, except for treason, in 1846, 
and sixteen more states abolished the death penalty by 1929.56  After World War I, there 
                                                 
48 Demleitner, N. (2002). The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead? Oregon 
Law Review. 81, p. 150. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Schmidt, J. (2007). The EU Campaign Against the Death Penalty. Survival. 49(4), p. 124; Delegation of 
the European Union to the United States (2015). Leading the Fight Against Capital Punishment. EU 
Matters. p. 1-2. Retrieved from http://www.euintheus.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/EU_MATTERS_Death_Penalty_WO12.pdf; see Delegation of the European 
Union to the United States (2016). Death Penalty Archive. Retrieved from http://www.euintheus.org/what-
we-do/policy-areas/democracy-and-human-rights/torture-and-capital-punishment/death-penalty/. 
51 Demleitner, N. (2002). The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead? Oregon 
Law Review. 81, p. 134. 
52 Patterson, K (2006). Acculturation and the Development of Death Penalty Doctrine in the United States. 
Duke Law Journal. 55, 1224. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Constitution of the United States (1787). Retrieved from 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution.html. 
55 Ibid.; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, at 100–01, 
(1958)); Patterson, K (2006). Acculturation and the Development of Death Penalty Doctrine in the United 
States. Duke Law Journal. 55, 1224-1225. 
56 Demleitner, N. (2002). The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead? Oregon 
Law Review. 81, p. 134. 
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was a resurgence in capital punishment in the United States.57  By the 1960s, however, 
capital punishment was declining in the United States, and it was becoming more of a 
regional practice, particularly in the South.58  States that retained capital punishment in 
law used it less frequently in practice.  In 1972, the United States Supreme Court started a 
de facto moratorium on capital punishment in Furman v.  Georgia, in general because of 
the arbitrary manner in which it was imposed. 59 
 Unlike Europe, capital punishment began to increase in the United States starting 
in the late 1970s.60  Opposition developed to the Supreme Court’s de facto moratorium, 
and state legislatures revised their statutes to reinstate capital punishment and attempt to 
correct the deficiencies described in Furman.61  In Gregg v.  Georgia,62 the Supreme 
Court approved of some states’ capital punishment frameworks under the new statutes, 
while rejecting others, effectively providing more guidance to states on permissible 
frameworks for imposing the death penalty and ending the de facto moratorium on capital 
punishment. 
Although the United States Supreme Court ended the de facto moratorium on 
capital punishment, it continued to restrict the types of crimes and persons subject to 
capital punishment in the following decades.63  In the 1980s and 1990s, the death penalty 
expanded in various individual states, including in some states that had previously 
abolished the death penalty in law, as well as at the federal level with the 1994 Federal 
Death Penalty Act.64  After nearly forty years without a federal execution, the federal 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. p. 134-135. 
59 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Demleitner, N. (2002). The Death Penalty in the United States: 
Following the European Lead? Oregon Law Review. 81, p. 135. 
60 Demleitner, N. (2002). The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead? Oregon 
Law Review. 81, p. 135. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, (1976). 
63 Patterson, K (2006). Acculturation and the Development of Death Penalty Doctrine in the United States. 
Duke Law Journal. 55, 1228-1229; see, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 
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government executed Timothy McVeigh on June 11, 2001 for his actions in the 
Oklahoma City Bombing.65 
As the United States expanded the use of capital punishment, the European Union 
set its sights on its abolition.  In its specific abolition policy towards the United States, 
the European Union has issued demarches to federal and state officials, chastised the 
United States in public declarations and international forums, filed amicus curiae briefs in 
the United States Supreme Court, entered into extradition agreements with the United 
States, and conducted an extensive information campaign against the death penalty 
through the funding of NGOs in the United States.66 
 
 
1.2 Background on the War on Terror  
 
In a September 20, 2001 speech addressing a joint session of the United States 
Congress, then United States President George W. Bush described the “War on Terror”67 
as “a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen” that “begins with Al Qaeda” 
but does “not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and 
defeated”.68  In that speech, President Bush promised to “direct every resource at our 
command--every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law 
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war--to the 
destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.”69  What was not clear at the 
                                                 
65 Demleitner, N. (2002). The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead? Oregon 
Law Review. 81, p. 136. 
66 Schmidt, J. (2007). The EU Campaign Against the Death Penalty. Survival. 49(4), p. 127; Delegation of 
the European Union to the United States (2016). Death Penalty Archive. Retrieved from 
http://www.euintheus.org/what-we-do/policy-areas/democracy-and-human-rights/torture-and-capital-
punishment/death-penalty/. 
67 Although the War on Terror has also been referred to as the “Overseas Contingency Operation” under 
President Obama, this dissertation uses War on Terror for consistency. 
68 Bush, G.W. (2001). President Bush Addresses the Nation. Retrieved from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html. 
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time of this speech was the extent that human rights concerns would be secondary to 
ensuring security and getting “justice” for terrorist crimes in the War on Terror.70 
Europe is also not a stranger to its own experiences with terrorism, considering 
the thousands of victims of terrorism in the last thirty years in Spain, Britain, Ireland, and 
elsewhere in Europe.71  The September 11, 2001 attacks, as well as later terrorist attacks 
in Madrid, London, Paris, Brussels, and elsewhere, nonetheless presented strengthened 
and renewed security concerns within the European Union.  The challenge for the 
European Union was not only one of balancing protection of its own area and citizens 
with promoting normative principles, but also how to respond to the needs and demands 
of other countries, particularly in the relationship with the United States.  Europe’s initial 
reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks was of general support and sympathy for the 
United States people.72  As the years passed, however, there was greater division over the 
United States response to the threat of terrorism.  Although Europe generally looked 
favorably upon the United States’ use of the United Nations and multilateralism in 2001 
and 2002 to pursue al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan,73 as the War on Terror 
progressed the European Union became more internally divided on the United States 
approach to combating terrorism, including when it comes to balancing security and 
justice concerns with human rights.  This dissertation focuses on some of the most 
prominent of these human rights issues, extraordinary rendition, torture and ill-treatment, 
arbitrary detention, and drone strikes, which have also been the focus of involvement or 
advocacy within the European Union in the time frame examined. 
The United States Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) extraordinary rendition 
program, for example, was conducted with the help of officials in European Union 
member states, while the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (with support from the European Commission) investigated the United 
                                                 
70 See Ignatieff, M. (2004). The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror. Princeton University 
Press: Princeton. (discussing the challenges of addressing terrorism in a democracy) 
71 Council of the European Union (2013). EU Fight Against Terrorism. Retrieved from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/?lang=en. 
72 Manners, I. (2006): European Union ‘Normative Power’ and the Security Challenge. European Security. 
15(4), p. 410. 
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States program and the European support for it and produced reports condemning the 
practices.74 
Extraordinary rendition is a program in which individuals are secretly kidnapped 
and transferred without process of law to third states often known for torture. 75  As such, 
extraordinary rendition can involve a number of practices that constitute human rights 
violations by themselves, both in the process of removing an individual without any legal 
protections or knowledge of that person and his/her family as well as in the ensuing 
arbitrary detention or torture.76  One of the most difficult challenges with protecting 
human rights for such a process of abduction and detention is the secrecy involved that 
creates difficulty in accessing victims, evidence, and courts on the matter.77 
Although the extraordinary rendition program has been used in the post 
September 11 War on Terror, its legal origins in the United States began in part with 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 3978 issued in 1995 to the CIA in reaction to the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing and 1995 Oklahoma City and Tokyo bombings.79  
PDD 39 provides: 
 
“Return of Indicted Terrorists to the U.S. for Prosecution: We shall 
vigorously apply extraterritorial statutes to counter acts of terrorism and 
                                                 
74 European Parliament (2007). Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the 
Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners. A6-0020/2007. Retrieved from 
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0020+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN; Council of Europe (2006). Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-
State Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States, Doc. 10957, 12 June 2006. p. 2. 
75 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, rendition is “the return of a fugitive from one state to the state 
where the fugitive is accused or convicted of a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary (2004). Eight Edition. p. 
1322. The term extraordinary rendition has been used to describe the CIA’s abduction of terrorist suspects 
in the context of the War on Terror, with “extraordinary” possibly intended to describe the unusual nature 
of responding to terrorism by using means that go beyond ordinary (international) legal procedures. See 
Winkler, M. (2008). When “Extraordinary” Means Illegal: International Law and European Reaction to the 
United States Rendition Program. Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review. 30, 
p. 38-39. 
76 Duffy, H. (2008). Human Rights Litigation and the ‘War on Terror’. International Review of the Red 
Cross. 90, p. 587-588. 
77 Ibid. p. 588. 
78 Presidential Decision Directive 39 (1995). Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm. 
79 Winkler, M. (2008). When “Extraordinary” Means Illegal: International Law and European Reaction to 
the United States Rendition Program. Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review. 
30, p. 39. 
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apprehend terrorists outside of the United States.  When terrorists wanted 
for violation of U.S. law are at large overseas, their return for prosecution 
shall be a matter of the highest priority and shall be a continuing central 
issue in bilateral relations with any state that harbors or assists them.  
Where we do not have adequate arrangements, the Departments of State 
and Justice shall work to resolve the problem, where possible and 
appropriate, through negotiation and conclusion of new extradition 
treaties. 
If we do not receive adequate cooperation from a state that harbors a 
terrorist whose extradition we are seeking, we shall take appropriate 
measures to induce cooperation.  Return of suspects by force may be 
effected without the cooperation of the host government, consistent with 
the procedures outlined in NSD-77, which shall remain in effect.”80 
 
The terms of PDD 39 thus provide for attempting to apprehend terrorists outside 
the United States with the cooperation of the host government, including through 
adoption of extradition treaties, but it also provides for the return of terrorist suspects 
through force without the cooperation of the host government.  Interstate cooperation 
among law enforcement bodies is often based on treaties, but treaties may take 
considerable time to negotiate and their enforcement can be time consuming and full of 
political hurdles.81  As such, conducting renditions through such treaties arguably affects 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the United States ability to obtain terrorist suspects 
and gather intelligence, potentially preventing counterterrorist measures from moving as 
quickly and allowing terrorists additional time to plan or execute attacks.82 
Extraordinary rendition is thus a strategy in which extradition and human rights 
treaties are ignored for the sake of gathering intelligence on potential security threats.  
Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained that the United States renditions 
                                                 
80 Presidential Decision Directive 39 (1995). Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm. 
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are an adaptation to the “new kind of conflict” that the War on Terror presents, in which 
“we must track down terrorists who seek refuge in areas where governments cannot take 
effective action, including where the terrorists cannot in practice be reached by the 
ordinary processes of law.”83 
Justifying the practice, Rice contended that some suspected terrorists captured 
“have information that may save lives, perhaps even thousands of lives.  .  .  .  The 
captured terrorists of the 21st Century do not fit easily into traditional systems of criminal 
or military justice, which were designed for different needs.  We have to adapt.”84  The 
“adaptation” may be viewed as a justification for circumvention of or exceptions to 
international law.85  In other words, the extraordinary threat of terrorism has led the 
United States government to extraordinary rendition operations outside of the ordinary 
rendition process governed by (ordinary) international law.  Less than one week after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, President Bush signed off on a classified directive known as 
the “memorandum of notification,” which authorized the CIA “to capture, detain and 
interrogate terrorism suspects, providing the foundation for what became its secret prison 
system.”86 
 The arbitrary detention of prisoners without habeas corpus87 and due process 
rights, particularly at the Guantanamo Bay detention center and other secret sites, has 
been another area of major concern to human rights advocates.  The detention of 
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay spawned a number of cases in United States courts 
                                                 
83 Rice, C. (2005). Full Text: Rice Defends US Policy. BBC News. Retrieved from 
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challenging the deprivation of habeas corpus and related due process rights.88  In the 
earlier cases, the United States Supreme Court tended to exercise a degree of judicial 
restraint, declining to decide as a constitutional matter whether the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay had the privilege of habeas corpus, instead basing their decisions on 
more limited grounds.89  This resulted in a “curious game of legal ping-pong .  .  .  
between the judicial and political branches” in which the United States administration 
and Congress complied with the Supreme Court decisions through minimalistic 
interpretations of those decisions and enactment or revisions to the statutes upon which 
those decisions were based, which only led to additional cases to address the same human 
rights issues under the revised legal framework.90  It was only after six years that the 
United States Supreme Court, on June 12, 2008 in Boumediene v.  Bush, declared that 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay have the privilege of habeas corpus under the United States 
Constitution.91 
 The European Union has sought to curb arbitrary detention by the United States.  
For example, it pressured the United States government to treat Guantanamo detainees as 
prisoners of war and to provide them protection under the Geneva Convention(s).92  
While some countries in the European Union were critical of the United States detention 
of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, others were helping the United States capture and 
transfer prisoners to Guantanamo Bay, allowing secret prisons within their own borders, 
or detaining suspected terrorists under similar circumstances.  For example, secret 
detention facilities were in Poland and Lithuania, with a detention facility in Lithuania 
built after it had joined the European Union.93  Although of a different magnitude, 
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Belmarsh Prison in London has been compared to Guantanamo Bay, as suspected 
terrorists were also held there for extended periods without charge or trial.94  Over time, 
however, the United Kingdom’s position on Guantanamo Bay became more critical, with 
Harriett Harman, the Constitutional Affairs Minister calling for it to be closed.95 
 Torture and ill-treatment has also been an increasingly problematic occurrence 
during the War on Terror.  While it is debatable how high up the military or 
administration ladder responsibility should lie for scandals such as those at Abu Ghraib 
or Baghram, the extraordinary rendition program, where suspected terrorists are often 
taken to countries known for torture, and the “Torture Memos,”96 which argue for the 
legality of certain highly coercive interrogation techniques, suggest that torture and ill-
treatment has been sanctioned at least in some circumstances by the highest levels of 
government.  Not only has the legality of highly coercive interrogation techniques been 
discussed, but the CIA has admitted to using such techniques on suspected terrorists, 
including waterboarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, accused of masterminding the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.97 
Five months before the September 11 attacks, the European Union Guidelines on 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment were adopted by 
the Council of the European Union.98  Despite this, the United Kingdom has also been 
involved in the torture or ill-treatment of prisoners.  Baha Mousa was an Iraqi who died 
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in September 2003 while in the custody of British soldiers after being tortured.99  Mousa 
and his fellow inmates “were beaten with bars, repeatedly kicked and forced to drink 
their own urine .  .  . kept hooded with hessian sacks in temperatures of 60C, made to 
maintain a painful stress position for hours and deprived of sleep.”100  In March 2008, 
Defence Secretary Des Browne admitted that there were “substantial breaches” of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in Mousa’s death.101 
Further, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Latvia, and Portugal have all intervened 
in European Court of Human Rights cases where persons allege that their deportation is 
to states where “there is a real risk of their being subject to torture and ill-treatment”.102  
They asked the Court to create a new balancing test between national security interests 
and protection from ill-treatment in light of the growing threat of terrorism.103  In 
addition, in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,104 the United Kingdom has 
argued that evidence acquired by foreign officials through torture should be admissible 
evidence, making a distinction from evidence obtained by torture by UK officials, an 
argument later rejected by the House of Lords.105  Such positions are revealing of the re-
evaluation of security interests and human rights that not only occurred in the United 
States, but also in a limited number of European Union member states.  As explained by 
Duffy: 
 
“Although they were unsuccessful, the very fact that governments made 
these interventions, despite the odds of success being seriously stacked 
against them (in the light of clear and on-point jurisprudence from the 
Court itself, quite apart from any of the principles at stake), is telling.  It 
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arguably reveals a shift in the approach to rights protection by certain 
states at least, and a questioning and undermining of even the most 
sacrosanct human rights protections.  The resolute rejection of this 
approach by the European Court is an example of the important role of the 
courts in reaffirming fundamental principles”.106 
 
The United States utilization of drones for targeted killings of persons in the War 
on Terror has also become increasing controversial.  With regard to the use of drones for 
targeted killings, President Obama’s administration has substantially increased the 
practice compared to the Bush administration.107  The Obama administration has carried 
out approximately 90 percent of the drone strikes by the United States.108  The use of 
drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles, provides the United States with “an 
unprecedented ability to track and kill individuals with great precision, without any risk 
to the lives of the forces that use them.”109  The United Kingdom has also utilized armed 
drones to kill individuals,110 but not to the same degree as the United States particularly 
outside of the battlefield.111 
The use of drones for targeted killings has sometimes been criticized, including 
by the European Parliament and officials from European Union member states.112  In 
addition to potential issues with state sovereignty, the use of drone strikes has raised 
concerns about arbitrary killing in violation of human rights, particularly when they take 
place away from the zones where conventional hostilities are taking place.113  Although 
there has been some criticism of the use of drones in such circumstances, the European 
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Union has to a large extent been silent regarding the issue with regard to the United 
States. 
The example provided by United States human rights practices also affects the 
European Union’s human rights advocacy in other countries throughout the world.  With 
regard to the War on Terror in particular, other states are able to look to the actions of the 
United States to justify their own human rights practices.  For example, “the war on terror 
retrospectively legitimated Russian actions in Chechnya” and the “Chinese repression of 
Uighurs in Xinjiang has been framed in terms of the total war on terror since September 
2001.”114  The European Union’s human rights dialogue with other states is negatively 
affected by the use of the War on Terror as an excuse for human rights violations.115  As 
such, the human rights issues involved in the War on Terror are important not only for 
the European Union’s human rights policy towards the United States, but also towards 
the world generally. 
 
 
1.3 The European Union in the World 
 
Scholars continue to discuss the European Union in the world. A variety of terms 
have been used by scholars to discuss the European Union in the world, such as the 
power, actorness, role, performance, influence, impact, success, and/or effectiveness of 
the European Union, often with variation within individual works of scholarship.116  With 
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the variation of terminology used (including mixtures within individual works of 
scholarship), it is important to look into the scholarship to understand what is more 
specifically being examined and/or measured. As stated by Graeger and Haugevik, “it 
seems clear that any assessment of performance will depend on how we define 
performance in the first place.”117 
Some early studies of the European Union in the world focused on the European 
Union’s actorness. In 1977, Gunnar Sjostedt defined actorness as the “the capacity to 
behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system.”118  
Since then, scholars have continued to discuss the concept of the European Union’s 
actorness.119 With studies of actorness often centering around the capacity or “ability to 
act” of the European Union,120 “actorness is often analysed largely on the basis of EU 
internal criteria.”121 While the existing studies regarding European Union actorness 
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 Samuel R. Layton, Page 27
certainly have value, it is also important for political science scholars to “go beyond 
studies of actorness (or ability to act).”122 “Ginsberg’s innovative study” attempted to 
address this concern, with Ginsberg at that time aiming “to take analysis of EU external 
policy ‘to its next logical stage of development – to analyse the effects (or outcomes) of 
actions.’”123 As discussed below, recent political science scholarship generally continue 
with this aim in attempts at examining the influence, impact, performance, success, 
and/or effectiveness of the European Union.124 
Scholars have also often discussed and debated the European Union’s power in 
the world, with descriptions of the European Union as a civilian power,125 normative 
power,126 a structural power,127 a superpower,128 and a small power,129 among others.130  
Although there is variation in the descriptions of the European Union’s power, the 
concept of power has often explicitly or implicitly centered on an ability or potential to 
have an influence.131 While such a focus on power has value, some scholars have 
expressed concern that it at least sometimes is “insufficiently grounded in empirical 
                                                                                                                                                 
Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness and Effectiveness. International Relations, 27(3), p. 
261-275. 
122 Niemann, A. & Bretherton, C. (2013). EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of 
Actorness and Effectiveness. International Relations, 27(3), p. 267. 
123 Niemann, A. & Bretherton, C. (2013). EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of 
Actorness and Effectiveness. International Relations, 27(3), p. 267, quoting in part Ginsberg, H. (2001). 
The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., p. 15. 
124 See, e.g., Niemann, A. & Bretherton, C. (2013). EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of 
Actorness and Effectiveness. International Relations, 27(3), p. 267 (stating that Ginsberg’s “aim, and the 
systematic application of his analytical framework, accords with the concerns of this Special Issue.”). 
125 Duchêne, F. (1972). Europe’s Role in World Peace, in R. Mayne (ed.) Europe 
Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead. London: Fontana. 
126 Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market 
Studies. 40(2), p. 235-258. 
127 Keukeleire, S., & MacNaughtan, J. (2008). The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
128 McCormick, J. (2007). The European Super Power. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
129 Toje, A. (2008). The European Union as a Small Power. Journal of Common Market Studies. 49(1). 
130 See also discussion in Section 2.2. 
131 Forsberg, T. (2011). Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type. 
Journal of Common Market Studies. 49(6), p. 1194; See Schunz, S. (2010). How to Assess the European 
Union’s Influence in International Affairs: Addressing a Major Conceptual Challenge for EU Foreign 
Policy Analysis’, Journal of Contemporary European Research. 6(1), p. 24-25 (discussing other 
examples); Niemann, A. & Bretherton, C. (2013). EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of 
Actorness and Effectiveness. International Relations, 27(3), p. 264. 
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findings,”132  sometimes insufficiently addresses the effects of the European Union’s 
actions,133 and is still “in the process of attaining a more systematic empirical focus.”134 
Given these concerns, scholars have increasingly begun to examine the effects of 
the European Union’s foreign policy activity.135  In 2010 Simon Schunz explained, 
“virtually no attempts have been made” with regard to the examination of the European 
Union’s foreign policy “to specify what influence means and how to assess it (with the 
partial exception of Ginsberg 2001, who employs the term ‘impact’).”136 In 2011, 
Jorgensen, Oberthur, and Shahin likewise point out that European foreign policy 
literature “has not developed systematic conceptualisations of performance” and so they 
aimed to provide a conceptual framework for assessing performance of the European 
Union in international institutions, which they suggest has effectiveness, relevance, 
efficiency, and financial/resource viability as core elements.137 Similarly, Niemann and 
Bretherton state that “the literature contains relatively few systematic empirical 
explorations of the actual extent of EU actorness and especially effectiveness in 
international relations” and that “systematic empirical analyses of EU effectiveness are 
still relatively rare.”138 
                                                 
132 Schunz, S. (2010). How to Assess the European Union’s Influence in International Affairs: Addressing a 
Major Conceptual Challenge for EU Foreign Policy Analysis’, Journal of Contemporary European 
Research. 6(1), p. 24. 
133 Smith, K. (2007). The EU in the World: Future Research Agendas. European Foreign and Security 
Policy Studies Programme, p. 13. Retrieved from http://iep-berlin.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Vortrag-
von-Dr.-Karen-E.-Smith.pdf. 
134 Niemann, A. & Bretherton, C. (2013). EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of 
Actorness and Effectiveness. International Relations, 27(3), p. 264. 
135  Beach, D. (2015). Liberal International Relations Theory and EU Foreign Policy. in Jorgensen, K. et al. 
(eds.). The Sage Handbook of European Foreign Policy. Sage. p. 92-96. 
136 Schunz, S. (2010). How to Assess the European Union’s Influence in International Affairs: Addressing a 
Major Conceptual Challenge for EU Foreign Policy Analysis’, Journal of Contemporary European 
Research. 6(1), p. 26. In his article, Schunz makes an “initial attempt” to further develop the concept and 
assessment of the European Union’s influence in order to “stimulate debate” but does not have a fully 
developed framework for doing so. Schunz, S. (2010). How to Assess the European Union’s Influence in 
International Affairs: Addressing a Major Conceptual Challenge for EU Foreign Policy Analysis’, Journal 
of Contemporary European Research. 6(1), p. 38. Ginsberg specifically defines “external political impact”, 
but also frequently uses the term influence. Ginsberg, H. (2001). The European Union in International 
Politics: Baptism by Fire. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
137 Jorgenson, K., et al. (2011). Assessing the EU’s Performance in International Institutions – Conceptual 
Framework and Core Findings. Journal of European Integration.33(6), p. 601-602. Relevance, efficiency, 
and viability focus more on issues internal to the European Union than effectiveness alone. Ibid, p. 603-
605. 
138 Niemann, A. & Bretherton, C. (2013). EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of 
Actorness and Effectiveness. International Relations, 27(3), p. 263; Brattberg, E. (2013). Actorness and 
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Much of the recent scholarship on the European Union’s influence, impact, 
performance, success, and/or effectiveness139 has focused on whether the European 
Union has (partially or fully) achieved its goals, objectives, or preferences.140  For 
example, Jorgensen, Oberthur, and Shahin define the European Union’s effectiveness “in 
an international institution as the degree to which the EU has achieved its goals and 
objectives in the decision-making process within that institution,” and point out that 
many “studies of EU performance have, implicitly or explicitly, used EU goals and 
objectives as a central performance standard” and similarly state that their “standard of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Effectiveness in International Disaster Relief: The European Union and United States in Comparative 
Perspective. International Relations, 27(3), p. 359. 
139 Again, a mixture of terminology is often used within a single publication.   
140 Jorgenson, K., et al. (2011). Assessing the EU’s Performance in International Institutions – Conceptual 
Framework and Core Findings. Journal of European Integration.33(6), p. 559-620; Baroncelli, E. (2011). 
The EU at the World Bank: Institutional and Policy Performance. Journal of European Integration.33(6), 
p. 637-650; Kissack, R. (2011). The Performance of the European Union in the International Labour 
Organization. Journal of European Integration.33(6), p. 652; Oberthur, S. (2011). The European Union’s 
Performance in the International Climate Change Regime. Journal of European Integration.33(6), p. 667; 
Schaik, L. (2011). The EU’s Performance in the World Health Organization: Internal Cramps after the 
‘Lisbon Cure.’ Journal of European Integration.33(6), p. 700, 702; Graeger, N. & Haugevik, K. (2011). 
The EU’s Performance with and within NATO: Assessing Objectives, Outcomes and Organisational 
Practices. Journal of European Integration.33(6), p. 744, 754; Thomas, D. (2012). Still Punching Below Its 
Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in European Union Foreign Policy. Journal of Common Market 
Studies. 50(3), p. 458, 460; Niemann, A. & Bretherton, C. (2013). EU External Policy at the Crossroads: 
The Challenge of Actorness and Effectiveness. International Relations, 27(3), p. 267; Schaik, L. (2013). 
The EU’s Growing Pains in Negotiating International Food Standards. International Relations, 27(3), p. 
294; Groen, L. & Niemann, A. (2013). The European Union at the Copenhagen Climate Negotiations: A 
Case of Contested EU Actorness and Effectiveness. International Relations, 27(3), p. 311; Elsig, M. 
(2013). The EU as an Effective Trade Power? Strategic Choice of Judicial Candidates in the Context of the 
World Trade Organization. International Relations, 27(3), p. 328; Carbone, M. (2013). Between EU 
Actorness and Aid Effectiveness: The Logics of EU Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. International Relations, 
27(3), p. 343; Brattberg, E. (2013). Actorness and Effectiveness in International Disaster Relief: The 
European Union and United States in Comparative Perspective. International Relations, 27(3), p. 359; 
Smith, K. (2006). Speaking with One Voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human Rights Issues at the 
United Nations. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(1), p. 113-137; Smith, K. (2010). The European 
Union at the Human Rights Council: Speaking with One Voice but Having Little Influence. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 17(2), p. 224-241; Quaglia, L. (2014). The Sources of European Union Influence 
in International Financial Regulatory Fora. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(3), p. 328; Schunz, S. 
(2010). How to Assess the European Union’s Influence in International Affairs: Addressing a Major 
Conceptual Challenge for EU Foreign Policy Analysis’, Journal of Contemporary European Research. 
6(1), p. 27; Basu, S. et al. (2012). The European Union’s Participation in United Nation’s Human Rights 
and Environmental Governance: Key Concepts and Major Challenges. in Wouters, J. et al. (eds.). The 
European Union and Multilateral Governance: Assessing EU Participation in United Naitons Human 
Rights and Environmental Fora. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 6. 
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EU goal achievement thus stays central among established standards in (EU) policy 
evaluation.”141 
While there is overlap between the research on goal/objective/preference 
achievement and Ginsberg’s notion of external impact, they are not necessarily 
conceptually interchangeable nor operationalized the same in measurement.  First, when 
the European Union’s goals/objectives/preferences are (partially or wholly) internal, 
there will be a divergence of focus between effectiveness and external impact.142  
Second, goals can be to varying extents under- or overambitious.  On the one hand, an 
overambitious goal may not be (wholly or partially) reached but nonetheless have an 
external impact on the target state.  On the other hand, an underambitious goal may be 
wholly reached but be of little or no vital importance to the target state.  Third, it may be 
difficult to determine what the goals of the European Union are, and there may be 
conflicting goals from which the achievement of one takes away from the achievement of 
another.  As explained by Jorgensen, Oberthur, and Shahin: 
 
“We need and want to acknowledge that assessing EU goal achievement 
itself is likely to raise important challenges. To start with, objectives can 
be so broad as to render them nearly meaningless for an assessment. 
Consider the example of the European Security Strategy of 2003, which 
lists five broad strategic objectives, the achievement of which can hardly 
be assessed. In other cases, EU objectives may not necessarily be clear or 
explicit. It is also not difficult to imagine that policy may pursue several 
objectives that may be partially contradictory, in which case effectiveness 
may need to be assessed per objective and weighted overall. . . .  Finally, 
we may wish to take into account how easy or difficult the achievement of 
                                                 
141 Jorgenson, K., et al. (2011). Assessing the EU’s Performance in International Institutions – Conceptual 
Framework and Core Findings. Journal of European Integration.33(6), p. 603-604. 
142 See, Smith, K. (2006). Speaking with One Voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human Rights 
Issues at the United Nations. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(1), p. 132; Smith, K. (2010). The 
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the goals has been, given their level of ambition, the characteristics of the 
problem and the preferences of other actors.”143 
 
Similarly, Jorgensen, Oberthur, and Shahin state that “the case studies [within the special 
issue of the Journal of European Integration they introduce] show that it is frequently 
difficult to identify the EU policy objectives in their respective policy areas. In almost all 
cases, there is no explicit description of the goals set out for the EU.”144 
These concerns are particularly relevant for the focus of this research.  As 
discussed in Section 1.2, terrorism has presented complex and sometimes conflicting 
issues of security, justice, and respect for human rights, and the European Union and its 
member states have not always acted consistently on these challenging issues. Goals 
relating to security or justice can arguably conflict with respecting the human rights of 
terrorist suspects.  While the European Union’s position with regard to the death penalty 
in the United States has been much more consistent, the United States response to the 
European Union’s criticisms of human rights has at times pointed to the fact that the 
death penalty system in the United States is the result of democratic processes (with 
democracy also being a value promoted by the European Union). In this context, 
Ginsberg’s analytical framework for assessing external impact thus has not only the 
benefit of focusing on the actual effects (rather than only the European Union’s capacity 
or “ability to act”145) on the non-member target (in this research, the United States), but it 
also does not base the measurement of external impact146 primarily on whether the 
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Framework and Core Findings. Journal of European Integration.33(6), p. 604. 
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146 See Chapter 2. 
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European Union’s goals, objectives, or preferences have been fully accomplished. Thus, 
while the European Union’s goals, objectives, or preferences are sometimes discussed in 
this research as part of the context or background, they are not used as the primary basis 
for determining the level of external impact on the United States. 
While power and influence are not necessarily conceptually interchangeable, the 
ability of the European Union to have an external impact is (at least) sometimes implied 
within (some of) the debates regarding the European Union’s power in the world.147  As 
explained by Forsberg, “the concept of ‘power’ implies the ability to achieve results.  
With the notable exception of enlargement policy, the record of the EU achieving 
normative ends is, however, mixed and contested.”148  Thus, an examination of the 
European Union’s external impact is not only important in its own regard, but it may also 
have implications for at least some of the various debates concerning the European 
Union’s power.149 
 
 
1.4 European Union-United States Relations 
 
The transatlantic relationship today has roots in “the Second World War and the 
Cold War, conflicts that bound the United States to Europe.”150 Both sides struggled 
together against communism and fascism based in part on shared values of democracy 
and capitalism.151 After World War II, the United States security presence, financial 
support (through the Marshall Plan), and political support “provided valuable support for 
European integration and the creation of an EU that today incorporates most of 
                                                 
147 See Schunz, S. (2010). How to Assess the European Union’s Influence in International Affairs: 
Addressing a Major Conceptual Challenge for EU Foreign Policy Analysis’, Journal of Contemporary 
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Europe.”152  While some predicted that the end of the Cold War would also mean the 
practical end of NATO, “the economic, political, social and military links across the 
Atlantic proved strong enough to support the relationship in the post-Cold War world.”153 
On the economic side, the European Union and the United States continue to have a high 
level of trade in goods and services.154 In this context, academics have often examined 
the European Union and the United States from a comparative perspective155 or the 
relations between them.  As explained by Tortola: 
 
“Ever since the early days of European integration, supporters of the 
project have time and again pointed at the US as, if not a historical 
example to follow entirely, at least a model from which to borrow 
selectively or, at other times, a competitor to match in the international 
arena”156 
 
Michael Smith has also called the United States “Europe’s most significant ‘other’”, 
while acknowledging the “ambivalent” attitude of the United States towards European 
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integration with general support for it “as a stabilising and energising force” but also as a 
potential economic and diplomatic challenger.157   
The literature today discussing the relations between the European Union and the 
United States suggests a complicated mixture of commonalities, convergence, 
collaboration/cooperation, and interdependence in combination with disagreements, 
tensions, and competition.158 This complexity of the European Union-United States 
relationship has been described as “schizophrenic” with its combination of working 
together and divergence on different issues.159 Examples include on the one hand the 
European Union and United States standing together at times concerning Iran’s nuclear 
policy and working towards strengthening their economic relationship and, on the other 
hand, disagreements regarding regulatory standards and the United States’ conduct 
during the War on Terror.160  The literature also suggests that the mixture of these 
features of the relationship between the European Union and the United States has varied 
to some degree depending on the area and time period as well as between member states 
themselves.161 For example, the US-led invasion of Iraq placed the United Kingdom at 
odds in its support for the United States efforts relative to some of the other European 
Union member states, such as France and Germany.162  As noted by Oliver and Williams, 
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“enthusiasm for Atlanticism varies among European states and among the US political 
elite.”163 
With regard to the European Union’s foreign policy, the relationship with the 
United States (and questions and disagreements about it) has played an important role 
particularly in the context of issues relating to world order or security.164 For example, 
there was a “sharpening” of tensions between the European Union and the United States 
to some degree with regard to world order issues during the George W. Bush 
administration.165 During the Reagan administration, the United States’ focus on the 
discourse of the “politics of strength” was largely in the context of contending with 
another Superpower.166 During the George W. Bush administration, such discourse by the 
United States occurred in the context of a “peculiar sense of vulnerability resulting from 
the biggest ever attack on the mainland of the USA.”167 In that context, the United States 
was often accused of unilateralism in at least some circumstances while multilateralism 
was being promoted by the European Union.168 
According to Michael Smith, such a situation in the United States can “translate 
into problems in the management of American Power” for Europe.169 Michael Smith 
suggests that during the Bush Administration, the European Union and the United States 
policy elites saw “each other as ‘foreign bodies’” more than in previous decades when 
confronting issues related to hard security, while in other areas such as “business, 
corporate affairs and ‘everyday integration’ there continued to be more responsiveness 
                                                 
163 Oliver, T. & Williams, M. (2016). Special Relationships in Flux: Brexit and the Future of the US-EU 
and US-UK Relationships. International Affairs, 92(3), p. 559; see Keukeleire, S. & Delreux, T. (2014). 
The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 177-178. 
164 See Smith, M. (2009). Between ‘Soft Power” and a Hard Place: European Union Foreign and Security 
Policy Between the Islamic World and the United States. International Politics, 46(5), p. 597; Smith, M. 
(2004). Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the United States and World Order. International 
Politics, 41, p. 96. 
165 Smith, M. (2004). Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the United States and World Order. 
International Politics, 41, p. 96. 
166 Ibid., p. 101. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Smith, M. (2009). Transatlantic Economic Relations in a Changing Global Political Economy: 
Achieving Togetherness but Missing the Bus? The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 
11, p. 98. 
169 Smith, M. (2004). Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the United States and World Order. 
International Politics, 41, p. 101. 
 Samuel R. Layton, Page 36
and interpenetration.”170  The demands and challenges placed by the United States and 
the Islamic world have also to some degree made it more difficult for the development of 
consensus within the European Union and its member states,171 and the reaction to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks could be considered a continuation of the debate 
within the European Union and its member states with regard to aligning with or 
separating further from the United States positions.172   
There is some disagreement in the literature as to whether the European Union 
can challenge the United States in the world, particularly outside of the economic 
arena.173 Although the European Union’s influence on its member states, candidate states, 
and some other actors is generally accepted, “majority thinking holds that the EU has too 
many internal problems – including divisions of political opinion, declining population 
growth, and enlargement fatigue – to stand up to the Americans on anything much more 
than economic matters”.174 Similarly, Kissack explained that “the central criticism that 
the EU is faced with is that it promotes [human rights] when it is easy or cost free, but is 
far less willing and/or able to do so when faced with powerful states that have the 
potential to impose high costs on the EU.”175  Likewise, Mattlin suggests that the 
European Union “practically never” makes use of its formal foreign policy tools “towards 
the USA, Russia, China or India.”176  Similarly, Allen and Smith explained that in 2010 
during the Spanish Presdiency there was a context in which the European Union sought 
“to be taken seriously” while the United States had an “apparent inclination to take the 
Union for granted.”177  While Keukeleire and MacNaughtan argue that the European 
Union has structural power, they also have suggested that the European Union has 
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difficulty managing its relationship with the United States and have had mixed results in 
doing so.178  Describing the disparity between the European Union’s relationship with the 
United States relative to other countries in the world, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 
explained their position as follows: 
 
“The EU has proved reluctant to criticize and unable to sanction the US 
even where American policy has run counter to the EU’s fundamental 
values.  If the US were any other country, concern over its record on 
human rights protection, lack of respect for international law, the death 
penalty, extraordinary rendition, Guantanamo Bay and trial by military 
tribunal would in all likelihood trigger EU sanctions and a policy of 
concerted non-cooperation.  However, the EU and EU member states are 
rarely willing to openly criticize the US, and never dare actually to use the 
sticks at their disposal to add weight to their concerns.”179 
 
Thus, the United States is not only a potential economic and diplomatic challenger for the 
European Union,180 but previous literature also suggests that it presents a potential 
challenge for the European Union specifically in the area of human rights. 
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1.5 The European Union’s Human Rights Promotion 
 
   Scholars have often emphasized the importance of human rights in the external 
relations of the European Union.181  Kissack suggests that “for the EU, [human rights] 
promotion has shifted from being a concern of external action to the concern of external 
action.”182  Wiessala likewise stated that “few observers doubt today that the EU has a 
human rights-guided foreign policy identity.”183  Similarly, Manners description of the 
European Union as a normative power in particular has often been influential in the 
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academic literature,184 and the European Union’s human rights promotion may be 
considered “instrinsically linked” to the idea of “normative power Europe.”185 The “core 
norms” of the European Union identified by Manners in his 2002 article included peace, 
liberty, democracy, rule of law, and, particularly relevant for this research, human 
rights.186  Despite the importance the European Union places on human rights, overall the 
academic literature indicates that the European Union’s efforts have had mixed results in 
this area.187 
In 2006, Karen Smith, for example, pointed out that “the European Union has 
repeatedly and prominently declared that it seeks to promote human rights issues within 
the United Nations,” which is “in line with its commitments to the UN and to promoting 
respect for human rights in third countries.”188 Karen Smith specifically examined the 
cohesiveness and effectiveness of the European Union’s human rights promotion in the 
United Nations.189 Smith suggested that “the EU certainly has the potential to lead within 
the UN” but opposition to the EU can also exist by some that “view it as neo-colonial and 
domineering.”190 Smith found that although the European Union “wins” most of the 
resolutions it introduces in the United Nations, “EU decisions to put forward resolutions 
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are based partly on whether they are ‘winnable’.”191 Smith also suggested that the 
European Union’s influence on human rights in the United Nations may vary depending 
on who is speaking on behalf of the European Union, support from the European Union 
member states, and the European Union’s internal coordination.192  In a 2010 article, 
Karen Smith further argued that, despite increased European Union voting cohesion, its 
external effectiveness on the United Nation’s Human Rights Council was limited.193 
With regard to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, Mattlin indicates 
that the European Union has more leverage over “prospective accession countries” and 
“small developing countires” than “established democratic countries” (such as the United 
States) and “major non-democratic countries.”194  He further indicates that the European 
Union’s human rights dialogue with China “is now commonly seen as being at least a 
partial failure.”195  Mattlin argues that the European Union’s challenges with regard to 
China may be at least partially attributable to the human rights issues within the war on 
terror: 
 
“Losing the moral high ground Following Tiananmen, there was 
considerable respect within China, especially among educated people, for 
the Western political system and political values. However, this respect is 
all but gone today. Western efforts to take the moral high ground on 
human rights, liberty and democracy took a serious beating due to the war 
on terror and the infringements on political and civil rights that it has 
entailed. Western critique of Chinese human rights rings hollow in the 
face of secret detentions, a gradual dismantling of habeas corpus and 
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incidents of indirect condoning of torture. The EU has pursued the war on 
terror just as aggressively as the USA, although trying to underline the 
differences by emphasising legality.”196 
 
Despite this, the European Union has been criticized for taking stronger actions 
against weak states for human rights violations than powerful ones such as the United 
States, China, and Russia.197  Mattlin argues that “Brussels faces an almost impossible 
task in trying to uphold a consistent normative policy towards major countries like China 
and Russia without appearing inconsistent or hypocritical.”198  Like Mattlin, other 
scholars have also suggested that the European Union’s human rights promotion has had 
the most influence over states seeking accession to the European Union or seeking 
greater access to the European market or aid.199  Indeed, guaranteeing human rights, 
including abolition of the death penalty, is a requirement for membership in the European 
Union.200  As explained by Kissack: 
 
“The success of enlargement policy in transforming the economic, 
political and social structures of former communist states has been 
attributed to the prize that awaited – the ‘golden carrot’ of membership. 
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To states for which membership is not an option, aid and trade priviliges 
are the EU’s most influential tools…”201 
 
Particularly with regard to the European Union’s efforts eliminate the death 
penalty as part of its human rights promotion, the European Union’s (potential) influence 
on the United States death penalty remains unsettled.  Some scholars have indicated that 
the European Union may have limited success in its advocacy against the United States 
death penalty specifically.  For instance, although Manners has used the issue of the death 
penalty to illustrate the European Union’s normative power, early on he expressed some 
doubts specifically with regard to the European Union’s ability to change the mind of the 
United States government on this issue.202  Manners later pointed out, however, that the 
United States Supreme Court looked to the EU (among other actors) in determining 
world opinion on capital punishment for juveniles.203  Similarly, focusing primarily on 
the federal administration, Ginsberg concluded that the European Union had “no effect” 
on capital punishment in the United States in the 1990s, when the European Union’s 
efforts in this regard were largely just getting started.204 
Somewhat more optimistically, Dieter argues that “slowly, but impressively, 
international law and opinion are beginning to have an impact on law in the United 
States, and particularly on the death penalty” but “international concerns about the death 
penalty would probably never be enough alone to make the U.S. abandon the practice”.205  
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He notes that the United States Supreme Court cited a European Union amicus curiae 
brief when it banned execution of mentally retarded persons.206 
Similarly, Schmidt argued that the European Union’s207 world-wide campaign 
against the death penalty has been “fairly successful” with more than 20 European and 
non-European countries abolishing the death penalty in the nearly ten years after the 
promulgation of the European Union guidelines on the death penalty.208  Schmidt also 
notes that while the European Union’s advocacy towards the United States at the federal 
government level and in international bodies has returned responses noting the 
complexity of the United States federal system and that the death penalty is largely a state 
issue, the European Union can probably take some credit for some United States Supreme 
Court decisions limiting the death penalty.209  Nonetheless, Schmidt concludes that it 
remains “unclear where the EU campaign may eventually lead.”210 
With greater optimism, Demleitner suggested that in the long run Europe’s 
abolitionist advocacy “may prove decisive for the future development of the death 
penalty in the United States”.211  Similarly, Trail suggests that if the European Union acts 
uniformly in its advocacy against the death penalty then the United States will be forced 
to make changes to its death penalty policy.212 
Unlike the death penalty, where the European Union has presented a relatively 
united front in its advocacy against the death penalty over the last decade, the European 
Union and its member states struggled themselves with how to balance security and 
human rights in a time of concerns regarding terrorism.  At the same time, problematic 
human rights practices, such as the extraordinary rendition program, are surrounded by 
secrecy in the name of security interests. In this context, much of the discussion among 
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academics has focused on how the European Union and its member states have reacted to 
the War on Terror, including in terms of the help provided in Europe to the United States, 
as well as how the European Union should react to the United States War on Terror and 
the threat of terrorism.213 
For example, while Manners utilizes the death penalty in arguing that the 
European Union is a normative power, in a later article Manners focuses on how the 
European Union should act normatively in response to the “security challenge” posed by 
terrorism.214  Manners explained this security challenge: 
 
“The security challenge to the EU presented by acts of terrorism against 
civilians in places such as New York, Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, London, 
Sharm el-Sheikh, Amman and Mumbai is doubly challenging because 
these terrorist acts raise fundamental questions as to the merits of the EU’s 
normative approach to world politics.  In the face of such 
undifferentiating, non-negotiable ‘new terrorism’ and the need for 
effective counter-terrorist strategy, what place is there for the niceties of 
normative principles such as democracy, human rights or good 
governance? Surely the EU must be pragmatic about putting aside its 
normative ideals in the pursuit of terrorists and the prevention of terrorism, 
if only to ensure the security of its citizens? And, finally, whilst the 
principles Hume advocates are clearly successful in resolving conflict 
within Europe, the new terrorism of al-Qaeda inspiration is obviously a 
radically different manifestation of violence.”215 
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Nonetheless, Manners suggests that the European Parliament’s report on the 
United States extraordinary rendition program played a role in White House admissions 
regarding extraordinary rendition.216  Similarly, Winkler is somewhat optimistic about the 
European Parliament’s and other European actors’ condemnations of human rights 
practices in the War on Terror, suggesting that it would be difficult for governments to 
ignore such pressure or defend those practices.217   
Examining the European Union’s impact on these human rights issues also has 
implications in the study of EU-US relations (discussed earlier).  It provides empirical 
support indicating whether common or diverging interests and values exist as well as how 
(intentionally or unintentionally) receptive the United States is to European Union stimuli 
in this specific context.  As explained by Schmidt: 
 
“Just as the United States constructed a unique identity by adopting and 
internalising a unique set of political principles, based on individual 
liberty and laissez-faire economics, so too is the EU, led as always by its 
political elites, now in the process of constructing its own identity.  
Although there are considerable points of overlap, the death penalty issue 
shows these are competing visions, which could cause increasing frictions 
in transatlantic relations over time.”218 
 
Understanding the European Union’s impact on the United States on the complicated and 
contentious human rights issues in the War on Terror and the death penalty helps provide 
clarity as to whether the relationship between the two is one sided, with the United States 
the dominant partner, or whether the European Union can successfully assert itself where 
there is disagreement.  Michael Smith, for example, has called the United States “a key 
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test” of the European Union’s foreign policy.”219 As such, if the European Union has 
frequent, high levels (i.e. considerable or significant) of impact in these areas of 
diverging interests and values, then that suggests that the European Union is not merely 
the weaker partner or a follower, but has the demonstrated ability to influence the United 
States. 
 
 
1.6 Diffusion Mechanisms 
  
An important aspect in the debate over the European Union’s impact on the United 
States, as well as the world generally, is understanding the means by which the European 
Union achieves that impact, i.e. through which diffusion mechanisms has the European 
Union achieved its impact.220  A variety of taxonomies have been developed to describe 
diffusion mechanisms.  For instance, Towns describes the main diffusion mechanisms as 
coercion, persuasion, learning, and mimicry.221  Goodman and Jinks offer coercion, 
persuasion, and acculturation as the mechanisms that influence state practice with regard 
to human rights.222  Borzel and Risse list coercion, manipulation of utility calculations, 
socialization, persuasion, and emulation.223  Simmons, et. al. describe coercion, 
competition, learning, and emulation.224 
Depending on the actors and issues involved, however, some diffusion 
mechanisms are more useful or relevant than others.  A state with a small military that 
has not developed advanced military weapons is unlikely to threaten the United States, 
China, or Russia with coercion through its military and unlikely to achieve much success 
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in doing so.  Similarly, diffusion through competition is more often applicable to 
economic policies than to human rights in the United States.225 
Although the literature has produced a variety of taxonomies to describe diffusion 
mechanisms, the different taxonomies generally revolve around the concepts of coercion, 
persuasion, and setting an example, when broadly understood.226  For example, Manners 
and Forsberg’s focus on the European Union’s normative power leads them to discuss in 
more detail non-coercive mechanisms of influence while essentially dividing the concepts 
of persuasion and setting an example into sub-types for the spread of norms.227 
For instance, Forsberg’s “invoking norms” involves the activation of 
commitments made through promises, agreements, or other authority.228  Forsberg 
distinguishes “invoking norms,” which he describes as “activation of commitments” or 
“promises,” from a narrow definition of persuasion in that it does not require that one be 
“persuaded about the goodness of the orders” from an authority.229  This is, however, a 
fine distinction that makes divisions between the content of the persuasion (whether the 
argument was based upon and accepted for its goodness rather than if the argument was 
based upon and accepted for its (moral, legal, practical, social, etc.) appropriateness) 
rather than focusing only on persuasion more broadly as a mechanism of influence that 
explains how the diffusion process occurred. 
Persuasion, broadly understood, can certainly include the “invoking norms” 
argument (even if made implicitly) form of: you promised x, when you make a promise 
you have an obligation to keep it, therefore you should do x.  Of course, this may also 
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Journal of Common Market Studies. 49(6), p. 1197. 
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overlap to some extent with legal coercion if legal remedies are sought from violation of 
a treaty or other legal obligation. 
While Ginsberg correctly identifies the central concepts for diffusion mechanisms 
as carrots and sticks (coercion), persuasion, and leading by example, his analysis of the 
European Union’s external impact does not explicitly include these concepts, despite 
acknowledging the importance of diffusion mechanisms for having an external impact.230 
 Krista Patterson, on the other hand, argues that coercion and persuasion alone do 
not explain similarities between trends in the last centuries in the United States and 
Europe (as a whole, not strictly the European Union) on capital punishment, and suggests 
that acculturation could explain how the similarities occurred.231  Patterson explicitly 
operates, however, on the assumption that Europe has influenced the United States on the 
matter because of broadly similar trends.232  Such an approach, in Ginsberg’s words, 
largely ignores “the individual trees in the forest”.233  When assessing how (i.e. which 
diffusion mechanisms) Europe has had an impact on the United States it is crucial to 
determine whether there was any impact in the first place. 
Utilizing Ginsberg’s analytical framework, discussed further in Chapter 2, to 
examine inputs, outputs, and outcomes, in combination with diffusion mechanisms, can 
be of great assistance in this regard and is used as a basis for more thoroughly examining 
the European Union’s external impact on the United States with regard to the prominent 
human rights issues in the War on Terror and the death penalty.  “Only after a careful 
reading of the individual trees in the forest will we know if the forest itself is gaining 
ground.”234  
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2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Research Questions 
 
External impact is an important component of foreign policy decision making.235  
When a foreign policy has external impact it demonstrates that the action has influence 
and provides legitimacy for further foreign policy action.236  As Ginsberg explains, 
“Without external political impact, there is no reinforcing link back to new sources of 
action, there is no expectation of effective action, foreign policy decision making would 
not be sustainable, and the Europeans would continue to react to world political events 
shaped by others”.237  When the European Union has an impact it affirms the European 
Union’s identity as an international actor, which in turn encourages further foreign policy 
activity.238  In light of the importance of external impact for foreign policy, this doctoral 
research will examine the following questions: 
Core question: 
To what extent, if any, does the European Union have impact on the United States on 
human rights issues? 
Subquestions: 
Which outputs and diffusion mechanisms has the European Union used towards human 
rights violations in the War on Terror and the continued use of death penalty executions 
in the United States? 
Which outputs and diffusion mechanisms have had the most impact on the United States? 
External impact, unlike success or failure that is often subject to judgment from 
various perspectives, is based upon the European Union’s foreign policy effects on 
outsiders.239  Success or failure, on the other hand, depends on the internal and/or 
external objectives and expectations that may come from different perspectives, which 
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can potentially vary widely particularly in the European Union context where multiple 
levels and actors may be involved.  In accordance with Ginsberg’s analytical framework, 
this research takes an external approach to the evaluation of the European Union’s impact 
on the United States. 
  
 
2.2 Case Selection 
 
 The reality of any research entails that choices are made. The examination of the 
European Union’s influence on human rights in the United States, specifically with 
regard to the War on Terror and the death penalty, is both of societal importance and has 
the possible potential for generalizability. Arguably, societal importance is one of the 
most crucial reasons for performing research and should not be ignored. “A principle as 
elementary as it is easily forgotten in the profession… is that we should study problems 
and questions linked, at least indirectly, to the well-being of the societies in which we 
live.”240  As a preliminary matter in this regard, examining external impact relates to at 
least some degree to the more foundational issue of how important the European Union is 
for other societies (or at least other governments that affect other societies). 
Further, the choice of examining the European Union’s external impact on the 
United States is justified at least in part by both of their sizes and multi-national reach.241  
Comparisons between the European Union and the United States have specifically 
pointed to the historical importance of the United States for the European project as well 
as the United States as a “competitor to match in the international arena.”242  The 
European Union’s external impact on the United States in the area of human rights in 
particular could also have implications for human rights issues elsewhere in the world.  
For example, Mattlin suggests that the European Union’s challenges with regard to China 
may be at least partially attributable to the human rights issues within the War on 
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Terror.243  Similarly, Manners suggested that “the war on terror retrospectively 
legitimated Russian actions in Chechnya” and the “Chinese repression of Uighurs in 
Xinjiang has been framed in terms of the total war on terror since September 2001.”244 
 With regard to generalizability, the European Union’s external impact on the 
United States on the human rights issues of the War on Terror and death penalty could be 
considered particularly challenging cases in at least some ways.  Mattlin suggests that the 
European Union’s normative role in the world varies depending on the target country and 
identifies four categories of states: “1. prospective accession countries, 2. small 
developing countries, 3. established democratic countries, [and] 4. major non-democratic 
countries.”245  Mattlin generally suggests that the European Union’s influence over the 
first two groups may be based in part on the “other countries’ fear of exclusion from EU 
markets or the promise of future membership,” which “works reasonably well in the 
asymmetric relationships that the EU has with countries in the first group… and to some 
extent also with countries in the second group” but “does not work with the third and 
fourth groups of countries.”246 Likewise, Kissack stated that “the significance of [human 
rights] promotion clauses incorporated into ACP, Enlargement and Neighbourhood 
policies is that these are the countries the EU has traditionally had the greatest degree of 
influence over.”247  Examining the European Union’s influence on the Ukraine, Langbein 
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and Wolczuk similarly stated that “membership aspirations of non-accession countries 
generate openness to EU influence,” particularly for rule selection.248 
Mattlin suggests that the European Union’s “biggest test” of its normative 
commitment is in the fourth group that does “not share the European Union’s political 
values.”249  Nonetheless, as noted earlier, Mattlin argues that the European Union’s 
challenges with regard to China may be at least partially attributable to the human rights 
issues within the war on terror,250 which would arguably relate back to the (world-wide) 
societal importance of the cases examined in this research.  Furthermore, Mattlin also 
indicates that the countries in the third group (such as the United States) “share many of 
the EU’s political values” but “this perceived commonality in values may, in fact, often 
be more assumed than actual, as positions on many substantive issues, such as the death 
penalty, often diverge considerably.”251  The European Union’s human rights promotion 
in particular has at times been challenged “as a form of Western imperialism,”252 and, 
despite the United States sharing some political values with the European Union, the 
United States history as a British colony can also potentially raise challenges for the 
European Union today.253  In addition, Keukeleire and Delreux have pointed out that the 
differences in voting patterns between the European Union and United States on treaties 
dealing with “the abolition of the death penalty, the ICC, the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, the prohibition of anti-Personnel mines, biological 
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diversity, economic, social and cultural rights, civil and political rights, elimination of 
discrimination against women, the rights of the child and the status of refugees… are 
greater than the difference between the EU and either China or Russia (although this in 
and of itself is no guarantee of either China or Russia adopting EU-style behavior).”254  
Michael Smith has also called the United States “integral to European Foreign Policy” 
and stated that the United States “constitutes a key test of that foreign policy and it will 
continue to do so.”255 
Although international human rights promotion is one of the priorities of the 
European Union, it is also an area in which the European Union has been critically 
challenged256 and can potentially face particular difficulty with regard to the United 
States. Manners own use of the issue of the death penalty to illustrate the European 
Union’s normative power while expressing some strongly phrased doubts specifically 
with regard to the European Union’s ability to change the mind of the United States 
government on this issue suggests that the United States represents a particularly 
challenging case in this area.257  Along these lines, Manners stated, “What is self-evident 
about [the European Union’s] engagement [on the death penalty issue] is the extent to 
which the EU is clearly not going to change the minds of the [Chinese or United States] 
governments…”258 With regard to the United States’ War on Terror, “the unilateralism 
and assertiveness of US foreign policy under the George W. Bush Administrations 
provide possibly the most testing challenge for the Europeans since the end of World War 
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II,”259 and these new challenges included the United States connections between security 
and human rights, among others.260 
The European Union’s efforts with regard to the death penalty and the War on 
Terror in the United States have been extensive, and a wide spectrum of specific cases are 
examined in this research that include all relevant death penalty cases until 2009 gathered 
from the Death Penalty Archive of the European Union Delegation to the United 
States261, the abolition of the death penalty in the European Union, each case of funding 
by the European Union of NGO’s focusing on the death penalty in the United States 
through EIDHR,262 and United States federal and state court cases in which the European 
Union has been involved.263  The Death Penalty Archive of the European Union 
Delegation to the United States contains the European Union’s formal diplomatic actions 
on the death penalty towards the United States, organized by year, and it has been 
particularly useful in providing (and thus allowing for review and analysis of) copies of 
government documents in this regard.264  For the War on Terror, this dissertation focuses 
on European Union actions related to extraordinary rendition, torture and ill-treatment, 
arbitrary detention, and drone strikes, which are cases that have also been the focus of 
involvement or advocacy within the European Union in the time frame examined, but not 
the right to privacy since much (but not all) of the European Union’s actions in this area 
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fall outside of the time period examined and thus could potentially provide a particularly 
incomplete picture of the external impact on that right.265 
 
 
2.3 Analytical Framework: A Modified Ginsberg Approach 
 
To examine the European Union’s external impact on the United States in the 
sphere of human rights issues, this doctoral research utilizes a modified analytical 
framework originally elaborated by Roy H.  Ginsberg in his book entitled The European -
Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire.  This research, as explained in Sections 
2.2.2, 2.2.3, and 2.2.4, makes important modifications to that framework in terms of time 
frame, in receiving United States governmental levels (federal and state) and branches 
(executive, legislative, and judicial) examined, by explicitly including diffusion 
mechanisms, and by explicitly adding the impact on laws to the impact on policies, 
behavior, or interests. 
Ginsberg connects the European Union’s foreign policy system inputs and outputs 
to the effects that these outputs have on nonmembers and elaborates on an analytical 
framework for evaluating this impact on the nonmembers.266  Inputs are defined as the 
sources that initially stimulate European Union foreign policy activity.267  In other words, 
inputs are sources that set the decision making process in motion.  Such sources of 
European Union foreign policy activity can include external stimuli, the logic of 
collective action, and national, subnational, and nongovernmental actors, among 
others.268 
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“[European foreign policy] activity refers to the outputs generic to the foreign 
policy system.”269  Outputs produced by the foreign policy system range from economic 
and political actions to common declarations and positions.270  Actions implement 
policies and require something to be done by the European Union while “declarations and 
positions are not specifically action oriented.”271  The European Union interacts with the 
outside world through outputs.272  An output with an external impact is an outcome.273  
Outputs and outcomes may generate feedback that affect the European and international 
contexts and may generate new inputs for the European Union foreign policy system. 
Thus, not only is knowledge of the European Union’s external impact essential to 
an understanding of the European Union’s role in international affairs, but it also plays an 
important part in the European Union’s foreign policy decision making structure.274  An 
evaluation of the level of external impact of the European Union is thus necessary. 
 External impact refers to the various effects of European Union foreign policy 
activity on nonmembers, in this case the United States, such that 1. “nonmembers modify 
or change the direction or substance” of a policy, law, or behavior “that would not likely 
have occurred in the absence of the EU stimulus or EU stimulus accompanied by stimuli 
from other” actors,275 and/or 2. “nonmembers interests are beneficially or adversely 
affected by a [European foreign policy] action” or inaction.276  External impact will 
generally involve some sort of interaction between the sending state (for this research, the 
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European Union) and the target state (for this research, the United States).277 Temporally, 
the European Union’s output will precede the outcome in the United States.278 In some 
cases, the link between the output of the sending state and the outcome in the receiving 
state may be relatively straight forward, potentially more so if the output and outcome are 
close in time. 
However, in many cases there may be, for example, multiple actors involved 
across a (relatively) extended time period, which can potentially leave more room for 
judgment in assessing the external impact of the European Union. This research takes 
account of such issues of causation in two main ways: First, Ginsberg’s method of 
assessing levels of impact, discussed in more detail below, distinguishes between 
circumstances when the European Union is acting alone versus in conjunction with other 
actors, and assigns a higher level of impact if the European Union is directly and 
primarily responsible for a change or modification in the behavior, laws, or policies of the 
United States.279  Second, in cases in which causation is relatively less clear, 
counterfactuals can be a useful tool for identifying the link (or lack thereof) between 
European Union outputs and outcomes in the United States. 280 Counterfactual reasoning 
can be particularly suitable in examining some cases with regard to the first part of 
Ginsberg’s definition of external impact.281  The use of Ginsberg’s levels of external 
impact and counterfactuals, however, while providing useful methods for assessing 
external impact, does not convert this research into an exact science.282 Nonetheless, 
these methods will help provide insight and further understanding of the plausible 
external impact of the European Union on the United States. 
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Although the primary focus of this research concerns the European Union’s 
impact and not directly power,283 it is important to note that external impact will be used 
in a broad sense in order to take into account the various kinds of power (soft, hard, 
civilian, military, relational, structural, normative, etc.), as well as the related means of 
influence, that the European Union potentially has in relation to the United States.  
Manners, for example, describes the European Union as a “normative power” based in 
part on “its ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations.”284  In this 
context, the European Union would have an external impact when the European Union 
shapes conceptions of “normal” such that United States’ policy, law, behavior, or 
interests are affected, whether the United States is internalizing those norms or reacting to 
those norms. 
The conception of external impact also takes into consideration the continuum 
between relational power and structural power.  Relational power is “the power of one 
actor to get another actor to do something it would not otherwise do.”285  Structural 
power is “the authority and capacity to set or shape the organizing principles and rules of 
the game and to determine how others will play that game.”286  With regard to relational 
power, the European Union would have an external impact on the United States when the 
European Union gets the United States to do “something it otherwise would not do,” i.e. 
causes the United States to modify or change its behavior, laws, or policies.  With regard 
to structural power, the European Union would have an external impact on the United 
States when the European Union “set[s] or shape[s] the organizing principles and rules of 
the game” affecting United States’ interests, behavior, laws, or policies. 
Likewise, external impact includes the effects of the European Union’s use of 
hard power as well as soft power.  Thus, the European Union would also have an external 
impact if a change in the United States’ interests, behavior, laws, or policies was a result 
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of a change of United States preferences based on the attractiveness or legitimacy of the 
European Union’s culture, values, political ideals, or policies.287 
The European Union is unique in character, exhibiting characteristics of both an 
international organization and a state with “a hybrid of supranational and international 
forms of governance”288 and a multilevel and multiple actor foreign policy.289  At the 
same time, as Ginsberg explains: 
 
“National and EU foreign policies are products of different levels of 
governmental decision making and respond in different ways to different 
internal and external demands.  When an EU member state or group of EU 
member states takes a foreign policy action outside of the EU context 
(outside the contexts of the treaties, outside areas where the EC and 
member governments share competence, and outside acquis 
communautaire, acquis politique, and CFSP), such action is not a 
[European foreign policy] action.”290 
 
Although member states sometimes take action in support of or within the framework of 
the European Union, the individual actions of member states are not always conducted 
within or in support of the European Union, and as such cannot always be attributed to 
the European Union. 
Such a distinction is especially important when considering the European Union’s 
external impact on the United States.  From the United States’ perspective, it can often be 
preferable to work through bilateral relations with individual member states than with the 
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European Union as a whole.291  Furthermore, the United States and the United 
Kingdom’s shared history are sometimes relevant to United States common law, placing 
the United Kingdom in a special position when it comes to the interpretation of some 
legal rights, including some human rights protections.  From the United States 
perspective, it is thus important for at least some judges to distinguish the common 
history with the United Kingdom from the United Kingdom’s actions as a member state 
of the European Union (which is further complicated by the recent events concerning 
Brexit).  For example, Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court explained: 
 
“It is beyond comprehension why we should look .  .  .  to a country that 
has developed, in the centuries since the Revolutionary War—and with 
increasing speed since the United Kingdom’s recent submission to the 
jurisprudence of European courts dominated by continental jurists—a 
legal, political, and social culture quite different from our own.”292 
 
The separate impact of the national policies of each of the individual member states is 
thus beyond the scope of this research. 
 
 
2.3.1 Measuring External Impact 
 
This research will utilize Ginsberg’s four categories for measuring levels of 
impact: nil, marginal, considerable, and significant impact.  Nil external impact occurs 
when, alone or in conjunction with other actors, the European Union’s action or inaction 
has no impact on the nonmember.293  In other words, there is nil impact when the 
European Union has had no influence on nonmembers or their interests.294 
                                                 
291 Keukeleire, S., & MacNaughtan, J. (2008). The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. p. 311-312. 
292 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 626-627 (2005). 
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Marginal impact occurs when, alone or in conjunction with other actors, the 
European Union influences the behavior, interests, laws, or policies of the United States 
generally or indirectly, but there is not a tangible change in the United States’ behaviors, 
laws, or policies.295  An example would be if the European Union condemned the United 
States for human rights violations, causing the United States to become isolated but no 
tangible change in United States human rights.  Another example is if the European 
Union alters conceptions of “normal” in the world without the United States internalizing 
those norms, causing the United States to become isolated without a tangible change. 
Considerable impact occurs when, alone or in conjunction with other actors, the 
European Union has a tangible influence on the behavior, interests, laws, or policies of 
the United States.296  In this category, the European Union, alone or in conjunction with 
others, may have a major impact on United States’ interests and may cause a tangible 
change or modification in the laws, behavior, or policies of the United States.297  An 
example would be if the European Union, working with a large group of other actors, 
helps persuade a United States court to expand legal protections to suspected terrorists or 
capital defendants. 
Finally, significant impact occurs when the European Union, alone or in 
conjunction with only one to three other actors,298 is directly and primarily responsible 
for a change or modification in the behavior, laws, or policies of the United States.299  
Further, to fall under the significant impact category, the European Union action must 
have a major beneficial or adverse effect on the vital interests of the United States.300  
This is thus the highest level of impact, requiring primary responsibility for the change 
with fewer other actors involved than the considerable impact category.  The European 
Union action must directly influence the United States, i.e. not through an intermediary 
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reacting to the European Union that in turn influences the United States.  The four levels 
for measuring impact are summarized in the following table: 
 
Levels of External Impact301  
 Nil Marginal Considerable Significant 
Degree of Influence none general, 
indirect 
tangible primary, direct 
Quality of Influence none beneficial or 
adverse 
effects 
major 
beneficial or 
adverse effects 
major 
beneficial or 
adverse effect 
on vital 
interests 
Change/Modification 
in 
behavior/policy/law 
of US 
none none yes yes 
 
The European Union has multiple instruments at its disposal for reaching the 
various levels of external impact.302  The European Union’s foreign policy instruments 
are used to affect outsiders and include, for example, offering or refusing diplomatic 
recognition, imposing economic or diplomatic sanctions, hosting international 
conferences, and issuing demarches.303  Such instruments may be used unilaterally or 
multilaterally.304  Instruments are linked together with outputs, with individual outputs of 
the European Union employing instruments in response to particular issues and inputs.305 
                                                 
301 Adapted from Ginsberg, H. (2001). The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. p. 53; see also Ginsberg, R. & Penksa, S. (2012). The 
European Union in Global Security: The Politics of Impact. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 53-54. 
302 Ibid. p. 49-50. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. p. 50. 
305 See discussion of inputs and outputs in Section 2.2. 
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2.3.2 Extending the Scope of Ginsberg’s Approach from the Impact on the United 
States Federal Administration to the Legislative and Judicial Branches at the State 
and Federal Level 
 
Ginsberg’ study on the European Union’s external impact on the United States 
primarily focuses on the effects of the European Union at the United States federal level 
administration (i.e., the federal executive branch).306  As explained by Ginsberg: 
 
“U.S. relations with the EU are conducted by members of the U.S.  
Administration and managed by the federal foreign policy bureaucracy, 
both of whom are clearly subject to EU political impact because they are 
the principal agents of U.S. foreign policy with regard to the EU.  
However, when the question of EU political impact is directed at the 
pluralist U.S. political system of individual actors and constituencies, 
cognizance of the EU and its political impact varies widely.”307 
 
Thus, although Ginsberg’s study focuses on the United States federal administration, 
Ginsberg acknowledges that the European Union may have impact on other levels and 
actors in the United States. 
With regard to the human rights issues involved with the United States death 
penalty and War on Terror, the European Union has focused its advocacy or had a 
potential impact not only on the United States federal level administration, but also on the 
legislature and courts at the federal and state level.  This makes sense given that the 
United States death penalty and War on Terror can involve human rights issues dealt with 
at different branches or levels of government.  Human rights involve both the policies, 
interests, and behaviours of the executive branch as well as the laws affecting or 
governing human rights enacted by legislatures and interpreted by courts.  In the United 
States federal system, each state has its own policies and laws governing the death 
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penalty in particular in addition to those that exist at the federal level.  As such, this 
research examines the European Union’s impact in the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches at both the federal and state levels, thus broadening the scope of Ginsberg’s 
original research. 
Although this research focuses on the European Union’s impact on the branches 
and levels of United States government (as opposed to the wide variety of private actors), 
the European Union has also provided considerable funding to multiple non-
governmental organizations working in the United States on human rights issues.  As the 
European Union can indirectly impact the various branches and levels of government 
through such funding, such advocacy by the European Union is examined in Chapter 7. 
In addition, this research expands Ginsberg’s examination of the European 
Union’s impact on non-members policies, interests, or behaviours to explicitly include 
the European Union’s impact on laws in the United States.  In the context of the 
European Union’s impact on the United States for the human rights issues involved in the 
death penalty and War on Terror, it is particularly crucial to include the European 
Union’s impact on United States laws (and their interpretation and application).  In the 
United States political system of separation of powers and checks and balances, the 
legislature and courts can limit abuses of power by the executive through legislation and 
judicial interpretation of laws (especially the United States Constitution) respectively, at 
least where the rule of law is followed. 
Further, in the United States, death penalty and War on Terror human rights 
issues are deeply intertwined with legal issues and the criminal justice system for alleged 
domestic and international crimes.  It is through laws and their interpretation that the 
death penalty is or is not limited to certain crimes or persons or de jure abolished.  
Likewise, it is through laws and their interpretation that terrorist suspects receive or fail 
to receive human rights protections, and it is through the United States Constitution, as 
the law of the land, and its interpretation by courts that the United States administration 
must provide those protections in accordance with the rule of law. 
Appropriately, the European Union recognizes the deep connection of law and 
human rights in its specific advocacy concerning the United States death penalty and War 
on Terror human rights issues and has sought both de facto and de jure limits on or 
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abolition of the death penalty as well as legal protections for terrorist suspects and respect 
for those legal protections through the rule of law.  Considering the United States 
political system, the issues examined, and the European Union’s actual advocacy on these 
issues, this research extends Ginsberg’s framework to explicitly include the European 
Union’s impact on United States laws in addition to its impact on United States policies, 
interests, and behaviour.  This research thus has an interdisciplinary element combining 
law and politics to the extent that it also utilizes Ginsberg’s political framework for 
examining the European Union’s impact on United States laws, including case law. 
 
 
2.3.3 Adding Diffusion Mechanisms to Ginsberg’s Approach 
 
As already discussed, diffusion mechanisms have been the subject of a large body 
of literature.308  As enumerated by Ginsberg, the European Union’s diffusion mechanisms 
include coercion (carrots and sticks), persuasion, and leading by example.309  These 
diffusion mechanisms may be combined or used alone. 
While Ginsberg recognizes that diffusion mechanisms are essential to having 
external impact, and as such are implicitly involved in the cases he examines, Ginsberg 
does not elaborate much on these mechanisms or (at least explicitly) systematically 
include diffusion mechanisms in his study of the European Union’s external impact in the 
1990s.310  An explicit inclusion of these mechanisms, however, provides an important 
link that explains how the European Union’s outputs are connected to particular 
outcomes, and therefore should be included in the analysis of the European Union’s 
external impact. 
 
Coercion: Coercion involves the threat or use of material or legal force in an attempt to 
influence another state.  It corresponds to Ginsberg’s description of the European Union’s 
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use of carrots and sticks as a means of influence.  Coercion may involve the threat or use 
of military force, manipulation of economic benefits or costs, or manipulation of 
opportunities and constraints of the target state.311  Some forms of coercion are more 
likely than others based on the context.  Power asymmetry may be a factor in the decision 
to utilize coercion,312 with militarily weak actors less likely to threaten military action 
against states with large, advanced militaries except, perhaps, on the most crucial issues.  
The decision to pursue economic sanctions may involve consideration of the impact on 
one’s own state due to interdependence.   
 
Persuasion: Persuasion concerns convincing another actor of the truth, validity, or 
appropriateness of norms, beliefs, policies, laws, or behaviors, without resort to coercion, 
through rhetoric, argumentation, or the spread of information.313  It includes “both 
manipulative moves and propaganda, public diplomacy and (dis)information campaigns, 
as well as the force of the better argument.”314  While persuasion is often conducted 
directly between two (or more) parties, such as during bilateral discussions or through 
demarches, it may also be performed indirectly, such as through financial support for 
NGOs that themselves lobby governments and disseminate information.  Persuasion, 
broadly understood, thus encompasses Manners informational diffusion315 and Forsberg’s 
notions of persuasion, “invoking norms,” and to a large extent “shaping the discourse of 
what is normal.”316 
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Setting an Example: The European Union may also have an impact through the model it 
provides to others.317  The model provided by the European Union may be intentionally 
or unintentionally copied or, if the model has (or is perceived to have) failed in some 
manner, may provide an example of what not to do.  Broadly understood, setting an 
example thus includes the notions of learning,318 mimicry,319 acculturation,320 and 
contagion,321 among others.  The example may be followed due to various socialization 
pressures as well as learning from the good or bad practices of others. 
 
 
2.3.4 Time Frame: A New Decade 
 
This research will focus on the external impact of the European Union’s foreign 
policy on the United States resulting from European Union outputs in the late 1990s 
through 2009.  There have been important developments in the area of human rights 
covering this time frame.  In particular, the European Union developed its guidelines on 
the death penalty in 1998 and has continued its advocacy for the death penalty’s abolition 
throughout the 2000s.  Further, the September 11, 2001 attacks were the catalyst for the 
War on Terror and the corresponding human rights issues that have arisen.  This research 
does not focus on outputs beyond 2009 because outcomes do not always instantaneously 
follow outputs, so focusing on the most recent outputs could increasingly and 
misleadingly skew the results in favor of less impact.322 In order to provide a complete 
and accurate picture of the European Union’s impact, however, this research does 
incorporate outcomes occurring beyond 2009 because the chain of inputs, outputs, 
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outcomes, and corresponding impact between the European Union and the United States 
may generally begin before 2009 but continue afterwards.  The effects of foreign policy 
activity are not always instantaneous. 
 
 
2.3.5 Data Collection 
 
Various kinds of data have been utilized for evaluating the European Union’s 
impact on the United States.  This research involves a variety of inputs, outputs, and 
outcomes relating to the European Union’s foreign policy system and its relations and 
effects on different levels and branches of government in the United States. As such, a 
variety of sources have been used.  In the course of this research, information has been 
gathered and examined from numerous European Union and United States government 
documents such as treaties, demarches, letters, public statements and speeches, 
resolutions, reports, laws, court-related documents, executive and legislative documents 
and videos, responses to oral and written interviews,323 journal articles and books, and 
various news sources, among others. 
With regard to the death penalty in the United States and the European Union’s 
actions on the issue, information has largely been accessible and publicly available.  
Although the United States has been criticized for its use of the death penalty, the United 
States generally does not operate secretly in its death penalty policies or practices.  
However, the United States has to a large extent maintained secrecy concerning some of 
its policies and practices with regard to the War on Terror.  The United States has not 
been alone in this regard, as human rights activists have also struggled to obtain full 
information from some European governments.  Such secrecy presents challenges for 
human rights advocates and researchers, as it is difficult to address potential human rights 
abuses if there is little or no information about those abuses. 
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Overtime, however, greater information regarding United States practices, such as 
extraordinary rendition, arbitrary detention, torture and ill treatment, and drone strikes, 
has been exposed by various governmental and non-governmental groups, including 
through the efforts of the European Union and media organizations, among others.  As 
explained later, the European Union’s actions in reducing the secrecy of the United States 
is highly important and relevant to this research. 
 
 
2.4 Structure 
 
 The following chapters utilize this modified analytical framework to examine the 
European Union’s impact on the human rights issues in the War on Terror and the death 
penalty in the United States.  Chapter 3 examines the European Union’s impact on the 
death penalty in the United States, specifically focusing on the executive and legislative 
branches at the state and federal level.  Chapter 4 focuses on certain human rights issues 
in the War on Terror (extraordinary rendition, arbitrary detention, torture and ill 
treatment, and drone strikes) and also focuses on the impact on the executive and 
legislative branches in the United States.  As Ginsberg’s analytical framework has been 
expanded to include the European Union’s impact on United States laws and the judicial 
branch, Chapters 5 and 6 examine the European Union’s impact on the United States for 
the death penalty and War on Terror, respectively, and focus on the impact towards the 
federal and state courts in the United States.  With regard to the death penalty, the 
European Union has also funded multiple non-governmental organizations that have 
pursued abolition of the death penalty in the United States, so Chapter 7 focuses on the 
European Union’s impact through such funding.  Finally, Chapter 8 combines the results 
from the previous chapters and provides overall findings and conclusions based upon the 
research. 
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3. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S IMPACT ON THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES 
 
 This chapter examines the European Union’s impact on federal and state 
executive and legislative branches of government in the United States.  The European 
Union’s advocacy against the death penalty relating to the executive branches of 
government has been particularly extensive.  In fact, the European Union’s repeated and 
continuous advocacy against the death penalty has caused some United States diplomats 
to grow concerned with the extent to which they have been consumed with responding to 
objections to the death penalty rather than focusing on other issues of interest to the 
United States. 
This chapter specifically examines 79 individual death penalty cases in which the 
European Union has argued for commutations, as well as the impact of the European 
Union on consular access rights, extradition, access to drugs used in lethal injections, the 
death penalty as a whole at the United States federal and state level, and a world-wide 
moratorium on the death penalty.  All three diffusion mechanisms, coercion, persuasion, 
and setting an example, have been at play for these issues, and the European Union has 
sought to influence these issues through multiple instruments, including public statements 
and declarations, direct communications and negotiations with the United States, bilateral 
treaties, parliamentary resolutions, sponsorship of United Nations resolutions, European 
Commission regulations, as well as the European Union’s internal abolition of the death 
penalty.  The European Union’s impact through the financial support of NGOs (which 
may, in turn, influence the federal and state executive and legislative branches in the 
United States) is discussed separately in Chapter 7.   
 
 
3.1 The European Union’s Impact on US Federal and State Capital Punishment 
Through its Own Abolition 
 
With the abolition of the death penalty in the European Union and all of its 
member states, the United States has become increasingly isolated on the issue from its 
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traditional allies in the world, causing concern among United States diplomats and in 
individual US states.  Indeed, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States are now the only 
advanced industrial democracies that continue to practice the death penalty,324 and the 
United States and Belarus are the only two retentionist states in law and practice in the 
OSCE area.325 
With regard to specific death penalty issues, the United States has not only been 
out of sync with its traditional allies in the European Union, but finds company with 
countries that the United States would not ordinarily associate itself with on human rights 
issues.  For example, in the four years preceding the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Roper v. Simmons to abolish the juvenile death penalty, the only countries to 
execute juvenile offenders in practice were the Democratic Republic of Congo, China, 
Iran, Pakistan, and the United States.326  As explained by nine former United States 
diplomats in their amicus curiae brief in Roper v. Simmons, “In no other area of human 
rights does the United States consider these nations to be our equals.”327 
For these former United States diplomats, it was problematic that the United 
States found company with these countries rather than the European Union, “whose 
members include our closest allies” that “have expressed vehement opposition to the 
death penalty, particularly as applied to juveniles.”328 The former diplomats expressed 
concern that given the trend against the execution of juvenile offenders, the United States 
would “soon stand alone as the only country in the world” endorsing the practice.329 
Based on their experience, the former diplomats asserted that allowing the 
juvenile death penalty to continue would “diplomatically isolate the United States and 
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hinder its foreign policy goals by alienating countries that have been American allies of 
long standing.  These allies, with strong rule-of-law traditions and political histories, 
social values, and legal systems similar to ours, have led a worldwide protest against the 
practice of executing juvenile offenders in the United States.”330  The United States 
maintenance of the juvenile death penalty thus “impairs important U.S. foreign policy 
interests” and allowed the European Union to challenge the United States claim to world 
leadership in the area of human rights.331 
  With regard to the execution of persons suffering from mental retardation in the 
United States, these former United States diplomats similarly expressed concern that such 
practices create “diplomatic isolation” and harm the foreign policy interests of the United 
States.332  In their view, applying the death penalty to persons with mental retardation 
would “create friction with and alienate” United States allies “with strong rule-of-law 
traditions and histories, legal systems and political cultures similar to ours.”333  With 
regard to these concerns, the former diplomats pointed specifically to the criticism 
received by the European Union in formal diplomatic demarches and letters concerning 
specific executions.334  As with the juvenile death penalty, the former diplomats were 
concerned with the challenge to the United States “claim of moral leadership in 
international human rights.”335 
 While these concerns were expressed with regard to specific death penalty issues, 
the death penalty as a whole has presented similar challenges.  As two former State 
Department officials pointed out, the United States death penalty has led to a “diplomatic 
fallout” that isolates the United States from its allies in the European Union and 
elsewhere and has caused challenges to “our claim of moral leadership in international 
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human rights, and probably helped contribute to the embarrassing (if temporary) loss in 
2001 of America’s seat on the U.N. Human Rights Commission.”336 
The United States loss of its seat on the UN Commission on Human Rights in 
2001 was the first time the US was not on the Commission since 1947.337  The United 
States lacked the voting support, particularly from its European allies, needed to maintain 
a seat on the Commission in part because of its support for the death penalty.338  Whether 
it be in international forums such as the OSCE or in its bilateral meetings with the United 
States, the European Union has repeatedly made clear its position against the death 
penalty in the United States.  While the immediate United States federal response on each 
individual occasion often reflects an unchanged position on the death penalty by the 
United States, the European Union has nonetheless isolated the United States on the 
world stage from its Western allies. 
Of course, the European Union was not alone in isolating the United States.  As 
pointed out by the former United States diplomats, “numerous international and regional 
bodies have passed resolutions, statements, and judgements” that expressed opposition to 
the death penalty generally or in particular circumstances, including for example in the 
United Nations (e.g., the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee), the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights.339  As previously stated, Manners also pointed out that 
from 1998 to 2008, “thirty-two states have moved to abolish the death penalty for 
ordinary or all crimes, bringing the total number of abolitionist states to 135 against 
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sixty-two retentionist states,”340 a general trend that has continued in recent years.341  
Although this trend exists outside of the European Union as well, it is unlikely that the 
former United States diplomats would be as concerned to the same degree with the 
world-wide trend had the European Union and its member states not abolished the death 
penalty nor repeatedly reminded the United States of their position and of world-wide 
trends.  Indeed, the former United States diplomats repeatedly (dozens of times) pointed 
to the positions and efforts of the European Union and its member states in order to 
explain their own positions in two amicus curiae briefs on the death penalty.342 
The European Union’s abolition of the death penalty has also been pointed to by 
individual states abolishing the death penalty.  Eight of the twenty states that have 
abolished the death penalty in the United States have done so after 1998,343 when the 
European Union began its world-wide efforts towards abolition.  In three of the states 
abolishing or establishing a moratorium on the death penalty during the time period 
examined in this research,344 governors and legislators deciding to end or forego 
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reinstatement of the death penalty in their states expressed their concerns regarding the 
growing isolation of the United States from its allies in the European Union and 
elsewhere in the world in favor of association with countries often known for poor human 
rights records. 
New Mexico, for example, abolished the death penalty legislatively with House 
Bill 285 in 2009, replacing it with life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.345  
Representative Gail Chasey introduced the bill in January 2009, and had been sponsoring 
similar bills since 1999.346  Chasey has cited a number of reasons for abolition, such as 
the additional costs involved in maintaining the death penalty system, unfairness in 
administration, and a lack of effectiveness in deterring crime.347 
While there were multiple reasons for abolition in New Mexico, Representative 
Chasey also stated that abolition and views in the European Union were raised in the 
legislature and they were “not discounted and lent weight.”348  Similarly, Marcia Wilson 
of the New Mexico Coalition to Repeal the Death Penalty explained that there were a 
number of factors and actors contributing to the repeal of the death penalty in New 
Mexico, and abolition of the death penalty in the European Union played an incredibly 
important role through the example it provided.349  During the debate in the legislature, 
legislators supporting abolition frequently pointed to the views on the death penalty 
around the world.350  As New Mexico state Senator Gerald Ortiz y Pino explained, “We 
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are the last Western society that holds on to it.  .  .  .  It makes us less than we should 
be.”351 
Further, former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson signed the bill on March 
18, 2009, citing as his reasons the imperfections of any system imposing the death 
penalty, that minorities are disproportionately sentenced to death, and that “from an 
international human rights perspective, there is no reason the United States should be 
behind the rest of the world on this issue.”352  Six days later, he further explained his 
decision, pointing out that America is isolated internationally “as one of the few countries 
with the death penalty, saddled along with other repressive regimes that had the death 
penalty” and that “the world has moved ahead of us, Europe, Latin America, most nations 
have repealed it.”353 
Governor Richardson’s concern with US isolation and international trends in 
Europe and the rest of the world is not surprising considering his previous background as 
United States Ambassador to the United Nations.  Worldwide trends against the death 
penalty, including within the European Union, were thus one of the considerations in the 
New Mexico legislature as well as by Governor Richardson in abolishing the death 
penalty in their state. 
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that New Mexico would not have abolished the death 
penalty “in the absence of the EU stimulus or EU stimulus accompanied by stimuli from 
other” actors.354  While the European Union’s example was, as discussed above, 
referenced by persons in both the executive and legislative branches of New Mexico’s 
government during the process of abolishing the death penalty in New Mexico, there 
were multiple other reasons for abolishing the death penalty in New Mexico and the 
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European Union’s example acted more as a confirmation of a decision to do so than as a 
reason in and of itself to change direction on the death penalty.  The primary reasons for 
abolishing the death penalty in New Mexico were cost, the possibility of executing 
innocent persons, and issues of discrimination in the death penalty system, reasons that 
existed regardless of the European Union’s example.355  Former Governor Richardson, 
for example, stated that for him “what we cannot disagree on is the finality of this 
ultimate punishment. Once a conclusive decision has been made and executed, it cannot 
be reversed. And it is in consideration of this, that I have made my decision.”356 Governor 
Richardson then goes on to discuss the possibility of mistakes occurring in the system 
and resulting in innocent people being placed on death row or executed, as well as the 
concern that minorities are more likely to end up on death row.357  It is only after these 
explanations for abolishing the death penalty that Richardson states that the United States 
should not “be behind the rest of the world on” the issue of the death penalty.358 
 In New York, the Court of Appeals decision in People v. LaValle359 held part of a 
New York death penalty law violated its state constitution.  Specifically, pursuant to New 
York statutory law, the trial court instructed the jurors in the case to decide whether 
Stephen LaValle, found guilty of first degree murder and rape, should be sentenced to 
death or life without parole, but the decision of the jurors must be unanimous.360  If the 
decision was not unanimous, the defendant would be sentenced to life with the possibility 
of parole in 20-25 years.361 
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The New York statutory scheme in the event of deadlock among the jury 
members was unique because, unlike other states, deadlock resulted in a less severe 
sentence than the ones the jury was allowed to consider.362  According to the court, 
studies have indicated that some jurors may then select the death penalty even though 
they prefer life without parole because of fears of the possibility of release if the jurors 
become deadlocked.363  As a result, the Court of Appeals held the statutory scheme 
violated the Due Process Clause of the New York Constitution “because it creates the 
substantial risk of coercing jurors into sentencing a defendant to death.”364  The Court of 
Appeals also declined to set out a new death sentencing procedure, explaining that 
providing a different procedure is within the power of the legislature, not the courts.365 
Three years later in People v. Taylor, the New York Court of Appeals held that 
the ruling in People v. LaValle applied to the last person on death row in New York, 
effectively ending the death penalty in New York absent further legislative action.366 
 In response to the LaValle decision, five public hearings were conducted by the 
New York State Assembly’s standing committees on Codes, Judiciary and Correction 
between December 2004 and February 2005.367  Rather than immediately responding to 
the Court of Appeals ruling by restoring the death penalty in some form or formally 
abolishing the death penalty, the legislature sought to first review the death penalty, 
allowing for testimony during public hearings, so that it could make a more deliberative 
decision on the matter.368 
With 146 persons testifying and 24 individuals and groups submitting additional 
written testimony, a wide variety of issues were addressed during the hearings on the 
death penalty.369  In the hearings, the committees sought testimony directed at whether 
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the death penalty should be reinstated in New York.370  Among five other questions to 
address this issue, the public notices for the hearings specifically asked for testimony 
regarding the trends and experiences of other nations: “What do the trends and 
experiences of other states and nations which have considered or implemented the death 
penalty or life imprisonment without parole teach us about whether capital punishment 
should be reinstated in New York?”371 
That such information was specifically sought after by the legislative committees 
deliberating on the issue suggests an interest in international views regarding the death 
penalty.  While officials representing the European Union did not provide official 
testimony before the New York State Assembly standing committees, the testimony 
nonetheless made clear that the United States is almost alone among industrialized 
nations in the world, including across Europe, when it comes to retaining the death 
penalty.372  After obtaining the information sought through five days of hearings, the 
New York Assembly Codes Committee voted 11 to 7 against legislation reinstating the 
New York death penalty.373  While information about foreign experiences were sought by 
the New York legislature, they once again are not the main reason for abolishing (and not 
reinstating in this case) the death penalty, and only a small fraction of the New York 
State Assembly’s standing committee on Codes, Judiciary and Correction discusses the 
international trends.374  New York’s Assembly members were particularly concerned 
with the possibility of executing innocent people, again a concern that exists regardless of 
the situation in the European Union.375 
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 When Illinois enacted legislation abolishing the death penalty in 2011, it was the 
culmination of a variety of circumstances taking place over decades.376  Through the 
work of “a cadre of public defenders, pro bono lawyers, journalists, academics, and 
assorted activists,” it became clear that it was not possible to create a death penalty 
system free from flaws and discriminatory treatment.377 
The progression towards abolition in Illinois began in 1987 when exculpatory 
evidence was discovered that led to the exoneration of two persons on death row, Perry 
Cobb and Darby Tillis.378  In the decades leading up to abolition, there were eighteen 
more exonerations in the state, making the error rate at least 6% since the reinstatement 
of capital punishment in Illinois in 1977.379  Confidence in the Illinois death penalty 
system was further eroded by misconduct by the Chicago police, some of whom had 
tortured suspects into confessions that led to capital sentences, an Illinois circuit judge 
convicted of taking bribes, and a Chicago Tribune story revealing prosecutors across the 
United States engaging in discriminatory practices and hiding evidence in order to win 
cases.380 
Following some efforts to improve the death penalty system, on January 31, 2000 
then Illinois Governor Ryan declared a moratorium on executions until the flaws in the 
Illinois capital punishment system were addressed.381  Two months later, Governor Ryan 
created, through an executive order, the Commission on Capital Punishment, which 
issued a report in April 2002 recommending major reforms to the Illinois criminal justice 
system.382 
After a concerted effort by activists, on January 11, 2003 Governor Ryan 
announced the commutation of all Illinois death row inmates in an address at 
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Northwestern University School of Law.383  During that address, he explained his various 
reasons for his decision, from the potential of executing an innocent person to the many 
flaws in the Illinois death penalty system.384  During his explanation, Governor Ryan 
stated his concern about the isolation, including from Europe, of the United States in its 
retention of the death penalty: “Today the United States is not in league with most of our 
major allies: Europe, South Africa, Canada, Mexico, most of South and Central America.  
These countries rejected the death penalty.  We are partners in death with several third 
world countries.  Even Russia has called a moratorium.”385  
In the following years, reforms were made to the Illinois death penalty system 
based upon the recommendations of the Commission on Capital Punishment, but 
additional exonerations highlighted the inadequacy of the reforms.386  In October 2010, 
the Illinois Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee, created in 2003 by statute, 
issued its final report on the Illinois death penalty, which outlined continued flaws and 
reforms needed in the Illinois capital punishment system.387 
With the Illinois death penalty system still plagued by problems, in January 2011 
legislation was passed in both the Illinois House and Senate to abolish the Illinois death 
penalty.388  Illinois state Senator Kwame Raoul, one of the sponsors of the legislation, 
indicated that the legislators that voted in favor of abolition had done so for a variety of 
reasons.389  Senator Raoul called on his colleagues in the legislature to “join the civilized 
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world” by abolishing the death penalty in Illinois.390  Similarly, Senator Toi Hutchinson 
expressed her desire for Illinois not to be associated “with Afghanistan, China, Iran, Iraq, 
Congo, Saudi Arabia and other countries that allow the death penalty.”391 
After signing the legislation, Governor Quinn explained his decision, particularly 
pointing to the flawed death penalty system and the impossibility of designing a perfect 
system.392  In closing his speech, he stated that, although his decision to sign the 
legislation was his most difficult decision as Governor, he had a firm belief “that we are 
taking an important step forward in our history as Illinois joins the 15 other states and 
many nations of the world that have abolished the death penalty.”393  World views on the 
death penalty were thus of interest to former Governor Ryan in issuing a blanket 
commutation of death sentences and legislators and former Governor Quinn in de jure 
abolition of the death penalty in Illinois.  They had an interest in joining their European 
and other allies in this area, rather than be associated with nations not known for positive 
human rights records.  Nonetheless, as described above, Illinois was on track to 
abolishing the death penalty regardless of the European Union’s example, with repeated 
issues of innocence and other flaws within the capital punishment system at the 
forefront.394  In this context, Illinois would likely have abolished the death penalty 
regardless of whether the European Union’s example was present.395 
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 In each of these three states, there were multiple reasons for the decision to 
abolish (or not reinstate) the death penalty, and the example of the European Union was 
never the primary reason leading to abolition.  Instead, as discussed in more detail above, 
the European Union’s example tended to confirm the decisions that were being made by 
these states.  As such, the European Union’s impact through its example cannot be 
considered to fall under the considerable or significant impact categories.  Likewise, the 
isolation of the United States on the death penalty also failed to achieve any tangible 
change on the death penalty with regard to the federal level administration.  Although not 
causing a tangible change in the United States, the European Union’s example has 
affected the interests of the federal government as well as individual states as described 
above, which places the European Union’s impact as marginal in this case.   
 
 
3.2 The European Union’s Impact on Extradition of Persons Subject to the Death 
Penalty 
 
When accused or convicted criminals (possibly) subject to the death penalty in the 
United States are present in the European Union, it presents a situation in which the 
United States needs cooperation from European Union member states to extradite those 
persons to the United States.  “International extradition is the formal process by which a 
person found in one country is surrendered to another country for trial or punishment.”396 
Extradition primarily occurs under extradition treaties, which impose legal 
requirements before surrender of persons can occur.397  Where there have been differing 
approaches to the death penalty between countries, some abolitionist countries included 
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provisions in their extradition treaties allowing them to obtain so-called ‘diplomatic 
assurances’ or ‘guarantees’ that the death penalty would not be imposed or carried out by 
the requesting country.398  In practice, it has become standard for nations that have 
abolished the death penalty to respond to extradition requests with demands for 
assurances that the death penalty will not be used.399  When confronted by refusals to 
extradite individuals without assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed or 
carried out, the United States has been forced to either make such assurances, lose the 
ability to prosecute the individuals in the United States, or resort to extraordinary 
rendition.400 
In the Council of Europe, the 1957 European Convention on Extradition allowed 
for cooperation between European countries with regard to extradition of persons to 
jurisdictions with the death penalty.401  Article 11 of the European Convention on 
Extradition provides: 
 
“If the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death 
under the law of the requesting Party, and if in respect of such offence the 
death-penalty is not provided for by the law of the requested Party or is 
not normally carried out, extradition may be refused unless the requesting 
Party gives such assurance as the requested Party considers sufficient that 
the death-penalty will not be carried out.”402 
 
In interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of 
Human Rights has also been faced with the issue of extradition of persons potentially 
subject to the death penalty in the requesting country. For example, in Soering v. United 
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Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights stated that the “circumstances relating to 
a death sentence” could (and would, in Soering’s case involving the issue of extradition 
to the United States,) violate the prohibition of torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.403 The 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights was also signed on December 7, 2000, 
and under Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
“No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk 
that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”404   
Despite these developments, following the September 11, 2001 attacks the United 
States reportedly proposed that the European Union “eliminate discrimination against the 
United States and third (non-EU) countries’ extradition requests to member states.”405  
However, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks did not weaken the European Union’s 
resolve concerning extradition of persons potentially subject to the death penalty.  On the 
contrary, it presented an opportunity for the European Union to secure an extradition 
treaty with the United States that provides the right to condition extradition of persons on 
assurances that the death penalty will not be pursued or carried out for those persons. 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the European Union and the 
United States began negotiations to improve cooperation on criminal matters.406  
However, agreement with the United States was delayed for nearly a year during the 
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negotiations.407  Importantly, the European Union sought and obtained a right for its 
member states to refuse extradition absent guarantees that the death penalty would not be 
imposed or applied to the person extradited.408 
As a result, two agreements were signed on June 25, 2003, the Agreement on 
Extradition Between the European Union and the United States of America and the 
Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the European Union and the United 
States of America, after which each European Union member state effectively 
implemented the EU-US treaties by entering into new or modified extradition and mutual 
legal assistance agreements of their own with the United States.  The EU-US extradition 
agreement provides for a modern dual criminality standard, measures streamlining the 
exchange of information and transmission of documents, and rules for determining 
priority in competing requests for extradition, among other things, while the mutual legal 
assistance agreement aims to enhance and modernize law enforcement and judicial 
cooperation.409  Importantly, Article 13 on Capital Punishment of the extradition 
agreement provides: 
 
“Where the offence for which extradition is sought is punishable by death 
under the laws in the requesting State and not punishable by death under 
the laws in the requested State, the requested State may grant extradition 
on the condition that the death penalty shall not be imposed on the person 
sought, or if for procedural reasons such condition cannot be complied 
with by the requesting State, on condition that the death penalty if 
imposed shall not be carried out.  If the requesting State accepts 
extradition subject to conditions pursuant to this Article, it shall comply 
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Relations. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal. 13, p. 335. 
408 Ibid. 
409 The United States Department of Justice (2010). U.S./EU Agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance and 
Extradition Enter into Force. Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/useu-agreements-mutual-legal-
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with the conditions.  If the requesting State does not accept the conditions, 
the request for extradition may be denied.”410 
 
After being ratified by the parties, the treaty instruments were exchanged by the 
European Union and United States on October 28, 2009 and entered into force on 
February 1, 2010.411 
With regard to extradition, the European Union has had a significant impact on 
the United States.  The European Union was primarily and directly responsible for this 
agreement with the US limiting extraditions for persons where there might be a risk that 
the US would impose or carry out the death penalty.  As explained in a press release by 
the Council of the European Union, the extradition treaty 
 
“significantly improves the protection against the death penalty.  
Extradition to the US will henceforth only be possible under the condition 
that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if for procedural reasons 
such condition cannot be complied with, that the death penalty will not be 
carried out.  Unlike what is currently the prevailing practice, the non-
execution of the death penalty will no longer depend on case-by-case 
guarantees from the US.”412 
 
The European Union’s insistence on extradition limits relating to the death 
penalty has had a major effect on the vital interests of the United States of obtaining 
suspected criminals for interrogation, prosecution, and/or punishment, particularly in the 
larger post-September 11 context in which such limits were questioned.  The significant 
impact of the European Union is through a combination of persuasion, with regard to 
                                                 
410 Agreement on Extradition Between the European Union and the United States of America (2003). 
Official Journal of the European Union L 181/27.  
411 The United States Department of Justice (2010). U.S./EU Agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance and 
Extradition Enter into Force. Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/useu-agreements-mutual-legal-
assistance-and-extradition-enter-force. 
412 Council of the European Union (2009). EU/US Agreements on Extradition and on Mutual Legal 
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negotiating the agreement, as well as coercion, with regard to the refusal to provide 
requested persons without assurances regarding the non-application of the death penalty 
by the United States. 
 
 
3.3 The European Union’s Impact on Lethal Injection 
 
 The death penalty in the United States today is most frequently carried out by 
lethal injection.  However, in recent years, it has become more difficult for individual US 
states with the death penalty to obtain the drugs used in their lethal injection procedures.  
At first, 2005 Council Regulation No. 1236/2005, concerning trade in certain goods 
which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, contained a loophole allowing sodium thiopental and 
pentobarbital, anesthetics often used during lethal injection executions in the US, to be 
exported from European Union member states for use in executions.  Council Regulation 
No.  1236/2005 placed import and export restrictions on instruments such as gallows and 
guillotines, electric chairs, automatic drug injection systems, vaults used in executions, as 
well as torture devices. 
The 2005 regulation, however, failed to limit the death penalty in the United 
States, particularly with the supplies of drugs such as sodium thiopental and pentobarbital 
unaffected by the regulation for use in US executions.413  Had the European Union 
included restrictions on drugs used in lethal injections in the 2005 regulation, some 
executions could possibly have been avoided or delayed.414  Supplies of sodium 
thiopental, however, fell relative to demand after a shortage of raw materials to produce 
the drug in 2009.415  The shortage was exacerbated by a number of medical suppliers that 
stopped supplying some drugs for use in carrying out the death penalty, some of which 
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414 Amnesty International (2011). Stop Trade of Torture and Death Penalty Equipment. Retrieved from 
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did so in response to demands by European Union member states.416  The British 
government banned the export of sodium thiopental for use in executions after it was 
discovered that Arizona had received the drug from a company based in the United 
Kingdom.417  In January 2011, Hospira Inc., an Illinois-based company that had planned 
to manufacture sodium thiopental in a plant in Italy, also announced its decision to stop 
selling sodium thiopental because Italy wanted assurance that the drug would not be used 
to carry out the death penalty.418  Some states, such as Oklahoma and Ohio, turned to 
pentobarbital instead, but Lundbeck Inc., which is based in Denmark and is the only 
company that provided pentobarbital in the United States, asked that the drug not be used 
in executions.419   
With pressure from NGO’s and the European Parliament, on December 20, 2011 
the European Commission amended Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 with 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 1352/2011, such that all “short and 
intermediate acting barbiturate anaesthetic agents” including pentobarbital and sodium 
thiopental, among others, are included in a list of items requiring export authorization.420  
These 2011 restrictions have had important implications for the US death penalty, with 
some of the drugs already in short supply and for which the US does not manufacture 
domestically.421  This also suggests that the original 2005 Council Regulation No. 
                                                 
416 Grissom, B. (2011). A Drug Used in Executions Becomes Very Hard to Get. New York Times. Retrieved 
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1236/2005 would similarly have prevented or delayed executions in the United States had 
it not contained the loophole.422 
Following the amended regulation closing the loophole, Fresenius Kabi USA 
informed healthcare providers that they were implementing restrictions and controls on 
the sale and distribution of Propofol, another anesthetic being considered by some 
departments of correction for executions, to prevent its use in United States executions 
while ensuring “that this important drug continues to be immediately available to those 
patients and health care facilities where its use is medically necessary.”423  In their letter 
to healthcare providers, they explained that all of their Propofol is manufactured in 
Europe and that 
 
“European Union (EU) regulation prevents products that may reasonably 
be expected to be used in executions from being exported from the EU.  
Should Propofol begin to be used in executions in the U.S. and should the 
EU Commission place Propofol on its list of export restricted substances 
under the anti-torture regulation, it could severely restrict U.S. access to 
the drug.”424 
 
The shortage of sodium thiopental in particular has delayed executions and forced 
some US states to search for alternatives to their procedures that utilize the drug.425  
California, Texas, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, and Arkansas have all faced shortages of 
                                                 
422 In this sense, 2005 Council Regulation No. 1236/2005 could arguably be framed as an area in which 
European Union inaction (the loophole) resulted in the impact on the United States rather than the action in 
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sodium thiopental for their executions.426  As a result, the restrictions on the export of 
lethal injection drugs in the European Union has made it more difficult for some 
jurisdictions in the United States to obtain the drugs used in their lethal injection 
procedures, forcing some jurisdictions to continue searching for alternatives.427  Sarah 
Ludford, a European Parliamentarian, stated, “By persuading responsible pharmaceutical 
companies to supervise their distribution chain and by getting controls on exports from 
Europe tightened, U.S. prisons’ ability to procure their death machine supplies has been 
thwarted”.428 
This research focuses on outputs from 1998 to 2009.  However, 2005 Council 
Regulation No. 1236/2005 could be considered as an area in which the European Union’s 
inaction (the loophole) in 2005 also resulted in an impact on the United States, with the 
2011 amendment demonstrating that the lack of restrictions in this area by the European 
Union allowed the United States to continue with executions as scheduled. 429  The EU 
has thus had a significant impact on the US as it is primarily and directly responsible for 
decreasing (or failing to decrease)430 the supply of lethal injection drugs that were already 
difficult for the US to obtain outside of the European Union.  The primary diffusion 
mechanism for achieving this outcome was through coercion (or lack thereof), as the 
European Union (failed to) restrict United States access to material goods.431  
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3.4 The European Union’s Impact Through United Nations Resolutions 
 
Although the European Union is an observer in the United Nations without the 
ability to vote,432 the European Union has nonetheless played a key role in United 
Nation’s resolutions concerning the death penalty.  In particular, the European Union has 
repeatedly sponsored multiple legally non-binding resolutions calling for a moratorium 
on the death penalty.  The European Union sponsored its first resolution calling for a 
moratorium in 1999, but that resolution was later withdrawn.433  In addition to a 
worldwide moratorium on executions, the 1999 resolution also sought progressive 
restriction of the offenses subject to capital punishment, banning extradition of persons to 
countries where they would face the death penalty, and limits on the types of persons 
subject to the death penalty.434 
Starting in 2007, however, the European Union has successfully sponsored 
resolutions calling for a world-wide moratorium on the death penalty.435  The United 
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Nations General Assembly adopted European Union sponsored resolution A/RES/62/149 
on December 18, 2007, which, in addition to a moratorium, calls for respect for 
international standards concerning the rights of persons facing the death penalty as well 
as progressive restriction on the use of the death penalty and the offences subject to the 
death penalty.  While the resolution was jointly introduced by 87 countries, including all 
the European Union member states, the European Union was one of the driving forces 
behind it,436 while also to some extent downplaying its part during negotiations.437  
Resolution A/RES/62/149 passed with a 104 in favor and 54 against vote.438  The 
resolution does not call for immediate abolition of the death penalty and is not legally 
binding, but carries with it moral weight.  Nonetheless, the resolution faced a highly 
contentious debate before adoption, and was opposed by the United States, China, Iran, 
Sudan, and Syria, among 49 others.439  The European Union had to garner enough 
support to overcome the opposition that claimed the sponsors were attempting to limit 
their sovereignty.440   
Similar resolutions calling for a moratorium were passed with slightly increasing 
support in 2008, 2010, and 2012.  On December 18, 2008, the United Nations General 
Assembly reaffirmed its 2007 call for a global moratorium with European Union 
sponsored resolution A/RES/63/168, which passed with a vote of 106 in favor and 46 
against.  On December 21, 2010, a similar resolution was adopted with a vote of 109 in 
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favor and 41 opposed.441  On November 19, 2012, yet another vote was held in the 
United Nations General Assembly calling for a moratorium on the death penalty, this 
time with 110 countries for and 39 against the resolution.442  Unsurprisingly, the United 
States also voted against each of these resolutions.443 
The European Union, in combination with multiple other actors, contributed to 
achieving these results through persuasive efforts utilizing a “comprehensive and in-
depth consultation process.”444  Some countries in the Asian, African, and Carribean 
regions supported the moratorium as well, with their contributions to the passage also of 
importance within a context in which some of their neighbors were retentionist.445 
Amnesty International also played a particularly crucial role in the United Nations 
resolutions calling for a moratorium on the death penalty.446 As explained by Kissack: 
 
“[Amnesty International] played an important role in shaping the behavior 
of all states, be they abolitionist, retentionist, or undecided. [Amnesty 
International’s] network of offices around the world and capacity to 
mobilise its supporters allow it to lobby governments in their national 
capitals as well as diplomats based in New York. [Amnesty International] 
was extensively involved in the entire death penalty resolution process.”447 
 
European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner and European Commission Vice President Franco Frattini 
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attributed the passage of the first United Nations resolution calling for a moratorium to 
European Union solidarity and persuasiveness on the issue, stating: 
 
“Once again, the European Union has expressed itself as a single and firm 
voice in protecting human rights.  It has proved to be an efficient 
persuasive power in the world, steadily supporting any action in favour of 
human dignity.  In this case, the death penalty being the most evident 
institutional disregard for this human dignity, such a UN Moratorium 
constitutes a step forward.”448 
 
Although the passage of these resolutions calling for a world-wide moratorium on 
the death penalty contributes to United States isolation on the issue of the death penalty 
and the United States was opposed to the resolutions, the resolutions are non-binding and 
have not had a tangible effect on the United States.  The United States has dismissed 
international calls in the United Nations regarding the death penalty449 and the United 
States has not changed its position based on these non-binding resolutions.450  Thus, 
while the European Union may have played a key role in the passage of such resolutions, 
its impact on the United States in these cases was only marginal. 
 
 
 
3.5 The European Union’s Impact on Specific Cases  
 
The European Union has advocated against individual executions in the United 
States on numerous occasions.  The European Union’s advocacy has included public 
statements and declarations, including in the OSCE, as well as direct communications 
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with federal officials, state governors, and pardon boards.451  Prior to May 2010, the 
country holding the rotating European Union presidency presented letters to United 
States federal and state officials on behalf of the European Union arguing for 
commutation of death sentences in individual cases.452  After May 2010, following entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, similar communications have been made by the European 
Union Delegation to the United States.453  The European Parliament has also been 
similarly involved in individual death penalty cases, issuing statements and resolutions 
and sending letters to state officials requesting commutation of death sentences.454  This 
section reviews 79 cases in which the European Union has advocated against the 
execution of specific individuals, gathered from the Death Penalty Archive of the 
European Union Delegation to the United States,455 which contains the European Union’s 
formal diplomatic actions on the death penalty in the United States.456 
 While the European Union has involved itself in a large number of individual 
cases through such actions, the European Union’s efforts are nonetheless focused on a 
limited scope of cases because limited resources do not allow the European Union to 
become involved in every death penalty case in the United States.457  The European 
Union has largely targeted those cases where international law and treaties provide 
support for their position or where European Union citizens are subject to the death 
penalty in the United States.458  Such a focus is in line with the European Union 
Guidelines on the Death Penalty, which provides for specific demarches in “individual 
death penalty cases which violate minimum standards.”459  The European Union has 
focused on individual cases involving juveniles, mental disorders (including mental 
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illness and mental retardation), lesser crimes, VCCR violations, possible innocence, ends 
to de facto moratoriums, significant time on death row, and procedural and administrative 
issues. 
Although the European Union also focuses on some of these issues on a more 
general level outside of the context of individual executions, raising the issue in 
individual cases allows the European Union to address some of the finer issues in United 
States death penalty laws and policies and their application in real cases.  For example, 
while there are legal restrictions within the United States on the death penalty for persons 
with mental disorders, advocacy in specific cases allows the European Union to address 
the specific limitations of these laws, such as whether it is appropriate to medicate the 
mentally ill so that they become competent for execution or capital punishment for 
persons that are borderline mentally retarded but fall outside of the legal protections 
provided under Atkins v.  Virginia.460 
The United States federal government has responded to the European Union’s 
efforts in individual cases by generally explaining that the death penalty in the United 
States is the result of decisions by federal and state level democratically elected 
governments, the death penalty is not prohibited by international law, and that death 
penalty cases involve extensive procedural safeguards and exhaustive protections within 
the United States legal system and sometimes also briefly explains aspects of the specific 
case.461 
At the state level, the European Union’s communications are sometimes given 
consideration but generally did not affect the outcome in individual cases.462  For former 
Ohio Governor Ted Strickland, for example, “a great deal of consideration” is given to 
information received from death penalty advocates such as the European Union, but 
clemency decisions are “guided by the facts of the particular case, his oath in office, the 
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law in the State of Ohio, and his conscience.”463  The Connecticut Board of Pardons and 
Paroles indicated that the European Union’s efforts were misdirected altogether, and that 
the European Union’s “position regarding capital punishment more properly should be 
directed to any public debate which may occur in Connecticut’s legislative body, the 
General Assembly .  .  .  rather than clemency support for a single individual.”464  In 
2007, a press release by a spokesman for former Texas Governor Rick Perry clearly 
rejected the European Union’s efforts, stating: 
 
“230 years ago, our forefathers fought a war to throw off the yoke of a 
European monarch and gain the freedom of self-determination.  Texans 
long ago decided that the death penalty is a just and appropriate 
punishment for the most horrible crimes committed against our citizens.  
While we respect our friends in Europe, welcome their investment in our 
state and appreciate their interest in our laws, Texans are doing just fine 
governing Texas.”465 
 
While the primary diffusion mechanism in the specific efforts seeking 
commutation of individual sentences is persuasion, with arguments and information 
based on the specific issues at hand, there is the potential for the European Union’s 
example to come into play.  The European Union’s example has not, however, been a 
factor in the commutation of sentences in the 79 individual cases examined. 
The European Union’s advocacy against individual executions has not met with a 
large number of cases of impact, with 76 cases involving nil impact and 3 cases with only 
marginal impact, summarized in the Specific Cases Table below.  In each of the cases of 
marginal impact, there was no tangible change caused by the European Union as the 
                                                 
463 Torres, J. (2009). Letter to Angelos Pangratis. Retrieved from http://www.euintheus.org/what-we-
do/policy-areas/democracy-and-human-rights/torture-and-capital-punishment/death-penalty/death-penalty-
archive-2009/romellbroomvohio-govstricklandlett-to-ap-11-2-09/. 
464 Everett, G. (2004). Connecticut Board of Pardon and Parole Response. Retrieved from 
http://www.euintheus.org/what-we-do/policy-areas/democracy-and-human-rights/torture-and-capital-
punishment/death-penalty/death-penalty-archive-2004/. 
465 Rosen-Molina, M. (2007). Texas Governor Rejects EU Request to End Use of Death Penalty. Jurist. 
Retrieved fromhttp://jurist.org/paperchase/2007/08/texas-governor-rejects-eu-request-to.php. 
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outcome would likely have resulted even in the absence of EU action, with multiple 
abolitionist advocates, including those directly representing the inmate, seeking 
commutation of the death sentences and presenting the same facts and arguments.466  In 
the majority of cases, the European Union failed to have any impact on the individual 
death penalty cases. 
Although the European Union’s advocacy in individual cases only infrequently 
had an impact on the individual cases themselves, the European Union’s repeated 
advocacy in combination has been problematic for United States diplomats and affected 
their behavior.  The combined effect of the European Union’s repeated advocacy against 
the death penalty places United States diplomats on the defensive, requiring them to 
continually respond to foreign criticism of the death penalty instead of advancing United 
States interests.467  As a result, some former diplomats have expressed concern with the 
extent that “important bilateral meetings with our closest allies — particularly from the 
European Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America — were increasingly 
consumed with answering demarches challenging the death penalty”.468 
Thus, the European Union’s repeated combined advocacy against the death 
penalty has had a considerable impact on the United States because it has had a tangible 
effect on United States behavior, creating a situation where “instead of focusing on 
advancing U.S.  interests, U.S.  diplomats abroad are increasingly called into meetings to 
answer foreign criticisms of the death penalty.”469 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
466 See Fireston, D. (2002). Georgia Will Not Execute Mentally Ill Killer. The New York Times. Retrieved 
from http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/26/us/georgia-will-not-execute-mentally-ill-killer.html. 
467 Brief of Amici Curiae former U.S. Diplomats Morton Abramowitz, Stephen W. Bosworth, Stuart E. 
Eizenstat, John C. Kornblum, Phyllis E. Oakley, Thomas R. Pickering, Felix G. Rohatyn, J. Stapleton Roy, 
and Frank G. Wisner in Support of Respondent, 2004 WL 1636448 p. 23. 
468 Ibid. p. 9. 
469 Ibid. p. 23. 
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SPECIFIC CASES TABLE470 
Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Virginia v. 
Douglas Thomas 
(juvenile) 
Demarche with federal 
Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary and letter to 
governor of Virginia arguing 
international law against 
juvenile death penalty (1998-
99) 
Persuasion Executed January 10, 
2000 
nil 
Oklahoma v. 
Sean Sellars 
(juvenile) 
Demarches at federal and state 
level arguing international law 
against juvenile death penalty 
(1998-99) 
Persuasion Executed February 4, 
1999 
nil 
Texas v. Stan 
Faulder (VCCR; 
time on death 
row) 
Letter to governor of Texas 
arguing violations of VCCR 
and excessive length of time 
on death row (1998) 
Persuasion Executed June 17, 1999 nil 
Virginia v. Steve 
Roach (juvenile) 
Demarche arguing 
international law against 
juvenile death penalty (1999) 
Persuasion Executed January 13, 
2000 
nil 
Texas v. Glen 
McGuinnis 
(juvenile) 
Letter to governor of Texas 
arguing international law 
against juvenile death penalty 
(2000) 
Persuasion Executed January 25, 
2000 
nil 
                                                 
470 Specific cases examined were gathered from the Death Penalty Archive of the European Union 
Delegation to the United States. Information regarding these cases were analyzed from multiple sources, 
including the Death Penalty Archive of the European Union Delegation to the United States, The Death 
Penalty Information Center, the Archives at America.gov, and the Dossier on the Death Penalty from US 
Embassy in Brussels website at http://www.uspolicy.be/dossier/death-penalty-united-states-policy-toward-
death-penalty-dossier. 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Texas v. Larry 
Robison (mental 
disorder) 
Demarche arguing 
international law against death 
penalty for persons with 
mental disorders (2000) 
Persuasion Executed January 21, 
2000 
nil 
Virginia v. 
Douglas Thomas 
(juvenile) 
Demarches arguing 
international law against 
juvenile death penalty (1999-
2000) 
Persuasion Executed January 10, 
2000 
nil 
Juan Garza 
(federal 
moratorium) 
Demarche to President Clinton 
and European Parliament 
resolution making general 
arguments against the US 
death penalty and calling on 
President Clinton to grant 
clemency for Garza and 
impose a moratorium on all 
federal executions 
Persuasion Executed June 19, 2001 nil 
Texas v. Gary 
Graham 
(juvenile; 
possible 
innocence) 
Letters to governor of Texas 
arguing international law 
against juvenile death penalty 
and possible innocence (2000) 
Persuasion Executed June 22, 2000 nil 
Texas v. Jessy 
San Miguel 
(procedural 
issues) 
Letter to governor of Texas 
arguing procedural 
deficiencies (2000) 
Persuasion Executed June 29, 2000 nil 
Texas v. Oliver 
Cruz (mental 
disorder) 
Letter to governor of Texas 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2000) 
Persuasion Executed August 9, 2000 nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Texas v. John 
Satterwhite 
(mental disorder) 
Letter to governor of Texas 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2000) 
Persuasion Executed August 16, 
2000 
nil 
Georgia v. 
Alexander 
Williams 
(juvenile; mental 
disorder) 
Letters to governor of Georgia 
and Georgia pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
juveniles and persons with 
mental disorders (2000-2002) 
Persuasion Sentence commuted to 
life without parole 
marginal 
Virginia v. Derek 
Barnabei 
(possible 
innocence; 
procedural 
issues) 
European Parliament 
resolution, open letter from 
President of the European 
Parliament, and letter to 
governor of Virginia arguing 
procedural deficiencies and 
possible innocence (2000)  
Persuasion Executed September 14, 
2000 
nil 
Texas v. Miguel 
Flores (VCCR) 
Letters to governor of Texas 
and Texas pardon board 
arguing violations of VCCR 
(2000) 
Persuasion Executed November 9, 
2000 
nil 
Texas v. John 
Penry (mental 
disorder) 
Letters to governor of Texas 
and Texas pardon board (2000) 
Persuasion Plea agreement to a life 
sentence for other 
reasons 
nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Oklahoma v.  
Wanda Allen, 
Dion 
Smallwood, 
Floyd Medlock, 
Eddie Trice, 
Mark Fowler, 
Billy Fox, Loyd 
Lafevers, and D.  
L.  Jones 
(multiple 
executions 
scheduled for 
short time, two 
of which with 
mental disorders) 
Letters to governor of 
Oklahoma and Oklahoma 
pardon board arguing 
international law against death 
penalty for persons with 
mental disorders, noting large 
number of upcoming 
executions, and general EU 
position against the death 
penalty (2001) 
Persuasion All executed between 
January 9, 2001 and 
February 1, 2001 
nil 
Missouri v. 
Antonio 
Richardson 
(juvenile; mental 
disorder) 
Letters to governor of Missouri 
and Missouri pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
juveniles and persons with 
mental disorders (2001) 
Persuasion Sentence reduced 
through court system for 
other reasons 
nil 
Nevada v. 
Thomas Nevius 
(mental disorder) 
Letters to governor of Nevada 
and Nevada pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2001) 
Persuasion Clemency granted 
following Atkins v.  
Virginia US Supreme 
Court decision471 
nil 
Illinois v. 
Gregory Madej 
(VCCR) 
Letter to governor of Illinois 
arguing violations of VCCR 
Persuasion Sentence commuted for 
other reasons 
nil 
                                                 
471 See discussion of European Union impact through Atkins v. Virginia in Chapter 5. 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Ohio v. Jay Scott 
(mental disorder) 
Letter to governor of Ohio 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2001) 
Persuasion Executed June 14, 2001 nil 
Tennessee v. 
Philip Workman 
(moratorium) 
Letters to governor of 
Tennessee and Tennessee 
pardon board making general 
arguments against the US 
death penalty and for a 
continued moratorium on 
executions (2001) 
Persuasion Executed May 9, 2007 nil 
Oklahoma v. 
Gerardo Valdez 
Maltos (VCCR; 
mental disorder) 
Letters to governor of 
Oklahoma and Oklahoma 
pardon board arguing 
international law against death 
penalty for persons with 
mental disorders and violations 
of VCCR (2001) 
Persuasion Sentence reduced for 
other reasons 
nil 
Texas v. 
Napoleon 
Beazley 
(juvenile) 
Memo to US Department of 
State and letters to governor of 
Texas and Texas pardon board 
arguing international law 
against juvenile death penalty 
(2001-2002) 
Persuasion Executed May 28, 2002 nil 
Texas v. Gerald 
Mitchell 
(juvenile) 
Letters to governor of Texas 
and Texas pardon board 
arguing international law 
against juvenile death penalty 
(2001) 
Persuasion Executed October 22, 
2001 
nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
New Mexico v. 
Terry Clark 
(moratorium) 
Letter to governor of New 
Mexico making general 
arguments against the US 
death penalty and for a 
continued moratorium on 
executions (2001) 
Persuasion Executed November 6, 
2001 
nil 
Georgia v. José 
Martinez High 
(juvenile; mental 
disorder) 
Letters to governor of Georgia 
and Georgia pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
juveniles and persons with 
mental disorders (2001) 
Persuasion Executed November 6, 
2001 
nil 
Georgia v. Tracy 
Housel (mental 
disorder) 
Letters to governor of Georgia 
and Georgia pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2002) 
Persuasion Executed March 12, 2002 nil 
Tennessee v. 
Abu-Ali 
Abdur´Rahman 
(mental disorder) 
OSCE statement and letters to 
governor of Tennessee and 
Tennessee pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2002-2003) 
Persuasion On death row nil 
Missouri v. 
Christopher 
Simmons 
(juvenile; mental 
disorder) 
Letter to governor of Missouri 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
juveniles and persons with 
mental disorders (2002) 
Persuasion US Supreme Court holds 
juvenile death penalty 
unconstitutional in Roper 
v.  Simmons472 
nil 
                                                 
472 But see discussion of European Union impact in United States courts through Roper v. Simmons in 
Chapter 5. 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Texas v. T. J. 
Jones (juvenile) 
Letter to governor of Texas 
arguing international law 
against juvenile death penalty 
(2002) 
Persuasion Executed August 8, 2002 nil 
Texas v.  Javier 
Suarez Medina 
(VCCR) 
Letters to Texas governor and 
Texas pardon board arguing 
violations of VCCR (2002) 
Persuasion Executed August 14, 
2002 
nil 
Texas v.  
Toronto 
Patterson 
(juvenile) 
Letters to governor of Texas 
and Texas pardon board 
arguing international law 
against juvenile death penalty 
(2002) 
Persuasion Executed August 28, 
2002 
nil 
Kentucky v.  
Kevin Stanford 
(juvenile) 
Letter to governor of Kentucky 
arguing international law 
against juvenile death penalty 
(2002) 
Persuasion Sentence reduced to life 
without parole 
marginal 
Texas v.  James 
Colburn (mental 
disorder) 
Letters to governor of Texas 
and Texas pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2002-2003) 
Persuasion Executed March 26, 2003 nil 
Georgia v. James 
Brown (mental 
disorder) 
Letters to governor of Georgia 
and Georgia pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2002-2003) 
Persuasion Executed November 4, 
2003 
nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Mississippi v. 
Ronald Foster 
(juvenile) 
Letter to governor of 
Mississippi arguing 
international law against 
juvenile death penalty (2002) 
Persuasion Given life sentence 
following Roper v.  
Simmons US Supreme 
Court decision473 
nil 
Texas v. John 
Elliott (possible 
innocence and 
pending 
procedures) 
Letter to governor of Texas 
and Texas pardon board 
arguing possible innocence and 
noting pending procedures in 
Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (2003) 
Persuasion Executed February 4, 
2003 
nil 
Oklahoma v. 
Scott Hain 
(juvenile) 
Letters to governor of 
Oklahoma and Oklahoma 
pardon board arguing 
international law against 
juvenile death penalty (2003) 
Persuasion Executed April 3, 2003 nil 
Virginia v. Percy 
Walton (mental 
disorder) 
OSCE statements and letters to 
governor of Virginia arguing 
international law against death 
penalty for persons with 
mental disorders (2003-2008) 
Persuasion Sentence reduced to life 
without parole based on 
Atkins v.  Virginia and 
Roper v.  Simmons474 
nil 
Alabama v. 
Glenn Holladay 
(mental disorder) 
Letter to governor of Alabama 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2003) 
Persuasion Sentence reduced 
following Atkins v.  
Virginia475 
nil 
                                                 
473 See discussion of European Union impact through Roper v. Simmons in chapter 5. 
474 See discussion of European Union impact through Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia in Chapter 
5. 
475 See discussion of European Union impact through Atkins v. Virginia in Chapter 5. 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Oklahoma v. 
Kenneth Charm 
(mental disorder) 
OSCE statement arguing 
international law against death 
penalty for persons with 
mental disorders (2003) 
Persuasion Executed June 5, 2003 nil 
Oklahoma vs. 
Hung Thanh Le 
(VCCR) 
Letters to governor of 
Oklahoma and Oklahoma 
pardon board arguing 
violations of VCCR 
Persuasion Executed March 23, 2004 nil 
Arkansas v. 
Charles 
Singleton 
(mental disorder) 
Letters to governor of 
Arkansas and Arkansas pardon 
board arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2003) 
Persuasion Executed January 6, 2004 nil 
Texas v. Scott 
Panetti (mental 
disorder) 
Letters to governor of Texas 
and Texas pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2004) 
Persuasion On death row nil 
Texas v. Kelsley 
Patterson (mental 
disorder) 
OSCE statements arguing 
international law against death 
penalty for persons with 
mental disorders (2004) 
Persuasion Executed May 18, 2004 nil 
Oklahoma v. 
Osvaldo Torres 
(VCCR) 
OSCE statement arguing 
violations of VCCR 
Persuasion Sentence reduced to life 
without parole 
marginal 
Texas v. Jose 
Medellin 
(VCCR) 
Letters to governor of Texas 
arguing violations of VCCR  
Persuasion Executed August 5, 2008 nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Pennsylvania v. 
George Banks 
(mental disorder) 
Letters to governor of 
Pennsylvania and 
Pennsylvania pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2004) 
Persuasion Execution suspended 
through courts 
nil 
North Carolina v. 
Charles Walker 
(mental disorder) 
Letter to governor of North 
Carolina arguing international 
law against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2004) 
Persuasion Sentence reduced 
through court system 
nil 
Connecticut v. 
Michael Ross 
(moratorium) 
OSCE statement and letters to 
governor of Connecticut and 
Connecticut pardon board 
making general arguments 
against the US death penalty 
and for a continued 
moratorium on executions 
(2004) 
Persuasion Executed May 13, 2005 nil 
Indiana v. Bill 
Benefiel (mental 
disorder) 
OSCE statement and letters to 
governor of Indiana and 
Indiana pardon board arguing 
international law against death 
penalty for persons with 
mental disorders (2005) 
Persuasion Executed April 21, 2005 nil 
Indiana v. Alan 
Matheney 
(mental disorder) 
Letter to Indiana pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2005) 
Persuasion Executed September 28, 
2005 
nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Texas v. Steven 
Staley (mental 
disorder) 
OSCE statement and letters to 
governor of Texas and Texas 
pardon board arguing 
international law against death 
penalty for persons with 
mental disorders (2006) 
Persuasion Sentence reduced 
through court system 
nil 
Tennessee v. 
Sedley Alley 
(moratorium) 
OSCE statement making 
general arguments against the 
US death penalty and for a 
continued moratorium on 
executions (2006) 
Persuasion Executed June 28, 2006 nil 
Texas v. Angel 
Resendiz (mental 
disorder) 
OSCE statement and letters to 
governor of Texas and Texas 
pardon board arguing 
international law against death 
penalty for persons with 
mental disorders (2006) 
Persuasion Executed June 27, 2006 nil 
Tennessee v. 
Paul Reid 
(mental disorder) 
OSCE statement and letters to 
governor of Tennessee and 
Tennessee pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2006) 
Persuasion Died from illness nil 
Montana v. 
David Dawson 
(moratorium) 
OSCE statement and letters to 
governor of Montana and 
Montana pardon board making 
general arguments against the 
US death penalty and for a 
continued moratorium on 
executions (2006) 
Persuasion Executed August 11, 
2006 
nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
South Dakota v. 
Elijah Page 
(moratorium) 
OSCE statements and letters to 
governor of South Dakota and 
South Dakota pardon board 
making general arguments 
against the US death penalty 
and for a continued 
moratorium on executions 
(2006-2007) 
Persuasion Executed July 11, 2007 nil 
Indiana v. 
Norman 
Timberlake 
(mental disorder) 
Letters to governor of Indiana 
and Indiana pardon board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2007) 
Persuasion Execution stayed by 
courts, died in prison of 
natural causes 
nil 
Texas v. James 
Clark (mental 
disorder) 
Letter to Texas pardons board 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2007) 
Persuasion Executed April 11, 2007 nil 
Nebraska v. 
Carey Moore 
(moratorium) 
OSCE statement and letter to 
governor of Nebraska making 
general arguments against the 
US death penalty and for a 
continued moratorium on 
executions (2007) 
Persuasion Execution stayed through 
courts 
nil 
Arizona v. 
Robert Comer 
(moratorium) 
OSCE statement and letters to 
governor of Arizona and 
Arizona pardon board making 
general arguments against the 
US death penalty and for a 
continued moratorium on 
executions (2007) 
Persuasion Executed May 22, 2007 nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Texas v. Kenneth 
Foster 
(seriousness of 
crime) 
Letter to Texas pardon board 
arguing capital punishment 
limited to most serious crimes 
under international law (2007) 
Persuasion Sentence commuted for 
procedural reasons 
nil 
Kentucky v. 
Ralph Baze 
(moratorium) 
Declaration and letter to 
governor of Kentucky making 
general arguments against the 
US death penalty and for a 
continued moratorium on 
executions (2007-2008) 
Persuasion Stayed execution through 
courts, still on death row 
nil 
Georgia v. 
William Lynd 
(moratorium) 
Letter to Georgia pardon board 
making general arguments 
against the US death penalty 
and for a continued 
moratorium on executions 
(2008) 
Persuasion Executed May 6, 2008 nil 
Mississippi v. 
Earl Berry 
(mental disorder) 
Letter to governor of 
Mississippi arguing 
international law against death 
penalty for persons with 
mental disorders (2008) 
Persuasion Executed May 21, 2008 nil 
Virginia v. Kevin 
Green (mental 
disorder) 
Letter to governor of Virginia 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2008) 
Persuasion Executed May 27, 2008 nil 
Alabama v. 
Thomas Arthur 
(moratorium) 
Letter to governor of Alabama 
making general arguments 
against the US death penalty 
and for a continued 
moratorium on executions 
(2008) 
Persuasion Execution stayed by 
courts for other reasons 
nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Georgia v. Jack 
Alderman 
(possible 
innocence) 
Letter to Georgia pardon board 
arguing possible innocence 
(2008) 
Persuasion Executed September 16, 
2008 
nil 
Ohio v. Richard 
Cooey 
(moratorium) 
Letter to governor of Ohio 
making general arguments 
against the US death penalty 
and for a continued 
moratorium on executions 
(2008) 
Persuasion Executed October 14, 
2008 
nil 
Georgia v. Troy 
Davis (possible 
innocence) 
Declarations, OSCE 
statements, letters to governor 
of Georgia and Georgia pardon 
board, European Parliament 
President statement, European 
Parliament resolution, and 
letter from European 
Parliament to governor of 
Georgia arguing possible 
innocence (2008-2009) 
Persuasion Executed September 21, 
2011 
nil 
Texas v. Elkie 
Taylor (mental 
disorder) 
Letter to governor of Texas 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2008) 
Persuasion Executed November 6, 
2008 
nil 
Texas v. Curtis 
Moore (mental 
disorder) 
Letter to governor of Texas 
arguing international law 
against death penalty for 
persons with mental disorders 
(2008) 
Persuasion Executed January 14, 
2009 
nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Virginia v. 
Edward Bell 
(VCCR; mental 
disorder) 
Letter to governor of Virginia 
arguing violations of VCCR 
and international law against 
death penalty for persons with 
mental disorders (2009) 
Persuasion Executed February 19, 
2009 
nil 
Washington v. 
Cal Brown 
(moratorium) 
Letters to governor of 
Washington making general 
arguments against the US 
death penalty and for a 
continued moratorium on 
executions (2009-2010) 
Persuasion Executed September 10, 
2010 
nil 
Missouri v. 
Dennis Skillicorn 
(moratorium; 
seriousness of 
crime) 
Letters to governor of Missouri 
and Missouri pardon board 
making general arguments 
against the US death penalty, 
for a continued moratorium on 
executions, and arguing capital 
punishment limited to most 
serious crimes under 
international law (2009) 
Persuasion Executed May 20, 2009 nil 
Ohio v. Romell 
Broom 
(problems with 
first execution 
attempt) 
OSCE statement and letter to 
governor of Ohio arguing 
second execution attempt 
would be cruel and inhuman 
treatment (2009) 
Persuasion On death row nil 
Louisiana v. 
Gerald Bordelon 
(moratorium) 
OSCE statement and letter to 
governor of Louisiana making 
general arguments against the 
US death penalty and for a 
continued moratorium on 
executions (2009) 
Persuasion Executed January 7, 2010 nil 
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3.6 The European Union’s Impact on Consular Access Rights 
 
Although consular access rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations476 (VCCR) are not limited to foreign nationals accused of capital crimes, these 
rights have been of particular concern when the death penalty, as the most severe form of 
punishment in the United States, is at issue.  Indeed, the “Death Penalty” section on the 
website of the European Union’s delegation to the United States specifically includes 
briefs and documents involving consular access rights under the VCCR as part of the 
European Union’s advocacy against the death penalty.  The European Union’s focus on 
consular access rights in its death penalty advocacy is understandable given the (at a 
minimum) 135 foreign nationals representing 37 different nationalities, including six EU 
nationals from six different member states, under sentence of death in the US as of July 
2012.477 
Germany, Paraguay, and Mexico each initiated separate cases before the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) involving violations of the VCCR for persons 
sentenced to death in the United States.478  These cases generally revolve around VCCR 
Article 36, which provides detained or arrested foreign nationals with the right to contact 
the sending state consul and to be informed of their consular rights.  VCCR Article 36(1) 
states: 
 
“(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the 
sending State and to have access to them.  Nationals of the sending State 
shall have the same freedom with respect to communications with and 
access to consular officers of the sending State; 
                                                 
476 United Nations (1963), Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Retrieved from 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf. 
477 Warren, M. (2012). Foreign Nationals and the Death Penalty in the US. Death Penalty Information 
Center. Retrieved from http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/foreign-nationals-and-death-penalty-
us#background. 
478 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (9 
April 1998); LaGrand Case (Germany v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (27 June 2001); Case Concerning Avena 
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (31 March 2004).  
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(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, 
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its 
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison 
or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.  Any 
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in 
prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities 
without delay.  The said authorities shall inform the person concerned 
without delay of his rights under this subparagraph; 
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending 
State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond 
with him and to arrange for his legal representation.  They shall also have 
the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody 
or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgement.  Nevertheless, 
consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national 
who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such 
action.”479 
 
Article I of the Optional Protocol provides the ICJ with jurisdiction over disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of the VCCR.  The first case was brought by 
Paraguay in April 1998, which was withdrawn after the individual involved was executed 
despite a provisional measure from the ICJ for the United States to take all measures 
available to ensure that the execution did not occur until after a final decision by the 
ICJ.480 
The second case was initiated by Germany in March 1999 regarding two brothers 
named LaGrand.  At the time of Germany’s application, one of the brothers had already 
                                                 
479 United Nations (1963), Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Retrieved from 
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been executed and the other brother’s execution was approaching.481  As happened with 
Paraguay, despite a provisional measure by the ICJ to delay the execution until after a 
ruling by the ICJ, the other LaGrand brother was also executed.482  Germany, however, 
continued its case.  The ICJ concluded that the United States had breached its obligations 
under the VCCR and that, when German nationals are “sentenced to severe penalties” 
and the United States has failed to comply with Article 36, the United States is obligated 
to provide review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account 
of the VCCR violation.483 
In the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Mexico contended 
that the United States failed to inform 54 Mexican nationals on death row of their 
consular rights in violation of Article 36 of the VCCR, that the United States had failed to 
provide meaningful review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences due to 
the VCCR violations, and that judicial procedural default rules should not be applied to 
prevent review and reconsideration by the United States.484  Responding to Mexico’s 
allegations, the United States conceded that, except for two individuals, none of the 
Mexican nationals had been informed of their consular rights, but that review of the 
convictions and sentences based on the VCCR violations could occur during the 
executive clemency process when procedural default rules prevent review through 
judicial proceedings.  On March 31, 2004, the ICJ ruled that, although the LaGrand case 
left the means of review and reconsideration up to the United States, the judicial process 
is the suitable forum for review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences and 
that the clemency process by itself is not sufficient.485 
On February 28, 2005, President George W.  Bush issued a Memorandum to the 
Attorney General indicating that the international obligations under the ICJ’s Avena 
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judgment would be discharged “by having State courts give effect to the decision in 
accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals 
addressed in that decision”.486 
These ICJ cases ultimately led to the United States withdrawal from the Optional 
Protocol.487  Reisman and Arsanjani suggest that the United States withdrawal from the 
Optional Protocol is linked to a concern that the VCCR was being used as a method for 
seeking abolition of the death penalty.488  Reisman and Arsanjani explained: 
 
“[T]he essential objective of VCCR Article 36 was fulfilled; exercises of 
jurisdiction could not likely achieve much more and, if initiated, would 
probably be covert efforts at securing abolition of the death penalty.  It 
appears likely that the United States felt that states and, increasingly, non-
governmental organizations committed to abolitionism, would be able to 
continue to bring cases allegedly arising under Article 36 of the VCCR to 
an international tribunal and could well prove to be increasingly 
abolitionist in its orientation.  Given the federal structure of the American 
system, the proliferation of these cases could have presented serious, if not 
insoluble domestic legal and political problems for any US government.  
Hence the decision to preempt the problem by denouncing the Optional 
Protocol.489 
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More negative ICJ rulings could pose difficult legal and political problems for the 
United States government due to its federal structure and separation of powers, with the 
federal government potentially needing the cooperation of judiciaries and state 
governments, which have their own limitations and views on how to proceed.  Indeed, 
despite President Bush’s memorandum placing the burden on state courts to give effect to 
the ICJ Avena judgment, the burden of compliance with that judgment has shifted 
amongst the branches and levels of government.  The European Union’s death penalty 
advocacy concerning consular access rights has correspondingly been directed at 
different branches and levels of government, including United States courts through 
amicus curiae briefs.   
Although the European Union had no impact on United States court decisions on 
this issue (as discussed later in Chapter 5), the European Union has nonetheless had a 
marginal impact on US interests.  Based in part on pressure from the European Union, 
President Barack Obama’s administration expressed its support for the Consular 
Notification Compliance Act of 2011 (CNCA), which was proposed federal legislation 
that sought to comply with VCCR Article 36 and provided federal courts with 
jurisdiction to review claims of Article 36 violations in capital cases.490 
Likewise, in the US amicus curiae brief in Leal Garcia v. Texas, involving 
another individual named in the ICJ’s Avena judgment, the United States Solicitor 
General supported a stay of Leal Garcia’s execution due to the then pending CNCA.  The 
Solicitor General explained, among other reasons, that Leal Garcia’s execution without 
complying with the United States’ international obligations “would also harm relations 
between the United States and other countries and regional and multilateral institutions,” 
citing as support the European Union’s and other nations “repeated inquiries” and letters 
to the United States and former Texas Governor Rick Perry.491  While the European 
Union’s efforts were enough to help garner some support in the federal executive branch, 
the efforts did not result in changes to the way in which VCCR violations in capital cases 
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were handled.  The CNCA was not passed, the United States Supreme Court denied the 
application for stay based on the then pending legislation,492 and Leal Garcia was 
executed on July 7, 2011. 
 
 
3.7 Overall Results and Conclusion 
 
 In the European Union’s advocacy against the death penalty directed towards the 
United States federal and state executive and legislative branches, the European Union 
has had a significant impact on US lethal injections and extraditions and a marginal 
impact on abolition of the death penalty in individual states consular access rights, and 
United Nations resolutions calling for a moratorium on the death penalty.  In addition, the 
European Union has had a considerable impact with regard to its combined efforts in 
individual death penalty cases.  The European Union’s impact on the US federal and state 
executive and legislative branches is summarized in the following table. 
 
Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Lethal injection EU restricts export of drugs 
used in lethal injection 
Coercion US states change lethal 
injection protocols, 
seek alternative drugs, 
and delay executions  
Significant 
Extradition Extradition where there is a 
risk of death penalty banned 
under ECtHR case law and EU 
Charter of Fundamental 
Rights; EU seeks provision in 
EU-US extradition treaty 
requiring non-application of 
death penalty 
Persuasion; 
Coercion 
US and EU enter 
extradition treaty with 
provision requiring 
assurances regarding 
non-application of 
death penalty 
Significant 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
US death penalty 
generally 
Death penalty abolished 
throughout EU 
Setting an 
example 
US increasingly 
isolated on world stage; 
confirming role in 
abolition of death 
penalty in individual 
US states 
Marginal 
Consular access 
rights 
EU seeks enforcement of 
consular access rights in US 
death penalty cases 
Persuasion US federal 
administration 
supportive of (failed) 
attempts to comply 
with VCCR obligations 
Marginal 
US death penalty 
generally 
EU’s combined repeated 
pressure on US to abolish the 
death penalty493  
Persuasion Federal diplomats 
consumed with 
responding to repeated 
challenges to death 
penalty 
Considerable 
Death penalty 
world-wide 
EU sponsors UN resolutions 
calling for world-wide 
moratorium on the death 
penalty 
Persuasion 
(of third 
nations) 
Passage of resolutions 
in UN, increasing 
isolation of US on 
world stage. 
Marginal 
 
Although the European Union does not often use coercion in its relations with the 
United States,494 when the European Union has used coercion in its death penalty 
advocacy it has had a significant impact.  By refusing to extradite persons without 
assurances of non-application of the death penalty, the United States is forced to make 
such assurances or forego extradition of persons, as now memorialized in an extradition 
treaty with the European Union.  By prohibiting the export of drugs used in lethal 
                                                 
493 For separate impact in individual cases, see Specific Cases Table. 
494 Keukeleire, S., & MacNaughtan, J. (2008). The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. p. 314. 
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injections in the United States, states have had to delay executions due to diminishing 
supplies of drugs used in their lethal injection cocktails, alter their lethal injection 
protocols, and seek alternative drugs that are not almost exclusively available within the 
European Union.  These results were primarily achieved through European Commission 
regulations, bilateral treaties, as well as the signing of the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
The European Union’s example has also had a marginal impact on the abolition of 
the death penalty in individual states as well as isolation of the United States in the world 
on the issue.  While previous scholarship has recognized some broadly similar trends 
between Europe and the United States with regard to the death penalty,495 this research 
has found strong evidentiary support, particularly from the governors and legislators 
making the decisions to abolish the death penalty, that the European Union’s example has 
only played a marginal role in the abolition of the death penalty in individual states. 
Persuasion, when taken by itself in separate specific cases, often resulted in the 
lowest levels of impact in the European Union’s advocacy towards the United States.  
While the European Union helped persuade enough countries to support United Nations 
resolutions calling for a moratorium on the death penalty, the passage of the resolutions 
did not affect the US position on the matter, although it does add to the isolation of the 
United States on the death penalty.  With regard to VCCR violations in death penalty 
cases, the European Union was able to help convince some United States officials to 
attempt to comply with the VCCR, but those official’s efforts failed.  The European 
Union’s repeated advocacy has consumed United States diplomats’ time, requiring them 
to continually focus on the United States position on the death penalty.  Finally, the 
European Union’s advocacy for commutation of sentences in specific cases has 
frequently resulted in nil impact, with only a handful of cases in which the European 
Union had a marginal impact.  The European Union’s instruments on these issues have 
primarily included sponsorship of United Nations resolutions, public statements and 
declarations, as well as direct communications with United States officials. 
                                                 
495 Patterson, K (2006). Acculturation and the Development of Death Penalty Doctrine in the United States. 
Duke Law Journal. 55. 
 Samuel R. Layton, Page 123
In sum, while the European Union has made numerous efforts at persuading the 
United States to join the world in abolishing the death penalty and provided its own 
example, these efforts have often had the least levels of impact.  In contrast, the European 
Union’s uses of coercion have had a significant impact on the United States executive 
and legislative branches with regard to the death penalty.  The European Union has also 
had the most impact through instruments that require internal changes, commission 
regulations restricting the export of goods from the European Union, and the signing of 
the extradition treaties and European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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4. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S IMPACT ON THE WAR ON TERROR IN 
THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES 
 
With regard to the War on Terror, the European Union has presented much less of 
a consistent united front against the United States with regard to human rights issues than 
with the death penalty.  During the War on Terror, the United States has engaged in 
programs and activities that have been problematic from a human rights perspective.  For 
example, the United States has been criticized by human rights groups for arbitrary 
detention of persons at Guantanamo Bay and secret black sites, in which the detainees 
have often been denied due process of law and access to courts for an indefinite period of 
detention at such facilities.  The United States has also been criticized for the torture and 
ill treatment of suspects in the War on Terror, which not only includes some of the 
prisoner abuse scandals such as those at Baghram, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo Bay, 
but also a policy in which the CIA was utilizing “highly coercive interrogation 
techniques” sanctioned by some of the highest levels under the Bush administration, 
including sleep deprivation, forced nudity, and water boarding.496 
The CIA’s extraordinary rendition program combines some of these human rights 
problems into a single program while taking it a step further by adding secret abductions 
of terrorist suspects in which the persons were deprived of any contact with the outside 
world, including family, attorneys, and human rights organizations.  Under the 
extraordinary rendition program, terrorist suspects in another country would be arrested 
or abducted by the CIA, often forcefully or violently, and transferred to places where they 
were often subject to torture for the purpose of obtaining information about potential 
terrorist activities.497  In addition to these practices, the United States has been criticized 
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for using drones to arbitrarily kill terrorist suspects away from the battlefield, thus, in 
addition to potential state sovereignty issues, depriving those persons of any legal 
protections before being killed outside the zone of battle. 
This chapter examines the European Union’s impact on these human rights issues 
within the War on Terror in the United States, specifically with regard to the political 
branches of the United States government.  With regard to the War on Terror, the United 
States federal administration has been the focal point for European Union foreign policy 
activity, but the United States Congress has also been relevant in some regards.  The 
European Union’s impact on the War on Terror in United States courts is discussed 
separately in Chapter 6. 
 
 
4.1 The European Union’s Impact Through Setting an Example 
 
Unlike the clear and consistent example provided by the European Union with 
regard to the death penalty, the example of the European Union and its member states 
with regard to the War on Terror has been much less coherent.  Often the United States 
has taken the lead in this area, and as a result the European Union’s actions in this area 
could to some degree be characterized as more of a lack of an example.  In some 
instances the United States sought and obtained support from within Europe, whether in 
the form of intelligence or more direct involvement in supporting United States counter-
terrorism programs, allowing the United States to conduct problematic activities such as 
extraordinary renditions, operation of black sites, drone strikes, and the capture of alleged 
terrorist suspects that were subject to harsh interrogation techniques and transferred to 
Guantanamo Bay and other sites where they were deprived of due process and other legal 
protections.  As explained by Dworkin, “So far, Europe has tended to let the United 
                                                                                                                                                 
(on Extraordinary Rendition), A6-0020/2007; Marty, D. (2006). Council of Europe, Parliamentary 
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States take the initiative, criticizing American actions without offering a detailed 
alternative of its own.”498 
Unlike with the death penalty, the United States often took the lead in providing 
an example with regard to human rights in the War on Terror.  Less than a year after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks with the enactment of Council Framework Decision of 13 
June 2002 on combating terrorism, the European Union did provide for a relatively broad 
definition of terrorism for member states to include in their national legislation.499  It was, 
however, the United States that pressured the European Union to create a framework law 
on terrorism reflective of some anti-terrorism legislation in the United States.500 
This framework decision only broadly provided that “Nothing in this Framework 
Decision may be interpreted as being intended to reduce or restrict fundamental rights or 
freedoms such as the right to strike, freedom of assembly, of association or of expression, 
including the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions with others for the 
protection of his or her interests and the related right to demonstrate.”501  It also provided 
that “This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of altering the obligation to 
respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles”.502 
Some of the resulting themes of anti-terrorism laws in European Union member 
states reflected some of those in the United States.503  For example, the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 passed by the United Kingdom allowed for indefinite 
detention of terrorist suspects under some circumstances.504  The United Kingdom’s 
system of indefinitely detaining terrorist suspects was overturned by its courts.505  Italy, 
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Germany, and Belgium also passed anti-terrorism legislation.506  In protest, hundreds of 
lawyers signed a statement claiming “that the European framework decision threatens 
democratic rights.”507 
However, there was still some distinction in the way the United States and the 
European Union defined terrorism, with the European Union defining it as a crime and 
the United States viewing terrorism “as an act of war” during the 2000s.508  The previous 
experience with internal domestic terrorists have allowed some European Union member 
states to deal with suspected terrorists through their regular criminal justice systems.509  
As such, it was not always viewed as necessary to resort to military models for dealing 
with terrorists as the United States has done.510 
One of the main differences between the War on Terror under the Bush 
administration in the United States and counterterrorism within European Union member 
states was the US view that fighting terrorism requires the government to put aside 
normal rules with the War on Terror taking place “outside the conventional rules and 
relationships that define international and domestic society.511  This led to claims that the 
United States was responsible for arbitrary detention, extraordinary rendition, and torture 
and ill treatment of detainees.512  During the 2000s, “While President George W.  Bush 
has framed the conflict as a ‘war,’ a designation which has been used to justify the 
indefinite detention of suspected enemies, Europe prefers to see the conflict in terms of a 
criminal matter.”513  These somewhat different approaches to dealing with terrorism 
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reflects the United States experiences with hostilities, where in the past the United States 
has sometimes emerged stronger afterwards, and that the United States was in some ways 
more willing to take on a global war than Europe during the 2000s.514 
At least initially, Spain was one of the handful of European Union member states 
that supported the United States in the Iraq war and War on Terror.515  Spain’s motivation 
in doing so may be related to a desire to place its fight against ETA within the framework 
of the War on Terror.516  While there was some support for the United States War on 
Terror in earlier years, after terrorist attacks in Spain there was a feeling that further 
supporting the United States War on Terror would make things worse because Al Qaeda 
claimed that the attacks were a response to Spain’s collaboration with the United 
States.517 
Nonetheless, after the Madrid bombings, the United States and the European 
Union jointly issued the EU-US Declaration on Combating Terrorism, which only briefly 
referred to the importance of respecting human rights and the rule of law and focused 
more on enhanced practical cooperation.518  This joint declaration to some degree reflects 
the European Union’s own struggle with dealing with terrorism, the United States, and 
concerns for human rights. 
Overtime, there has been increasing evidence that, despite the claimed values 
within Europe, European Union member states have cooperated with United States 
counter-terrorism efforts that conflict with such values, suggesting that there is “a gap 
between official rhetoric and covert practice.”519  After the September 11, 2001 attacks, 
there was a strong intelligence sharing relationship between the European Union and 
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United States.520  Investigations have revealed that some European Union member states 
cooperated to varying degrees with the United States extraordinary rendition program, 
including by the United Kingdom and Spain.521 
In some instances, the United States did not necessarily make clear all the 
circumstances under which interrogation and detention was taking place with the 
European governments.522  Nonetheless, involvement by officials in European 
governments, including intelligence sharing, joint interrogations, and granting of 
overflight rights have been controversial because of the legal and moral issues raised with 
regard to human rights issues in the United States extraordinary rendition program.523  To 
some degree, the support received by some European Union member states “can be 
understood as implicitly condoning such practices.”524 
At the request of the United States, European states helped the CIA carry out its 
extraordinary rendition programs through help with the kidnappings/abductions and 
hosting CIA black sites where interrogations involved the torture or ill treatment of 
detainees.525  The CIA needed this support so that it could secretly abduct terrorist 
suspects, utilize European airports for the extraordinary rendition flights, and utilize the 
secret facilities for interrogation.526 
It was the active participation by multiple foreign governments, including 
candidate and member states of the European Union, that made the CIA’s extraordinary 
rendition and interrogation programs possible.527  As many as 17 candidate or member 
states of the European Union out of at least 54 governments world-wide cooperated in 
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some way with the CIA in its operations.528  It was with the help of other countries that 
the CIA was able to place detainees outside of the reach of the law.529 
A Council of Europe report concluded that there was sufficient evidence that 
secret prisons existed in Poland and Romania, calling the “illegal deportation of suspects 
by CIA kidnapping teams in Europe . . . a massive and systematic violation of human 
rights.”530  Lithuania, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus, and Croatia have been 
listed as some of the countries that helped to varying degrees the CIA in its renditions and 
other activities, with or without knowledge of details of those activities by the United 
States.531 
When Barack Obama took over as United States president, American and 
European views on the fight against terrorism narrowed to some degree, with President 
Obama attempting to end some of the United States policies that were problematic from a 
European perspective.532  Nonetheless, there was still not uniform agreement with the 
United States under the Obama administration, as Obama continued “to assert that the 
United States is engaged in a global armed conflict with al-Qaeda that includes some 
legal right to detain or kill enemy suspects worldwide, and to try them before military 
tribunals in some cases.”533   
In sum, compared to the death penalty, European Union member states have not 
together provided a clear and consistent approach towards combating terrorism from 
abroad, allowing the United States to largely take the lead.534  The example (or lack 
thereof) of the European Union at times came into conflict with its rhetoric.  This can be 
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considered problematic if the European Union wants to have a large degree of influence 
on the United States in this area. 
The European Union’s internal division to a large extent allowed the United 
States to take the lead, rather than the other way around.  European Union member states 
have often struggled to provide a consistent message when it comes to balancing human 
rights and the fight against terrorism, with European officials often acknowledging that 
the threat of terrorism presents complex questions without easy answers.535  The general 
lack of a clear and consistent example by the European Union as a whole, in a context in 
which some European Union member states criticized the United States while other 
member states separately provided support to United States counter-terrorism efforts 
despite questionable practices such as extraordinary rendition, arbitrary detention, drone 
strikes, and torture and ill treatment, did not have an effect on the United States’ interests, 
laws, policies, or behaviors.  Instead, the United States continued its problematic human 
rights activities while sometimes seeking and obtaining separate support from individual 
European Union member states.  As a result the European Union as a whole’s mixed 
example (or lack thereof) had nil impact on the United States. 
 
 
4.2 The European Union’s Impact on Arbitrary Detention by the United States 
 
The United States has been criticized for arbitrary detention of persons suspected 
of terrorism, both at Guantanamo Bay and at secret black sites operated by the CIA.  
While the secretive nature of the black sites means that there is limited information about 
them, some information has since been acknowledged or exposed.  One example of a 
black site is the one purchased by the CIA from the Polish intelligence service for $15 
million in 2003.  Poland did not acknowledge that the black site, nicknamed Quartz, 
existed until 2012.536  The CIA used the black site to conduct interrogations without 
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providing access to lawyers and family members, and where a mock execution, water-
boarding, and other highly questionable interrogation techniques were used.537   
The most notorious example of arbitrary detention has been the United States use 
of the facilities at Guantanamo Bay on Cuba.  The first detainees arrived at Guantanamo 
Bay on January 11, 2002.  Guantanamo was chosen because of the belief that the 
detainees there would be outside of the reach of United States courts, which, as discussed 
in Chapter 6, afterwards proved to be untrue.538  Over the years, the United States 
continued to bring hundreds of people labeled “enemy combatants” to the Guantanamo 
Bay detention center.539  In the War on Terror, the United States initially held the position 
that these enemy combatants were not protected by the Geneva Convention(s).540 
For years, the United States held the detainees at Guantanamo Bay in what has 
been often described as a “legal black hole,” in which the detainees were generally 
denied access to lawyers or family members and often deprived of (meaningful) due 
process protections with regard to their detention.541  Some of these detainees were 
claimed to be associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban in Afghanistan.542 
The European Union, as well as other international organisations, such as the 
United Nations and the Council of Europe, other governments, NGOs, media, and 
scholars, criticized the United States for the arbitrary detention of prisoners, in which 
detainees were denied rights and protections under the Geneva Conventions and subject 
to indefinite detention without due process.  The European Parliament in particular was 
critical of the United States in this regard.543  For example, after hearing testimony from 
legal representatives and family members of European Union citizens being held at 
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Guantanamo Bay, in 2003 a group of European Parliamentarians called on the European 
Union to pressure the United States for better treatment of the prisoners at Guantanamo 
Bay, including 20 European Union citizens from the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany.544  The European Parliamentarians wanted to push the United States to provide 
a jury trial or release the European Union citizens.545  They criticized the general silence 
from the European Union as a whole on the matter.546 
The European Parliamentarians called for a common front against the United 
States to try to ensure a fair trial for Guantanamo detainees, with European 
Parliamentarian Monica Frassoni noting that agreements with the United States on legal 
cooperation and extradition should be suspended until the United States does so.547  
Frassoni stated, “The EU has taken similar measures against other countries.  Why not 
against the United States?”548  Similarly, in 2006, Elmar Brok, then head of the European 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, called on the United States to close the 
Guantanamo Bay detention center and replace it with an international tribunal.549 
The European Parliament has utilized resolutions to condemn the United States 
for its treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.550  In resolutions, the European 
Parliament has specifically called on the United States federal administration to close 
Guantanamo Bay, to follow international humanitarian law in the treatment of prisoners, 
and to provide prisoners with a “fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, 
impartial tribunal” without delay.551  The European Parliament was concerned with the 
deprivation of the right to have their habeas corpus cases heard in regular United States 
courts as well as United States military regulations allowing prisoners to be sentenced to 
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death by courts-martial at detention centers.552  The European Parliament further 
recognized the need to address terrorism, but expressed that doing so successfully 
requires respecting human rights and civil liberties.553  The failure to respect human 
rights and civil liberties could provide additional strength for terrorist organizations to 
recruit more members. 
The European Parliament was not alone in criticizing arbitrary detention at 
Guantanamo Bay.  Under the Bush and Obama Administrations in the United States, 
there were also dialogues with a variety of international organisations, governments and 
non-governmental organizations on counterterrorism issues, including regular meetings 
with foreign ministry legal advisors from the various European Union member states 
regarding Guantanamo Bay and the application of the Geneva Conventions.554  The 
United States Administration also specifically had bilateral meetings with government 
officials from the European Union.555  The European Union has called on the United 
States to treat suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters held at Guantanamo Bay as 
prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention because of the potential human rights 
problems at Guantanamo Bay.556  Former High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy Javier Solana, for example, stated, “The Geneva Convention must be 
applied to everyone who is detained in similar circumstances.”557 
As mentioned earlier, these criticisms may in part derive from previous 
experiences within European Union member states.  Some member states already had 
experiences with domestic terrorism and had been able to deal with domestic terrorists 
through domestic criminal law.558  With these experiences, the United States War on 
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Terror was sometimes viewed as excessive as it was not being conducted under the rule 
of law559 and did not provide due process protections.560 
The United States was thus under pressure from the European Union and multiple 
other groups to address the problems at Guantanamo Bay.561  Under former President 
Bush, the United States generally rejected such criticism and claimed that the detainees 
were being treated humanely.”562  The United States position was that the detainees at 
Guantanamo were not prisoners of war covered by the Geneva Convention but instead 
illegal enemy combatants.563  The response under President Obama, however, has been 
somewhat more receptive. In January 2009 before taking office, Obama stated that 
closing Guantanamo Bay is important for sending “a message to the world that we are 
serious about our values.”564 Similarly, on May 21, 2009, President Obama expressed 
disagreement with the Bush administration’s practices during the War on Terror, stating 
that “they alienate us in the world” and stating that “there is also no question that 
Guantanamo set back the moral authority that is America’s strongest currency in the 
world.”565 Following President Obama’s May 21, 2009 speech, former Vice President 
Dick Cheney criticized Obama’s concern for world opinion, stating that Obama’s 
“administration has found that it’s easy to receive applause in Europe for closing 
Guantanamo.”566 
After taking office Obama signed an executive order promising to close the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility by January 2010, a goal which has not yet been 
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accomplished although plans to do so continue to be in place.  This presented an 
opportunity for the European Union and its member states to help in its closure or at least 
help reduce the number of detainees held at the facility.  In order to close the 
Guantanamo Bay facilities, it would be necessary to either transfer the detainees or clear 
them for release. 
However, the detainees from countries like Algeria, China, Egypt, Libya, and 
Uzbekistan could not be returned to those countries even if they were cleared for release 
from Guantanamo Bay facilities because of the real possibility of torture or persecution in 
their home countries.567  The problem also exists for stateless detainees without a country 
to return them to.568  Many of the detainees have remained at Guantanamo for more than 
a decade without charge and nearly half of them have been cleared for release since their 
release has been found not to pose a security threat.569 
While the United States does not dispute that primary responsibility lies with the 
United States government for the release of detainees from the Guantanamo Bay 
facilities, practically speaking the United States needs the help of other governments in 
order to eventually close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay.570  While in theory the 
United States could resettle all of the Guantanamo detainees cleared for release within the 
United States if they could not be returned to their home countries due to possible torture 
or persecution, resettling all the cleared detainees within the United States has been 
impractical because of internal political opposition as well as the possibility that 
detainees released into the United States might face official or unofficial harassment or 
abuse.571 
The US Congress, for example, has previously prevented Obama from moving 
Guantanamo detainees to the United States regardless of whether the purpose is trial, 
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detention, or resettlement.572  It was not until December 2013 that Congress lightened the 
restrictions on transferring prisoners, although there remains substantial resistance within 
Congress.573  Practically speaking, it has thus been necessary for other governments to 
accept Guantanamo detainees if they wanted to see the facility closed.574 
As such, European Union member states have had an opportunity to assist in the 
closure of Guantanamo Bay or at least reduce the detainees held there by resettling the 
detainees in their own countries.575  Some of the Guantanamo detainees already had 
connections in Europe that would potentially facilitate their reintegration, such as family 
ties and language skills.576 
Dozens of Guantanamo detainees faced no criminal charges but were not cleared 
for release from Guantanamo Bay because they claimed that they may be tortured or 
persecuted if returned to their home countries.577  Some of these detainees were turned 
over to the United States by bounty hunters in Pakistan and Afghanistan because of 
promises of monetary awards for bringing in suspicious people, and some of the 
detainees were relatives or acquaintances of persons suspected of terrorist activities.578  
For example, Chinese Uighurs were living in a village in Afghanistan that was being 
bombed in 2001, and some of them fled into the mountains.579  They were turned over to 
Pakistani authorities that reportedly turned them over to the United States for rewards.580  
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Most of this group was cleared to be released by 2004, but there were fears that they 
would be tortured by China if returned there.581   
European Union member states have recognized the need for their help in closing 
the facility and some have actually done so.582  Despite pressure to close Guantanamo 
Bay, the European Union was initially hesitant to help close Guantanamo Bay by 
resettling detainees.583  In 2009 though, the European Union and its member states and 
the United States issued a Joint Statement on Closure of Guantanamo Bay and Future 
Counterterrorism Operation.584 
The Joint Statement began by recognizing shared values, including “freedom, 
democracy, and respect for international law, the rule of law and human rights,” and 
stated that “efforts to combat terrorism should be conducted in a manner that comports 
with the rule of law, respects our common values, and complies with our respective 
obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee 
law, and humanitarian law.”585  While the Joint Statement provided “that the primary 
responsibility for closing Guantanamo and finding residence for the former detainees 
rests with the United States,” it also recognized that some of the detainees could not 
return to their home countries.586 
With this background, the Joint Statement explained that “the EU and its Member 
States wish to help the US turn the page” and that some European Union member states 
were willing to accept former Guantanamo detainees on a case-by-case basis.587  Under 
the Joint Statement, when considering the transfer of a specific detainee to a European 
Union member state the United States is required to “share with that Member State all 
available (confidential and other) intelligence and information concerning that person 
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relevant in order to allow it to take an informed decision and conduct a proper security 
assessment.”588 
The Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States on the Closure of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre of June 2009 
provided a framework for European Union member states accepting former Guantanamo 
Bay detainees.589  This framework generally left the decision and responsibility to the 
individual European Union member state involved, but also promoted cooperation 
between member states because of the lack of controls within internal borders of the 
European Union, especially with regard to information sharing.590  Dozens of former 
Guantanamo Bay detainees have been released to European Union member states, 
including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom, among others.591  These former detainees were often citizens or former 
residents of these European Union member states.592 
Most of the former Guantanamo detainees in Europe have reintegrated without 
significant problems, but some have been prosecuted for criminal activity, primarily for 
alleged crimes that occurred before their time at Guantanamo Bay.593  Two former 
Guantanamo Bay detainees have also been arrested in Belgium in 2015 for allegedly 
participating in a recruiting network for al Qaeda and Syria,594 which could present a 
challenge for the United States federal administration in seeking to close Guantanamo 
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Bay in the future.  President Obama has continued to try to convince595 other countries to 
accept and resettle detainees at Guantanamo Bay so that the prison can eventually 
close.596 
Although there has been some resistance from Congress, there has been progress 
towards closing the Guantanamo Bay detention center.597  The most detainees were held 
at Guantanamo Bay in June 2003, numbering nearly 700 at that time.  More than 500 
detainees were released during the time that Bush was president.  By April 2016, the 
number of Guantanamo Bay detainees had been reduced to 80,598 which is less than half 
the number of detainees at Guantanamo at the time when Obama took office as president 
and the least detainees since less than 2 weeks after the detention center started being 
used to detain terrorist suspects on January 11, 2002.599 
This reduction in the number of detainees at Guantanamo Bay has made the 
facility quieter and more manageable, with many of the remaining detainees allowed to 
spend much of their time in “communal conditions” in which “they are free to eat 
together, pray, play soccer and computer games and watch satellite TV.”600  Some 
advocates for closing Guantanamo Bay believe that the reduction in detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay also may make it easier to eventually close the facility, with fewer 
detainees potentially meaning it would be more manageable to close.601  The prisoners 
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not yet cleared for release still face trial by military commission, may face charges in the 
future, or are considered too dangerous to release.602 
Early in his presidency, Obama supported using domestic courts to try terrorist 
suspects when feasible and using military tribunals to charge suspects with violating the 
laws of war in other cases.603  President Obama announced reforms to the military 
tribunals in May 2009, including banning evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment and restricting hearsay evidence.604  In 2009, Obama also ordered the 
closing of the CIA’s secret prisons.605 
However, the order for the closure of the secret prisons oversees does not limit the 
use of facilities by the United States to hold terrorist suspects on a short-term, transitory 
basis.606  Although President Obama has moved closer to closing Guantanamo Bay and 
ending the use of black sites, the Obama administration has also moved toward 
“questioning terrorists for as long as it takes aboard U.S. naval vessels” while 
maintaining the ability for the United States government to prosecute the terrorist 
suspects in civilian courts.607 
The use of secret prisons allowed the CIA to conduct long harsh interrogations 
without giving the terrorist suspects access to lawyers.608  President Obama promised to 
end these prior practices, but did not have a ready replacement that would allow for 
intelligence gathering before sending the suspect to court.609  Conducting the 
interrogations on warships has sometimes been utilized as the answer to this issue, where 
persons have been detained “in military custody under the laws of war, which means a 
person can be captured and held indefinitely as an enemy combatant” according to United 
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States officials.610  These interrogations occur before giving the suspects their Miranda 
rights so that the intelligence gathered can be used for military or CIA actions but would 
not be admissible evidence in court.611 
This is arguably some improvement over prior policy as (at least some of) these 
people are not being held secretly, although they are not being provided a speedy trial or 
counsel during that time.612  According to Robert Chesney, a professor at the University 
of Texas School of Law, “This situation...  is a hybrid model in which military detention 
under the laws of war is used to facilitate short-term interrogation, and then combined 
with civilian criminal prosecution in order to take the person off the streets for the long 
term.”613 
In sum, the European Union’s criticisms of Guantanamo Bay and black sites and 
the framework provided by the European Union had a considerable impact, as it 
facilitated the relocation of former detainees and thus contributed, in conjunction with 
other countries accepting detainees, to reducing the number of detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay. This has made the facilities there more manageable and may, in the future, help in 
the final closure of Guantanamo Bay.  The European Union’s impact on arbitrary 
detention included persuasion and coercion, by presenting criticisms for ending the 
arbitrary detention of suspected terrorists and forming agreement with the United States 
and by facilitating the transfer and settlement of detainees within European Union 
member states.614 
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4.3 The European Union’s Impact on Extraordinary Rendition 
 
Under the extraordinary rendition program during the War on Terror, the CIA 
arrested or abducted suspected terrorists, often through force or violence, in another 
country and transferred them to places where torture might be used, particularly during 
interrogations for information.615  During this process, the individual generally was not 
allowed to contact family members, attorneys, human rights workers, or others regarding 
their circumstances.616  As explained earlier, renditions are not new and were regularly 
used under former President Clinton.617  Renditions were, however, expanded under 
former President Bush after September 11, 2001, generally to avoid some of the legal 
issues with bringing suspects to the United States.618 
One difference between previous uses of the rendition process and how it was 
used under President Bush during the War on Terror is that Bush’s use of renditions were 
often for purposes of bringing suspects for interrogation rather than to face legal 
process.619  The extraordinary rendition program under Bush has also often been 
criticized because of the transfer of individuals to places that are known for torture.620  
While cooperation between different countries’ law enforcement entities are ordinarily 
based on treaties, such as within the context of the extradition treaty entered into between 
the European Union and United States discussed earlier, the extraordinary rendition 
program conducted by the CIA sought to avoid the potentially time consuming legal and 
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political hurdles in favor of arguably quicker and more effective intelligence gathering 
outside of such legal constraints.621  The extraordinary rendition program did not always 
run smoothly, with some botched operations, mistaken identities, and prisoners taken to 
countries where they were subjected to torture.622 
In conducting its extraordinary rendition program, the United States utilized the 
help of other countries, including some European Union member states and (then) 
candidate countries.  Reports indicate that airports in Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal, and Spain have been used by the CIA when transporting terrorist 
suspects and detainees via aircraft.623  Due to the secrecy of the operations, it is not clear 
whether local intelligence agencies were aware of each of the CIA operations, but at least 
in some circumstances local intelligence agencies were involved.624  In 2003 for example, 
the United States CIA provided millions of dollars to Polish intelligence for their help in 
the program.625  More specifically, the Polish intelligence provided a secret prison in 
Poland, one of the CIA’s black sites, for the CIA to utilize in its extraordinary rendition 
and interrogation program.626 
The CIA prison in Poland was particularly important in the US War on Terror 
because it was the first to be used to detain September 11 conspirators, including Khalid 
Sheik Mohammed, who was “the self-declared mastermind of the attacks.”627  Khalid 
Sheik Mohammed was waterboarded 183 times at the CIA prison in Poland.628  In July 
2014, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Poland had violated the rights of 
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terrorism suspects because of the transfer to its black site.629  After the black site in 
Poland was emptied in late 2003, detainees were placed in sites in other countries like 
Romania, Morocco, and Lithuania.630  The Romanian and Lithuanian facilities were 
closed in 2006.631 
One of the largest difficulties for researchers and organizations advocating for 
human rights in opposition to the extraordinary rendition program is the secrecy 
involved, as the United States government has classified much information, including 
about the black site destinations.632  Overtime, however, some information has been 
released (but often heavily redacted), leaked, or investigated.  The United States Senate 
Intelligence Committee, for example, released a report in December 2014 on the CIA’s 
detention and interrogation program.633 
The Council of Europe and the European Union and its member states have also 
performed investigations into the secret prisons and other help from within their countries 
in connection with the United States extraordinary rendition program.634  Poland, for 
example, issued arrest warrants for CIA officials involved with the black site formerly in 
their country.635  An Italian court also issued an arrest warrant for 22 CIA agents 
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suspected of helping abduct Osama Mustafa Hassan in Italy without permission.636  
Hassan claimed that he was abducted in Italy, flown to Egypt, and tortured with electric 
shocks while detained.637  Such warrants are valid for detaining the CIA officials 
anywhere in the European Union.638  The efforts of NGOs, the media, the Council of 
Europe,639 and the European Parliament640 were essential to revealing some of the known 
facts about the generally secretive programs conducted by the CIA.641   
Particularly, a committee was formed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe to investigate the European involvement in the extraordinary rendition 
program.642  Swiss Senator Dick Marty was the lead investigator for the Council of 
Europe’s investigation into European cooperation with the United States.643  Relevantly, 
the European Union aided in the Council of Europe’s investigation, with the Commission 
providing support in obtaining information from the European Union Satellite Centre and 
Eurocontrol.644 In 2006, the Council of Europe’s investigative committee issued its first 
report, stating: 
 
“the CIA ‘rendition’ programme has revealed a network that resembles a 
‘spider’s web’ spun across the globe.  .  .  .  Analysis of the network's 
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functioning .  .  .  allows us to make a number of conclusions both about 
human rights violations - some of which continue - and about the 
responsibilities of some [COE] Member states .  .  .  .  [I]t is only through 
the intentional or grossly negligent collusion of the European partners that 
this ‘web’ was able to spread also over Europe.  .  .  .  across the world, the 
United States has progressively woven a clandestine ‘spider’s web’ of 
disappearances, secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers, often 
encompassing countries notorious for their use of torture.  Hundreds of 
persons have become entrapped in this web, in some cases merely 
suspected of sympathising with a presumed terrorist organisation.”645 
 
Similarly, on January 31, 2007, the European Parliament’s Temporary Committee 
on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for Illegal Activities, which was 
selected in 2005, also issued a report on European Union member state involvement in 
the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program.646  The European Parliament’s report found 
that the extraordinary rendition program has been conducted in violation of international 
law and is counterproductive to its intended purpose of combating terrorism.647  The 
report adopted by the European Parliament condemned extraordinary rendition, 
participants in that process, and the secrecy involved with the program.  The European 
Parliament’s final report stated that it 
 
“Condemns extraordinary rendition as an illegal instrument used by the 
United States in the fight against terrorism; condemns, further, the 
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acceptance and concealing of the practice, on several occasions, by the 
secret services and governmental authorities of certain European 
countries. 
Condemns any participation in the interrogation of individuals who are 
victims of extraordinary rendition, because it represents a deplorable 
legitimisation of that type of illegal procedure, even where those 
participating in the interrogation do not bear direct responsibility for the 
kidnapping, detention, torture or ill-treatment of the victims.”648 
 
The European Parliament also explained that it did not receive sufficient 
cooperation from European Union member states and institutions in its investigation of 
European involvement.649  The report stated that cooperation from European Union 
member states and institutions “has fallen far below the standard that Parliament is 
entitled to expect” and encouraged review of the state secrets defense with regard to 
disclosure of information, although it also approved of the actions of some judicial 
authorities in European Union member states.650 
Members of the European Parliament also briefed members of the United States 
House of Representatives on their findings for Congressional hearings on the 
renditions.651  The author of the European Parliament report, Carlo Fava, explained to 
members of the United States Congress that the European Parliament believes the 
extraordinary rendition program was “an illegal instrument used by the United States in 
the fight against terrorism.”652  The United States federal administration, on the other 
hand, claimed that it acted lawfully in the renditions.653   
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In the context of the United States policy of general secrecy regarding these CIA 
operations conducted under the extraordinary rendition program, the European Union’s 
involvement in exposing details about the program is important.  In addition though, the 
European Union was able to obtain public acknowledgements of the existence of the 
program from the United States. 
More specifically, in 2005, the European Union sought a response from the Bush 
administration about reports of secret prisons in Europe used for the extraordinary 
rendition program.654  Britain, then holding the presidency of the European Union, 
demanded information from the United States regarding reports that the CIA interrogated 
and detained prisoners in secret prisons.655  Specifically, British Foreign Minister Jack 
Straw on behalf of the European Union requested clarification on the extraordinary 
rendition program, including the use of covert prisons and airplane stopovers in Europe 
for carrying out the program.656 
On December 5, 2005, former United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
publicly responded to the European Union’s request for clarification in a briefing to 
journalists.657  Secretary Rice began her speech by explicitly referencing inquiries 
regarding the United States conduct in the War on Terror that were received from the 
European Union and stating that her speech was intended to respond to those inquiries as 
she was leaving for a tour of Europe that day.658  Secretary Rice stated that her speech 
“will essentially form the text of the letter that I will send to [British Foreign] Secretary 
[Jack] Straw, who wrote on behalf of the European Union as the European Union 
president.”659 
In her speech, Secretary Rice explained that the War on Terror takes the form of 
conventional military operations such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, a war of ideas, as well 
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as a “struggle waged also by our law enforcement agencies” in which cooperation of 
United States and foreign intelligence services takes place.660  Rice further explained: 
 
“We must track down terrorists who seek refuge in areas .  .  .  where the 
terrorists cannot in practice be reached by the ordinary processes of law. 
. . . The captured terrorists of the 21st century do not fit easily into 
traditional systems of criminal or military justice, which were designed for 
different needs.  We have to adapt.”661 
 
Essentially, Rice argued that a difficult issue is how to handle captured suspected 
terrorists, where traditional systems of criminal or military justice do not meet the current 
needs.662 
Secretary Rice claimed that captured members of al-Qaeda are unlawful 
combatants that can be held in accordance with the law of war.663  Rice also explained 
that renditions have been used by the United States and other countries for decades, and 
that, while sometimes traditional judicial procedures can be utilized, some situations do 
not allow for “traditional extradition”.664  She claimed that it was appropriate in those 
cases for the local government to cooperate with the rendition, which in her perspective is 
“a vital tool in combating transnational terrorism.”665  She further claimed that it is 
United States policy to comply with treaty obligations, including the Convention Against 
Torture, when conducting renditions.666  Although Rice did not mention the secret prisons 
in Europe, Rice did finally and importantly acknowledge the rendition program, calling it 
a “lawful weapon” that has been used to “save European lives.”667  The Bush 
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administration has claimed that its tactics in the War on Terror have prevented hijackings 
of planes in the United States and bombings in Europe.668 
Both the United States and some countries in Europe have strongly defended their 
general secrecy and involvement in the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program based on 
reasons of national security in such matters.669  For human rights advocates, this can be 
particularly problematic because in order to adequately address a potential human rights 
violation one must have knowledge that a human rights violation exists and the nature 
and extent of the violation.  The extraordinary rendition program has resulted “in a trend 
of concealment of some aspects of international relations from democratic scrutiny, and, 
more generally, a lack of accountability.”670 
The European Union’s involvement has helped push the door open exposing the 
CIA’s extraordinary rendition program.  The European Union accomplished this through 
persuasion in its efforts to expose information about the program, through pressure on the 
United States to acknowledge the program, helping with the Council of Europe’s 
investigation, and in the European Parliament’s own investigation.  The European 
Union’s inquiries in particular were directly and primarily responsible for the United 
States reducing its policy of nearly complete secrecy about the program, secrecy which 
the United States has contended is essential to its national security.  As such, the 
European Union has had a significant impact on the United States with regard to 
extraordinary rendition. 
With greater exposure of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition programs, political 
discussions in the public sphere have become possible.  In 2007, President Obama had 
written that building a better, freer world “means ending the practices of shipping away 
prisoners in the dead of night to be tortured in far-off countries, of detaining thousands 
without charge or trial, of maintaining a network of secret prisons to jail people beyond 
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the reach of the law”.671  Like the Bush administration, however, President Obama has 
continued the policy of sending terrorist suspects to other countries for purposes of 
interrogation and detention, but with more monitoring to ensure that they are not 
tortured.672  This decision was announced in 2009 by Obama’s Interrogation and Transfer 
Policy Task Force, despite earlier mixed messages from Obama under which some hoped 
he might end the practice of renditions entirely.673 
 
 
4.4 The European Union’s Impact on Torture and Ill Treatment 
 
There is significant overlap between the United States extraordinary rendition 
program and the torture and ill treatment of prisoners.  In addition to the prisoner-abuse 
scandals at Baghram, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo Bay, the release of the “torture 
memos”, written between 2002 and 2005 by United States legal officials, attempt to 
provide legal justification for and describe “brutal interrogation techniques used by the 
CIA,” indicating that mistreatment of prisoners was at least sometimes sanctioned at 
some of the highest levels under the Bush administration.674  The interrogation techniques 
described in the torture memos “were among the Bush administration’s most closely 
guarded secrets.”675  The memos were released because of a lawsuit filed by the 
American Civil Liberties Union for the release of the documents.676 
Some of the methods approved by the Bush administration through legal 
arguments for interrogating al Qaeda and terrorist suspects included sleep deprivation, 
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forced nudity, and waterboarding, among others.677  Waterboarding entailed strapping the 
person to an inclined gurney and pouring water on a cloth that covered the person’s nose 
and mouth, which gives the feeling of drowning, for up to 40 seconds at a time.678  Even 
these rules were not always followed when waterboarding suspects.679   
Not only were these methods approved in the torture memos, but they were also 
put into practice by the CIA.  Officials at a black site in Poland were briefed on enhanced 
interrogation techniques, including slapping, sleep deprivation, and waterboarding.680  In 
a more extreme example, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri had a drill put to his blindfolded head 
in a mock execution at a black site in Poland.681  As already mentioned, Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed was also waterboarded 183 times as well as deprived of sleep at the CIA 
prison in Poland.682  Some United States officials claimed that these techniques provided 
important results in gathering intelligence, although the value and reliability of the 
information has been questioned by others.683 
The Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, originally adopted in 2001, aim 
to “work towards the prevention and eradication of torture and ill-treatment within the 
EU and world-wide” through political dialogue, demarches, and bilateral and multi-
lateral cooperation.684  Along these lines, the European Parliament and other European 
Union officials have criticized the treatment of terrorist suspects by the United States 
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with the general view in Europe being that the CIA’s interrogation methods are torture.685  
In resolutions, the European Parliament has condemned the use of torture and ill-
treatment in the War on Terror by the United States.686  In 2006, for example, the 
European Parliament issued a resolution calling to end “special interrogation techniques” 
such as sexual humiliation, short shackling, and the use of dogs to create fear.687  
European officials have also criticized the prisoner-abuse scandals at Baghram, Abu 
Ghraib, and Guantanamo Bay.688   
The Bush administration largely ignored or denied such criticisms from the 
European Union.  After former Secretary of State Rice returned from a trip from Europe 
in 2005, John Bellinger, a former United States State Department senior legal advisor, 
denied that terrorist suspects were sent to other countries to be tortured, stating that the 
administration sought reassurances that the suspects would not be subject to torture.689  
John Bellinger acknowledged, however, that some terror suspects were questioned in 
other countries under the United States rendition program and claimed that transferring 
prisoners to countries criticized for human rights violations was not against international 
law.690  While Mr.  Bellinger denied that the United States had practiced or supported 
torture in other countries, he also did not comment on the enhanced interrogation 
techniques approved in the torture memos.691   
In Secretary Rice’s December 5, 2005 speech responding to inquiries from the 
European Union, Rice rejected the idea that the United States has used torture, stating:  
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“In accordance with the policy of this administration...  the United States 
does not transport, and has not transported, detainees from one country to 
another for the purpose of interrogation using torture[,] the United States 
does not use the airspace or the airports of any country for the purpose of 
transporting a detainee to a country where he or she will be tortured[, and] 
the United States has not transported anyone, and will not transport 
anyone, to a country when we believe he will be tortured.  Where 
appropriate, the United States seeks assurances that transferred persons 
will not be tortured.”692   
 
Rice also explained that abuse of detainees by United States officials, such as at Abu 
Ghraib, are investigated, prosecuted, and punished, such as by prison, demotion, or 
reprimand, in the United States.693  Rice denied that the policy of the United States 
allowed torture, and claimed that United States policy for interrogations will be 
consistent with domestic law and treaty obligations, including the Convention Against 
Torture.694  In the background of these claims and denials by United States officials, 
however, is that the torture memos provided legal justification for the United States 
practices that were considered by others, including some in the European Union, to be 
torture and ill treatment. 
President Obama’s administration, on the other hand, called some of the 
previously approved interrogation techniques, such as waterboarding, torture.695  Obama 
called the use of these interrogation techniques a “dark and painful chapter in our history” 
and stated that the United States would no longer use such methods.696  President Obama 
revoked the previous legal opinions on interrogation techniques his second day after 
                                                 
692 Rice, C. (2005). Full Text: Rice Defends US Policy. BBC News. Retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4500630.stm. 
693 Ibid. 
694 Ibid. 
695 Mazzetti, M. (2009). Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A. The New York Times. 
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taking office and ended the interrogation program in 2009.697  Obama approved a 
multiagency interrogation unit within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, called the High 
Value Interrogation Group, that would conduct oversight of the interrogations of 
terrorism suspects, which was previously the role of the CIA, to ensure that only 
noncoercive interrogation techniques approved by the administration were used.698  The 
Interrogation techniques would have to comply with the Army Field Manual 
guidelines.699  Human Rights Watch considered this change a significant step toward 
more humane treatment.700 
From the Obama administration’s perspective, the use of highly coercive 
interrogation techniques harmed the United States reputation in the world, such as with 
its traditional allies in the European Union and its member states.701  As explained by 
Con Coughlin: 
 
“America may remain the world's leading military power, but the lesson of 
the past seven years is that it cannot overcome the many challenges it 
faces on its own.  To make the world a better and safer place America 
needs all the friends it can get, a fact the new Obama national security 
team appear to grasp.”702 
 
Obama sought to repair the United States reputation with the world, including by casting 
aside some of the questionable policies utilized during the War on Terror under the Bush 
administration.703  Thus, while the European Union’s persuasive efforts regarding the 
United States treatment of terrorist suspects as torture were largely ignored or denied 
                                                 
697 Ibid. 
698 Johnston, D. (2009). U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, But With More Oversight. The New York Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/us/politics/25rendition.html. 
699 Ibid. 
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under the Bush administration, they were a concern for the Obama administration.704  It is 
likely, however, that the change under the Obama administration would have occurred 
regardless of the European Union’s condemnations of United States’ practices in this 
area. Obama’s position on the highly coercive interrogation techniques such as 
waterboarding was that they are “never acceptable” and emphasized that he has 
“consistently opposed” such practices, which suggests that Obama’s position was likely 
not changed because of the European Union’s actions.705 The European Union’s position 
in this regard only provided additional support for Obama’s existing position on the 
matter, so the European Union’s impact was only marginal and not considerable or 
significant. 
 
 
4.5 The European Union’s Impact on Drone Killings by the United States 
 
Drones are unmanned aerial vehicles that allow the United States to track and kill 
terrorist suspects with precision without jeopardizing lives of US military forces and at a 
lower cost than other methods.706  The United States first utilized drones for targeted 
killings in Afghanistan in 2001.707  Drones have become a choice weapon for the United 
States to combat suspected al-Qaeda terrorists.708 
After entering office, President Obama increased the use of drones for killing 
alleged terrorists.709  Obama’s former press secretary Robert Gibbs explained that he was 
instructed not to acknowledge the existence of the drone program in the United States, 
and, even though there is more transparency about it today,710 some parts of the program 
                                                 
704 Ibid.; Exec. Order No. 13491, 3 C.F.R. 
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Freedoms while Countering Terrorism. A/68/389. Retrieved from https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/478/77/PDF/N1347877.pdf?OpenElement; United Nations (2013). 
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are probably going to remain secret.711  Other countries have also used drones for 
targeted killings, including the United Kingdom and Israel.712  Similar to the United 
States, the United Kingdom discloses very little information on the specifics of drone 
utilization.713 
The use of drones for targeted killings, however, has been criticized for 
undermining the international rule of law as they may take place away from the zones 
where conventional hostilities are taking place.714  The European Parliament in particular 
has criticized the use of drone strikes as human rights law prohibits arbitrary killings, and 
has called for the European Union to adopt a common position concerning the use of 
armed drones.715 
Although an opinion poll indicated that many in Europe are opposed to the use of 
drones to kill terrorist suspects not on the battlefield, European leaders, other than in the 
European Parliament, have generally responded to the United States use of “drone strikes 
in a muted and largely passive way.”716  “It is not only the EU institutions that have failed 
to make their voice heard on the issue of drone strikes.  The member states have 
generally followed a similar pattern.”717 
Although there has been a general silence during the 2000s, some European 
officials, including from Germany, Austria, and some Nordic countries, have expressed 
disagreement with the United States on the matter in closed-door dialogues and bilateral 
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meetings.718  However, European officials have rarely expressed public disagreement on 
the issue, and the European Union as a whole has not provided its own vision on when it 
is appropriate to use lethal drone strikes against particular individuals.719  European states 
have not “made a serious effort to influence the development of US policy or to begin 
discussions on formulating common standards for the kinds of military operations that 
[drones] facilitate.”720 
The European Union’s general inaction has nonetheless had a marginal impact on 
United States interests with regard to the use of drone strikes.  Harold Koh, a former State 
Department legal advisor, stated that the United States federal administration “should be 
more willing to discuss international legal standards for use of drones, so that our actions 
do not inadvertently empower other nations and actors who would use drones 
inconsistent with the law.”721  Another former administration official explained that the 
reaction by allies to the United States on drone use is “the main test and constraint for the 
administration … if other states don’t object, the conclusion is that they are not 
concerned.”722  As a result, Anthony Dworkin concludes that “EU member states are in a 
position to use their influence to support those groups within the administration who are 
pushing for improved standards and greater internationalization” concerning the use of 
drone strikes.723  In this context, the European Union’s general inaction suggests to the 
United States that the use of drones to kill suspected terrorists, including outside of the 
battlefield, is generally permissible. 
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4.6 Overall Results and Conclusion 
 
 The European Union’s internal example has been relatively inconsistent with 
regard to balancing security and human rights concerns in the War on Terror, with some 
European Union member states helping or participating in similar practices to the United 
States and others utilizing rhetoric condemning the United States for human rights 
violations.  Without a clear example to follow, the European Union had nil impact in this 
regard.  Nonetheless, the European Union was able to have an impact on the United 
States with regard to arbitrary detention, extraordinary rendition, torture and ill treatment, 
and drone killings.  The European Union had a considerable impact on arbitrary 
detention, particularly by pressuring the United States to close Guantanamo Bay and by 
facilitating the reduction of prisoners subject to detention there.  The European Union 
also had a significant impact on extraordinary rendition, with the European Union 
helping to expose the program and its inquiries being crucial to the United States 
admitting the existence of the program.  The European Union’s criticism of the treatment 
of terrorist suspects had only a marginal impact on the United States, only confirming the 
Obama administration’s rejection of the interrogation methods utilized during the Bush 
administration.  The European Union’s general silence with regard to the United States 
use of drones for targeted killings outside of the battlefield also only had a marginal 
impact on the United States by indicating that the United States policies in this area were 
permissible.  The European Union’s impact on human rights issues in the War on Terror 
on the United States political branches is summarized in the following table. 
 
 
Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
War on Terror, 
generally 
Inconsistency within EU Setting an 
example 
None Nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Arbitrary 
detention 
EU seeks closure of 
Guantanamo Bay and legal 
protections for detainees by 
European Parliament 
resolutions and 
communications with US and 
public 
Persuasion Obama administration 
seeks closure of black 
sites and Guantanamo 
Bay and reduces 
number of persons 
detained 
Considerable 
Arbitrary 
detention 
Creation of framework for 
transfer of Guantanamo 
detainees to EU member states 
Persuasion; 
coercion 
Dozens of detainees 
transferred and settled 
in EU member states, 
reducing detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay 
Considerable 
Extraordinary 
rendition 
EU investigates, reports, and 
criticizes extraordinary 
rendition program through 
communications with US, 
supporting Council of 
Europe’s investigation, and 
European Parliament’s 
investigation 
Persuasion US acknowledges 
extraordinary rendition 
program and 
information about 
program exposed, thus 
reducing policy of 
secrecy about program 
Significant 
Torture and ill 
treatment 
EU criticizes US treatment of 
terrorist suspects in 
communications and European 
Parliament resolutions 
Persuasion Bush administration 
ignores and rejects 
criticisms; Obama 
continues to disapprove 
of interrogation 
methods used under 
Bush 
Marginal 
Drone killings General inaction from EU, but 
some criticism from European 
Parliament and other officials 
General 
inaction, 
some 
persuasion 
US continues drone 
program with little 
resistance 
Marginal 
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 The European Union achieved these results through persuasion, coercion, and 
(lack of) setting an example.  Within the European Union, individual member states did 
not always act uniformly in their approach to terrorism, with some member states 
following the United States lead rather than the other way around.  Persuasion was 
utilized by the European Union in criticizing United States policies and actions with 
regard to arbitrary detention, extraordinary rendition, and torture and ill treatment.  To a 
lesser extent, the European Union utilized persuasion to address the issue of targeted 
drone killings, although the European Union was relatively silent in this area.  To some 
extent, there were elements of coercion with regard to the European Union’s efforts to 
end the United States’ arbitrary detention of prisoners, as the European Union provided a 
framework for the transfer and relocation of former detainees to European Union member 
states. 
Accordingly, setting an example had the least impact, nil, on the United States 
political branches on human rights issues involved in the War on Terror.  Persuasion was 
present for significant impact on extraordinary rendition, considerable impact on arbitrary 
detention, and marginal impact for torture and ill treatment and drone killings, although it 
was the general inaction that was particularly relevant for the latter.  Coercion again was 
not frequently used, but when it was used on the issue of arbitrary detention it also 
contributed to the European Union’s considerable impact.  In sum, despite the European 
Union’s inconsistency in its approach to the War on Terror, the European Union’s impact 
in at least some of these cases against the United States on vital issues affecting policies 
aimed at national security in the War on Terror suggests that the European Union is a 
major force even in its relations with a world power. 
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5. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S IMPACT ON UNITED STATES COURTS IN 
DEATH PENALTY CASES 
 
In the European Union’s multifaceted advocacy against the death penalty in the 
United States, the European Union has chosen to directly target United States federal 
courts, rather than solely rely on traditional diplomatic or other channels, in death penalty 
cases, which makes strategic sense given the popular support for the death penalty and 
related support by some elected politicians in the United States.  The challenges faced by 
the European Union are illustrated by the September 7, 2011 Republican presidential 
debate, where the crowd applauded for former Texas Governor Rick Perry’s 234 
executions during his tenure as governor, “more than any other governor in modern 
times.”724  Although that audience may represent a limited segment of society, Gallup 
polls also indicate that a majority in the United States continue to support capital 
punishment.725  Governor Perry’s response to questioning during that debate about 
executions in Texas also expressed his belief that there is popular support for the death 
penalty: 
 
“I think Americans understand justice.  I think Americans are clearly, in 
the vast majority of -- of cases, supportive of capital punishment.  When 
you have committed heinous crimes against our citizens -- and it’s a state-
by-state issue, but in the state of Texas, our citizens have made that 
decision, and they made it clear, and they don’t want you to commit those 
crimes against our citizens.  And if you do, you will face the ultimate 
justice.”726 
 
                                                 
724 New York Times (2011). The Republican Debate at the Reagan Library. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/us/politics/08republican-debate-text.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all. 
725 Newport, F. (2010). In U.S., 64% Support Death Penalty in Cases of Murder. Gallup. Retrieved from 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/144284/Support-Death-Penalty-Cases-Murder.aspx. 
726 New York Times (2011). The Republican Debate at the Reagan Library. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/us/politics/08republican-debate-text.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all. 
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Given the number of executions in Texas, the European Union has sent multiple 
letters to Governor Perry regarding specific death penalty cases.  However, considering 
Governor Perry’s general views on the death penalty and the popular support for the 
death penalty, it is less of a surprise that the European Union has also turned to United 
States courts on the issue.  While the federal structure and separation of powers in the 
United States government can make it more complicated to advocate for and achieve 
results in abolishing the death penalty, it also presents alternative routes for influencing 
United States laws, policies, behavior, and interests.  United States courts, of course, play 
a central role in interpreting and applying laws associated with the death penalty.  When 
elected politicians are unwilling or unable to make changes concerning individual or 
minority rights, the courts are often the prudent alternative, particularly when it concerns 
criminal sentences and interpreting rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution.727 
 This chapter examines the European Union’s impact in United States courts on 
the death penalty utilizing the modified Ginsberg framework set forth earlier.  Some of 
the modifications to that framework are especially worth re-emphasizing due to their 
particular relevance to this chapter and the next chapter concerning human rights and the 
War on Terror. 
First, this dissertation expands Ginsberg’s notion of external impact from 
covering changes or modifications in the policies, interests, and behavior of the United 
States to also include changes or modifications in the laws of the United States.  This 
explicit extension of the framework to cover changes and modifications in laws 
(including their interpretation) is necessary to reflect the overlap and often inextricable 
link between law and policy – the former sometimes being the formalization of the latter 
by the government.  It also accounts for the fact that human rights foreign policy is often 
not only aimed at stopping human rights violations themselves in the short-term, but also 
towards embodying long-term human rights protections in laws within a system in which 
the rule of law is observed.  In human rights, as in many areas, form and practice often go 
hand in hand and are both essential. 
                                                 
727 Constitution of the United States (1787). Retrieved from 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution.html. 
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Relevantly, the European Union advocates for abolition of the death penalty 
worldwide in law, policy, and practice.  If the rule of law is followed, laws should and 
often do also directly and indirectly apply to and limit government policy, interests, and 
behavior, particularly when considering human rights violations perpetrated within or 
sanctioned by the government.  This is particularly true with regard to due process 
protections and the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments defined in the United 
States Constitution and other United States laws designed to limit the political and 
judicial branches of government.  With regard to capital punishment in the United States, 
for example, the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution728 places limits on 
members of the federal and state executive branches from seeking and judiciaries from 
imposing the death penalty. 
In the United States system of checks and balances and separation of powers, it is 
the judiciary itself which interprets and defines such limits, leading to another extension 
of Ginsberg’s framework.  Ginsberg primarily applies his analytical framework to the 
external impact on the United States federal administration.  There is, however, good 
reason to explicitly include the European Union’s impact on the United States judiciary.  
First, in the United States system, the judiciary is often considered a co-equal branch of 
government with the executive and legislative branches.  Given the common law legal 
system in the United States, the general provisions of the United States Constitution, 
diverse and complicated facts arising in different cases, and changing conditions in the 
United States and elsewhere, judges’ interpretations and applications of the law have on 
many occasions been criticized for crossing the line into creation of new laws.  While 
many judges may wish to exercise judicial restraint, both judges and politicians have 
pointed out that (at least some) judges do in fact also act like legislators in (at least some) 
cases.729  Judicial decisions often define the parameters of the rights of capital defendants 
and suspected terrorists as well as how those rights will be applied in practice. 
                                                 
728 Constitution of the United States (1787). Retrieved from 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution.html. 
729 See Kmiec, K. (2004). The Origin and Current Meaning of “Judicial Activism.” California Law Review. 
92(5), p. 1471-1473. 
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Not only is it important to consider the European Union’s impact on courts when 
examining its relations with the United States, it is particularly imperative in the context 
of the human rights cases examined.  Importantly, the United States Supreme Court’s 
decisions concerning Constitutional due process protections and the prohibition on cruel 
and unusual punishments730 that govern the death penalty and human rights abuses 
involved in the War on Terror are generally followed by the other branches of 
government.  As such, the courts are an important alternative route for the European 
Union to seek changes in human rights in the United States.  The European Union’s death 
penalty advocacy potentially affecting United States courts has included amicus curiae 
briefs, funding of external organizations, setting its own example, as well as the 
combination of instruments it has used in its world-wide advocacy against the death 
penalty which, where successful, may provide an example of abolition in the world 
generally. 
The following sections apply the modified Ginsberg framework to three specific 
issues within United States death penalty jurisprudence: the application of the death 
penalty to mentally retarded persons, the juvenile death penalty, and consular access 
rights of foreign nationals subject to the death penalty.  These three issues cover the death 
penalty cases in which the European Union has directly filed amicus curiae briefs in 
United States courts.  Capital sentencing determinations is also examined in Chapter 7 as 
an issue in which the European Union did not directly involve itself but, nonetheless, had 
an impact in United States courts through its funding of non-governmental organizations.  
In addition to the examination of these specific death penalty issues, this chapter 
examines the European Union’s general impact on the death penalty in other United 
States court cases. 
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5.1 The European Union’s Impact on the Execution of Persons with Mental 
Retardation 
 
 In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held in Penry v. Lynaugh731 that, 
although mental retardation was a mitigating factor when deciding whether to impose the 
death penalty, the execution of mentally retarded persons was permissible under the 
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.  In 
2002, the constitutionality of executing mentally retarded persons was again before the 
Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia,732 in which the European Union advocated against 
the execution of mentally retarded persons in an amicus curiae brief.733 
In its brief, the European Union argued that “there is a growing international 
consensus against the execution of persons with mental retardation” and the “practice of 
executing the mentally retarded contravenes international standards and norms.”734  The 
European Union’s brief points out that the Supreme Court has previously “recognized the 
relevance of the views of the international community in determining whether a 
punishment is cruel and unusual.”735  The European Union contended that the “propriety 
of that which is cruel and unusual in this country should, at least in part, be informed by 
considerations of international law, practice and morals.”736  The majority of the Supreme 
Court agreed with the European Union on these points and cited the European Union’s 
brief in its decision. 
 The specific issue at stake in Atkins v. Virginia was whether the application of the 
death penalty to the mentally retarded violates the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments.”  As explained by the majority 
opinion, the meaning of this Eighth Amendment prohibition is based upon “nothing less 
                                                 
731 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989). 
732 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
733 The EU’s brief was originally filed in McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001), which was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court after North Carolina passed legislation banning the execution of mentally 
retarded persons. In Atkins v. Virginia, the EU requested that the Supreme Court consider its brief from 
McCarver v. North Carolina. 
734 Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Union in Support of the Petitioner, 2001 WL 648609 p. 2. 
735 Ibid. p. 4 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988)). 
736 Ibid. p. 18. 
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than the dignity of man....  [and] draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”737  The majority explained that 
legislation is the “most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values” and that the 
Court’s own judgment also plays a part in the Eighth Amendment determination.738 
After concluding that a national legislative consensus in the US has developed in 
a direction against the application of the death penalty to mentally retarded persons, the 
majority opinion footnoted that this “legislative judgment” is consistent with a larger 
social and professional consensus, including among Americans, organizations, and other 
nations.739  Notably, the majority opinion explained that “within the world community, 
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders 
is overwhelmingly disapproved,” citing the European Union’s brief for support of this 
conclusion.740 
The majority also explained two other reasons that the execution of mentally 
retarded persons is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  First, the Court elaborated that 
the social purposes served by the death penalty are inapplicable to mentally retarded 
persons because their culpability is diminished for retribution purposes and deterrence is 
inapplicable due to their reduced capacities.741  Second, the majority explained that 
mentally retarded persons face a special risk of wrongful execution because of the 
possibility of false confessions, inability to provide meaningful assistance to counsel, 
they are often poor witnesses, their demeanor may falsely provide an impression of lack 
of remorse for their conduct, and that mental retardation could enhance the chances that a 
jury will conclude that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness exists.742 
Although the majority opinion’s reference to the disapproval in the world 
community of executing mentally retarded persons is only mentioned in a footnote as 
“further support to [their] conclusion” and not dispositive of the issue,743 Justice 
                                                 
737 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, at 100–01, (1958)). 
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Rehnquist’s dissent disapproved of any reliance on foreign opinion, among other areas of 
disagreement.  Justice Rehnquist explained that legislation is the best evidence of 
contemporary values as legislatures, rather than courts, respond to the will and the moral 
values of the people in a democratic society.744 
Justice Rehnquist thus criticized the majority opinion for its reliance on foreign 
laws since they do not establish whether a practice is accepted among people in the US.  
Justice Rehnquist explained that “if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we 
are looking, then the viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant.”745  Justice 
Scalia’s dissent echoed this point, stating: 
 
“[I]rrelevant are the practices of the ‘world community,’ whose notions of 
justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.  We must never 
forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are 
expounding.  . . .  [W]here there is not first a settled consensus among our 
own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices 
of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans 
through the Constitution.”746 
 
The dissenters’ disapproval of the majority mentioning the views of other nations 
in a footnote is particularly interesting given that in oral argument even counsel for the 
state of Virginia acknowledged that, although the opinions of foreign nations are not 
relevant in the initial step for determining whether execution of the mentally retarded 
violates the Eighth Amendment, the views of other nations are relevant to determining 
whether a practice is the product of historical accident.747  In line with this concession, 
the majority opinion’s conclusion first relies on legislative consensus in the United States 
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before relegating to a footnote that this conclusion is consistent with the larger social and 
professional context.  As explained by Justice Stevens, although the views of 
organizations and other nations “are by no means dispositive, their consistency with the 
legislative evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there is a consensus 
among those who have addressed the issue.”748 
The larger context in which a practice such as executing mentally retarded 
persons takes place and confirmation that the consensus in the United States is not merely 
a historical accident is important given the relative permanency of a determination by the 
Supreme Court that such executions are unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.  
Once that determination of a consensus is made, it is unlikely that such a determination 
would be overruled in another case because a ruling by the United States Supreme Court 
that a practice is unconstitutional, as it amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, would 
ordinarily be complied with by state and national legislatures.  The likelihood of a long 
term impact of such a determination was aptly explained by the Court during oral 
argument: “Because the evidence of the consensus is supposed to be legislation, and once 
we've decided that you cannot legislate the execution of the mentally retarded, there can't 
be any legislation that enables us to go back.”749  Thus, the impact of the European Union 
on the outcome of this case is likely to be long-term. 
In this case, the European Union’s impact was only marginal, as the majority of 
the United States Supreme Court only relied on the European Union’s brief and world 
opinion to confirm their view on the legislative consensus within the United States 
against allowing the death penalty for mentally retarded persons.  If the European Union 
did not file an amicus curiae brief in the case, the majority of the court would likely have 
come to a similar decision.  As discussed above, the justices did not consider the views of 
organizations and other nations as dispositive, as a primary consideration was the 
existence of a legislative consensus internally to the United States. In addition, the 
legislative consensus in the United States was confirmed as more than just a historical 
accident by entities other than the European Union. Specifically, the majority opinion 
                                                 
748 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). 
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also noted that their determination regarding the existence of a legislative consensus 
“reflects a much broader social and professional consensus” against “imposition of the 
death penalty upon a mentally retarded person,” citing the amicus curiae brief of the 
American Psychological Association, the amicus curiae brief of the American 
Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, and an amicus curiae brief 
filed together by groups of various religions.750 The majority opinion also pointed out that 
public opinion polls in the United States oppose executing mentally retarded persons.751 
As such, not only did the European Union’s brief and world opinion play a confirmatory 
role mentioned in a footnote that was not dispositive of the case but it was not alone in 
this regard.752 
 
 
5.2 The European Union’s Impact on the Execution of Juveniles 
 
 In 1988, the US Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the 
execution of persons under the age of 16 years old at the time of the crime in Thompson 
v. Oklahoma.753  The following year in Stanford v. Kentucky, on the same day that Penry 
v. Lynaugh allowed for the execution of mentally retarded persons, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the execution of individuals over 15 and under 18 years old at the time of 
the crime does not violate the Constitution.754  As already discussed, in 2002 the United 
States Supreme Court overruled Penry v. Lynaugh in Atkins v. Virginia.  Only a few years 
later in Roper v. Simmons, Christopher Simmons argued that the reasoning of Atkins v. 
Virginia also applies to people under 18 years old at the time of the crime such that 
execution of such persons should now be considered cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment.755  The European Union filed an amicus curiae brief in support 
of Simmons, arguing that there is an international consensus against the juvenile death 
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penalty based upon the practice of other nations, international law, and the norms and 
standards embraced by international organizations and bodies.756 
 As in Atkins v. Virginia, the majority opinion interpreted the Eighth Amendment 
as based upon “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”757  At the time of the Roper v. Simmons decision, twelve states prohibited the 
death penalty entirely and an additional eighteen states had the death penalty but 
excluded juveniles from the punishment – making thirty states that prohibit the death 
penalty for persons under 18 years of age.758  In the ten years prior to the Court’s decision 
in Roper v. Simmons, only three states – Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia – had carried out 
executions of juvenile prisoners.759 
The majority of the Court found that the consistent direction of change against the 
execution of juveniles demonstrated a national consensus.760  The majority also explained 
that juveniles are less culpable for their conduct due to their immaturity and that the value 
of the death penalty as a deterrent to juveniles may be limited because juveniles are less 
likely to make the cost-benefit analysis involved.761 
As in Atkins v. Virginia, the majority again turned to the international context for 
confirmation of their conclusions regarding the impermissibility of executing juveniles.762  
Unlike the relegation of this confirmation to a footnote in Atkins v. Virginia, however, the 
majority opinion in Roper v. Simmons devoted an entire section – out of four sections – to 
the discussion of the international context.  In this section, the majority noted: 
 The US is the only country that officially sanctions the death penalty for 
juveniles. 
 International covenants contain provisions expressly prohibiting capital 
punishment for crimes committed by persons under 18 years old, including 
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Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified 
by every country except the US and Somalia. 
 Since 1990, only seven other countries have executed juveniles, each of which 
later abolished or disavowed the practice of executing juveniles.763 
The Court summarized the international context stating, “It is fair to say that the United 
States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death 
penalty.”764  The majority opinion attributed particular relevance to the experience of the 
United Kingdom because of its shared history with the United States and the origins of 
the Eighth Amendment.765  
Justice Kennedy’s questioning during oral argument demonstrated his interest in 
the views of the European Union and the world generally, inquiring into the concept of 
unusual punishment within the large context of these views with his questions to counsel: 
 
“We've seen very substantial demonstration that world opinion is--is 
against this, at least as interpreted by the leaders of the European Union.  
Does that have a bearing on what's unusual? Suppose it were shown that 
the United States were one of the very, very few countries that executed 
juveniles, and that's true.  Does that have a bearing on whether or not it's 
unusual?”766 
 
As in Atkins v. Virginia, this decision is likely to have a long-term effect on 
United States death penalty laws because determinations of cruel and unusual punishment 
are based in part on a legislative national consensus, and legislatures are unlikely to pass 
new laws that would violate the Constitution under Supreme Court decisions.767  The 
Court’s continued reliance on the international context for confirmation of its decisions is 
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also building precedent for potential future reliance on and impact by the European 
Union. 
On the other hand, it is not impossible for case law to change course, and the 
United States Supreme Court’s reliance on the views of the European Union and other 
nations was highly controversial.  Indeed, a justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama was 
so displeased with the five United States Supreme Court justices’ reliance on 
contemporary “foreign law” and “that the Roper Court received and specifically cited 
amici curiae briefs from the European Union and from the Human Rights Committee of 
the Bar of England and Wales” that he advocated that, with two different Justices now on 
the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Alabama should decline to 
follow the Roper decision to give the now differently composed United States Supreme 
Court the chance to overrule the Roper decision.768  Thus, not only is the death penalty 
and its specific application a contentious topic, but the mere idea of following the 
example of or citing the brief of foreign authorities like the European Union is 
unacceptable even among some high level judges in the United States. 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Roper v. Simmons (joined by Justices 
Thomas and Rehnquist) also strongly disapproved of the majority opinion’s extensive 
discussion of the international context.  The dissent explained that foreign nations’ views 
are not relevant because they do not have the particular legal system of protections, such 
as juries and consideration of mitigating circumstances for the death penalty, that the 
United States has in place.769  The dissent also pointed out that the United States has 
either not ratified or made specific reservations to the treaties prohibiting the death 
penalty for juveniles discussed by the majority opinion.770 
Unlike the majority, the dissent focused on the differences between the United 
States’ legal, political, and social cultures and those of other countries, including the 
United Kingdom.  As explained by Justice Scalia, the United Kingdom has changed “in 
the centuries since the Revolutionary War” was fought by the United States with its 
“recent submission to the jurisprudence of European courts dominated by continental 
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jurists” such that the United Kingdom has developed “a legal, political, and social culture 
quite different from” that of the United States.771  As such, Justice Scalia rejected the idea 
that laws in the United States should “conform to the laws of the rest of the world”.772 
Despite the dissent’s vigorous disapproval, the European Union had a marginal 
impact on the majority opinion in this case – again by confirming the decision of the 
court regarding the impermissibility of imposition of the death penalty for persons over 
15 and under 18 years of age.  As in Atkins v. Virginia, the European Union’s brief and 
the international context only played a confirmatory role in the majority opinion and 
likely did not create a tangible change in the decision.  Tellingly, Justice O’Conner joined 
the majority opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, but in her dissent in Roper v. Simmons she 
briefly reasoned with regard to the international context that, since in her view there was 
no “domestic consensus” against executing persons over 15 and under 18 years of age, 
“the recent emergence of an otherwise global consensus does not alter that basic fact.”773 
Somewhat similarly, the majority in Roper v. Simmons pointed out that “the opinion of 
the world community” was “not controlling our outcome” but “does provide respected 
and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”774 
 
 
5.3 The European Union’s Impact on Consular Access Rights 
 
 As explained in Chapter 3, the European Union has also focused on consular 
access rights under the VCCR in its death penalty advocacy.  As discussed in that 
chapter, the European Union has had a marginal impact on the federal executive branch 
on this issue.  The European Union has not, however, had an impact on consular access 
rights through its amicus curiae briefs in United States courts. 
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The European Union has filed similar briefs in various cases concerning alleged 
violations of the VCCR, including in support of the petitions of Jose Ernesto Medellin, an 
individual named in the ICJ’s Avena case.  In its briefs, the European Union argues: 
 for the importance of the right to consular access under the VCCR; 
 that the VCCR confers an individual right to consular assistance to foreign 
nationals after arrest; 
 that violation of Article 36 requires judicial review and reconsideration of a 
conviction and sentence, regardless of whether there has been a showing that a 
different result would have been reached with the help of consul; 
 that procedural default rules should not be applied to Article 36 violations; and 
 that consular access is a right pursuant to customary international law.775 
 Although the justices did not necessarily reject all of the European Union’s 
arguments, the United States Supreme Court neither cited nor relied upon the European 
Union’s views in its holding for each case.  In Medellin v. Dretke, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the case based on several threshold issues, including that Medellin had not yet 
exhausted his state court remedies because he had a new pending state application for a 
writ of habeas corpus in Texas filed after the issuance of President Bush’s 
memorandum.776  
Relying on the ICJ’s decision in Avena and President Bush’s Memorandum that 
called on state courts to give effect to that decision, Medellin’s new application for a writ 
of habeas corpus was dismissed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for failing to 
timely raise the VCCR claim pursuant to Texas state law.777  The United States Supreme 
Court again granted certiorari to decide whether the ICJ’s ruling in Avena is directly 
enforceable in a state court and whether “the President’s Memorandum independently 
require[s] the States to provide review and reconsideration of the claims of the 51 
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Mexican nationals named in Avena without regard to state procedural default rules.”778  
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Texas court’s dismissal of Medellin’s 
application, holding that “neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes 
directly enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of successive 
habeas petitions.”779  The European Union’s arguments in its amicus curiae briefs had no 
impact on these court decisions regarding consular access rights in capital cases. 
 
 
5.4 The European Union’s Impact in Other Death Penalty Cases Generally 
 
The issues discussed above represent the specific death penalty issues in which 
the European Union has filed amicus curiae briefs in United States courts.  In other cases, 
although the outcome of the decision was not affected by the abolition of the death 
penalty in the European Union and elsewhere, judges have similarly expressed concern 
regarding the increasingly isolated position in the world of the United States in its 
continued use of the death penalty but were not part of the majority, viewed it as a 
concern for legislators rather than judges, or felt otherwise constrained by additional 
factors.780 
Justice Harrison of the Illinois Supreme Court, for example, expressed in a 
dissenting opinion the isolated position of the United States on the death penalty: 
 
“With the exception of Japan, the United States is now the only well-
established democracy that has not abolished the death penalty expressly 
or in practice.  Western Europe is free of capital punishment, as are most 
countries in our hemisphere.  Even in the United States, 12 states and the 
District of Columbia presently have no death penalty for any offense, no 
matter how severe. 
                                                 
778 Ibid. 
779 Ibid. p. 498-99. 
780 See, e.g., U.S. v. Church, 217 F.Supp.2d 700, 702 (W.D.Va. 2002); People v. Bull, 185 Ill.2d 179, 225 
(Ill. 1998). 
 Samuel R. Layton, Page 178
I do not know enough about international law to judge whether the nations 
who have abolished capital punishment are, in fact, less protective of 
individual human rights than the courts in the United States.  I do know, 
however, that the abolitionist nations have at least insured that no one will 
pay the ultimate price for their fallibility.  That is decidedly not the case in 
those United States jurisdictions retaining the death penalty, including 
Illinois.”781 
 
This is not to suggest, however, that every judge and court decision on the death penalty 
favorably considers the views of the EU and the world generally, as illustrated by the 
dissents in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, discussed earlier.  In multiple federal 
and state cases in which the European Union did not file an amicus curiae brief, United 
States courts have denied relief to defendants based on arguments that the death penalty 
is generally impermissible based upon the abolition of capital punishment in Europe and 
other nations and international law and norms.782 
Although the European Union did not have a tangible impact on the outcome of 
these cases, the European Union and world example have nonetheless entered the 
arguments of defense lawyers and other legal advocates and have been of serious concern 
in the deliberated decisions of at least some judges.  The European Union’s example, as 
well as the world example partially created by the European Union’s efforts, has led to a 
shift in United States interests – making some judges question capital punishment in a 
world where the United States is increasingly isolated on the matter.  As a result, even in 
some cases in which the European Union has not directly involved itself, the European 
Union has nevertheless had a marginal impact on the United States death penalty for what 
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it is as well as what it has accomplished in its world advocacy.  It is of course possible, 
although not certain, that in the years or decades to come this shift in United States 
interests will continue until greater overall change occurs. 
 
 
5.5 Overall Results and Conclusion 
 
Although the European Union faced resistance from some judges to having an 
impact in United States courts on death penalty issues, the European Union has 
nonetheless had a marginal impact through some of its efforts, summarized in the 
following table: 
 
Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanisms 
Outcome Impact 
Death Penalty 
for Mentally 
Retarded 
Persons 
EU files amicus 
curiae briefs in US 
Supreme Court cases 
Persuasion; 
setting an 
example 
US Supreme Court 
majority opinion relies 
on EU brief and EU & 
world example to 
confirm ruling that 
death penalty for 
mentally retarded 
persons is 
unconstitutional  
Marginal 
Death Penalty 
for Juveniles 
EU files amicus 
curiae briefs in US 
Supreme Court cases 
Persuasion; 
setting an 
example 
US Supreme Court 
majority opinion relies 
on EU brief and EU & 
world example to 
confirm ruling that 
juvenile death penalty 
is unconstitutional 
Marginal 
Consular 
Access Rights 
EU files amicus 
curiae briefs in US 
Supreme Court cases 
(Persuasion 
attempted) 
US Supreme Court 
does not rely on EU for 
its decisions 
Nil 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanisms 
Outcome Impact 
Death Penalty 
Generally 
(other cases783) 
Death penalty 
abolished throughout 
EU; EU advocates 
for world-wide 
abolition 
Setting an 
example 
Some US judges 
express concern over 
isolated position of US 
on death penalty 
Marginal 
 
 
The European Union had a marginal impact on the death penalty for juveniles and 
mentally retarded persons through persuasion and setting an example, as well as a 
marginal impact on other death penalty cases through its own example and world 
advocacy.  Even for the issue of consular access rights for which the European Union 
failed to have an impact on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the 
European Union nevertheless had a marginal impact on United States interests through 
other foreign policy advocacy as discussed in Chapter 3.  As demonstrated in Chapter 7, 
the European Union has also had an impact specifically in United States courts on capital 
sentencing through (indirect) persuasion via funding of the ABA’s Moratorium Project. 
In a 2006 article, Krista Patterson minimizes the role of persuasion in cases like 
Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons because the United States Supreme Court did 
not assign “persuasive or precedential value to foreign or international practices” and that 
the dissenting justices had a “strong reaction .  .  .  against the use of foreign or 
international law as persuasive precedent.”784  However, while it would be accurate to say 
that the justices of the United States Supreme Court did not look to French law, German 
law, European Union law, or other foreign law as singularly determinative of the 
outcome in the case without regard to the situation within the states in the United States, 
the majority of justices were nonetheless persuaded about the existence of an 
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international consensus against the death penalty and that the existence of this consensus 
was relevant to confirming the Court’s determination. 
Speaking more generally on the reliance on foreign law, Justice Breyer has 
explained a similar idea: 
 
I read briefs. Those briefs frequently explain law with which I was not 
previously familiar…. Those briefs will have to explain foreign law too, 
and ever more so. That is because foreign law comes before us ever more 
frequently in discovery cases, antitrust cases, EPA14 cases, NAFTA cases. 
We shall have to learn something about foreign law to decide those cases 
properly. And the lawyers will have to explain it, separating the more 
important from the less important information. If there are important, 
interesting, and relevant matters of foreign law, the lawyers will point 
them out.785 
 
Breyer later continued, “If the foreign materials have had a significant impact on my 
thinking, they may belong in the opinion because an opinion should be transparent. It 
should reflect my actual thinking.”786  While it is also true that some dissenting justices 
were not so persuaded, the justices joining the majority opinions in these cases were 
persuaded by some of the European Union’s arguments, and it is the majority opinion 
that sets the most binding precedent for other United States courts that deal with issues of 
capital punishment. 
Nonetheless, persuasion was not the only diffusion mechanism at work here, and 
the European Union’s impact on the death penalty for juveniles and mentally retarded 
persons was also accomplished through its own example and the example created through 
its world-wide advocacy.  In both Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the United 
States Supreme Court considered the death penalty practices of other nations in 
confirming its decisions, demonstrating that successes in the European Union’s world-
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wide efforts at abolishing the death penalty and its own example played such a 
confirmatory role in the decisions. 
In other cases in which the European Union did not specifically involve itself, 
judges have similarly expressed concern regarding the increasingly isolated position of 
the United States in its continued use of the death penalty but were either not part of the 
majority, viewed it as a concern for legislators rather than judges, or faced other 
constraints.787  Despite such concerns, in multiple cases in which the European Union did 
not file a brief, United States courts have not yet accepted legal arguments that the death 
penalty is generally impermissible based upon the abolition of capital punishment in the 
European Union and elsewhere in the world.788 
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6. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S IMPACT ON UNITED STATES COURTS IN 
THE WAR ON TERROR 
 
As previously discussed, in its specific relations with the United States, the 
European Union has made human rights a priority, but more so with the United States 
death penalty than the War on Terror.  The European Parliament has been particularly 
active on human rights issues in the US War on Terror.  In addition to the European 
Parliament’s investigation and 2007 Report on extraordinary rendition and the European 
Parliament’s resolutions calling for the closure of the prison at Guantanamo Bay, 
condemning the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, and condemning 
extraordinary renditions,789 many European Parliamentarians have also joined in amicus 
curiae briefs filed in United States court cases involving Guantanamo Bay detainees. 
Notably, these amicus curiae briefs were not filed on behalf of the European 
Union as a whole, even though, as Sarah Ludford, justice spokeswoman for the European 
Liberal Democrats in the European Parliament, stated: 
 
“The submission of European views would be much strengthened if the 
EU Council of Ministers did it on behalf of the European Union as a 
whole .  .  .  The EU has a duty to speak up for all the prisoners, including 
the non-Europeans.  Otherwise its claims to pursue a human rights policy 
will be severely dented.”790 
 
In contrast to the individual European Parliamentarians taking part in these Guantanamo 
Bay detainee cases, the European Union as a whole is represented as amicus curiae in 
some death penalty court cases. 
In a variety of ways, such litigation could potentially serve as an important 
instrument for protecting human rights and addressing human rights violations, 
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particularly in the context of the War on Terror.  First, human rights litigation helps in 
framing issues as a matter of law rather than only politics.791  This is particularly 
important in the War on Terror with the political discourse often revolving around 
terrorism and security instead of legality and the rule of law.792  Second, human rights 
litigation can lead to changes in law or practice, whether by exposing policies, practices, 
and their consequences in the course of litigation or through clarification of the law by 
courts themselves.793  Third, litigation offers victims of human rights violations a chance 
to tell their stories and, if successful, judgments that validate those stories.794 
Importantly, human rights litigation exposes courts to possible influence from 
international and foreign actors, particularly through amicus curiae briefs.795  United 
States courts play a central role in the interpretation and application of the various legal 
issues surrounding human rights violations in the United States War on Terror, from 
habeas corpus and procedural rights protecting against the arbitrary detention of 
Guantanamo prisoners to civil suits against alleged participants in extraordinary 
renditions.  In the United States system, the judiciary often acts as a check on executive 
power, as well as the legislature, in interpreting such human rights issues. 
This chapter examines the impact of the European Union in United States courts 
on human rights issues in the War on Terror, focusing on the issues of arbitrary detention 
and extraordinary rendition.  These two issues represent the cases in which European 
Union actors or actions have been involved in some manner in United States court cases 
involving alleged human rights violations in the War on Terror. 
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6.1 Arbitrary Detention 
 
The most well-known human rights litigation relating to the United States War on 
Terror concerns arbitrary detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.  This litigation 
generally revolves around the right to habeas corpus and the legality of trial by military 
commission.796  Habeas corpus is a “writ employed to bring a person before a court, most 
frequently to ensure that the party’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.”797  
Although historically habeas corpus has served different purposes, today it can act as an 
important check on (the abuse of) executive power, calling into account the executive to 
demonstrate the legality of imprisoning an individual. 
Similarly, trial by military commission has also raised concerns regarding 
excessive executive power in the context of the War on Terror.  Combined with a denial 
of the right to habeas corpus, military commissions with their specially set-up procedures 
can be used by the executive as a method of avoiding the rights and protections ordinarily 
provided in existing judicial systems.  Serious problems arise concerning indefinite or 
lengthy detention without trial and, if and when proceedings do take place, whether 
appropriate and fair procedures are in place to ensure that impartial determinations are 
made with impartial judicial bodies, defendants have the ability to defend themselves 
through access to evidence used against them, and that procedures are in place to prevent 
the use of inappropriate and unreliable evidence, particularly hearsay evidence obtained 
through torture. 
Of course, such human rights problems did not arise in a vacuum.  The United 
States executive and legislative branches set-up such procedures (or did not establish 
such procedures, as the case may be) based upon national security concerns over 
terrorism, and they did not simply back away from such concerns when confronted by 
litigation and adverse court decisions.798 
                                                 
796 Ibid. p. 575. 
797 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US 723, 737 (2008) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 728 (8th ed. 2004)).  
798 Duffy, H. (2008). Human Rights Litigation and the ‘War on Terror’. International Review of the Red 
Cross. 90, p. 575-579. 
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With courts exercising a degree of judicial restraint, it took multiple court cases 
and six years before the US Supreme Court decided that Guantanamo Bay detainees had 
the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus.799  In reaction to early set-backs in court 
cases, the political branches responded to the holdings of the Supreme Court through 
minimal interpretations of the decisions and revising legislation upon which the decisions 
were based, eliminating the rights the previous legislation provided.800  This “curious 
game of legal ping-pong” “played out between the judicial and political branches” 
demonstrates the resistance that existed in the political branches to addressing the human 
rights issues at hand.801  It also suggests that the European Union’s, or more specifically 
European Parliamentarians’, attempts to directly have an impact on United States courts 
is potentially an important, perhaps slow, method for affecting changes in United States 
laws and policies relating to human rights. 
The members of the European Parliament did not file amicus curiae briefs in the 
first cases involving the rights of detainees.  In 2004, a plurality of the United States 
Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld held that a United States citizen being held on US 
soil as an enemy combatant was entitled to certain constitutional due process protections, 
including “a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before 
a neutral decisionmaker.”802 On the same day, the Supreme Court decided Rasul v. Bush, 
involving prisoners without American nationality detained outside the United States at 
Guantanamo Bay.  In Rasul, the majority held that federal courts had statutory habeas 
corpus jurisdiction over the Guantanamo detainees’ cases but did not resolve whether a 
constitutional right to habeas corpus exists in such cases.803 
In response to the Hamdi decision, the United States government released one US 
national and transferred another to regular courts.804  In response to the Rasul decision, 
the executive branch created Combatant Status Review Tribunals and Administrative 
                                                 
799 Ibid. 
800 Ibid. 
801 Ibid. p. 575. 
802 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 509 (2004).  
803 Rasul v. Bush, 542 US 466, 484 (2004). 
804 Duffy, H. (2008). Human Rights Litigation and the ‘War on Terror’. International Review of the Red 
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Review Boards as a substitute for habeas corpus, and Congress passed the Detainee 
Treatment Act 2005 (DTA) providing that Guantanamo detainees do not have the right of 
habeas corpus.805 
With the United States Supreme Court not resolving the constitutional issue 
regarding non-national Guantanamo detainee habeas corpus rights, the political branches 
reacted by instituting alternative procedures based in new legislation.  Further litigation 
resulted, now with direct involvement through amicus curiae briefs by European 
Parliamentarians in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush. 
 
 
6.1.1 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Salim Ahmed Hamdan filed a habeas petition 
challenging the executive branch’s use of a military commission to prosecute him for 
conspiracy to commit terrorism.  He contended that the military commission convened by 
the president lacks authority to try him for the crime of conspiracy and that the 
procedures adopted for his trial violate military and international law, including that a 
defendant is allowed to see and hear evidence used against him.806 
A large group of current and former European and United Kingdom 
parliamentarians filed briefs in support of Hamdan at various stages of the case.  By the 
time the case reached the United States Supreme Court, 422 such persons had joined this 
amicus group, including 112 current and former members of the European Parliament, a 
former European Commissioner, a Vice President of the European Parliament, and a 
former Vice President of the European Commission.807  Although many of these people 
had diverse political views, they participated in the case because 
 
                                                 
805 Ibid. 
806 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 567 (2006). 
807 Amicus Curiae Brief of 422 Current and Former Members of the United Kingdom and European Union 
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“they share a common view that it is important to the international legal 
order that, even when faced with the threat of international terrorism, the 
United States comply with the standards set by international humanitarian 
law and human rights law.  Amici have taken part in these proceedings to 
urge the courts to ensure that the treatment accorded to prisoners such as 
Hamdan - be they terrorists or not - meets these standards.”808 
 
Based on this common view, the parliamentarians argued that Europe and the United 
States share a common heritage respecting human rights and the rule of law as reflected 
in human rights treaties and customary international law, that human rights treaties and 
customary international law apply to the United States prosecution of the war on terror, 
and that the military commission process being applied to Hamdan did not meet the 
standards imposed by human rights treaties and customary international law.809  In 
particular, the brief argued that the military commission process to try Hamdan 
 
“(a) fails to ensure an impartial determination of prisoners' guilt or 
innocence; 
(b) does not provide for appeal to an independent judicial body; 
(c) occasions detention without trial for periods in excess of three years; 
and 
(d) does not prevent the admission of evidence obtained through 
torture.”810 
 
Although the brief acknowledged that detailed arguments regarding United States 
constitutional and statutory interpretation and the Third Geneva Convention were made 
in the submissions of others, the brief’s more general concern was that “the war on terror 
is not conducted in a legal ‘black hole,’” but instead is conducted in accordance with the 
                                                 
808 Ibid. p. 1-2.  
809 Ibid. 
810 Ibid. p. 4. 
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rule of law and governed by international human rights treaties and customary 
international law.811 
Despite the United States federal administration’s argument that the DTA denied 
habeas corpus jurisdiction over Hamdan’s case, the majority of the Supreme Court again 
did not address whether Guantanamo detainees had a right of habeas corpus under the 
Constitution since Hamdan’s case was initiated before adoption of the DTA.812  The 
majority did find, however, that Hamdan was entitled to a number of due process 
protections.  More specifically, the Supreme Court held that “the military commission 
convened to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures 
violate both the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] and the Geneva Conventions”, 
with the Geneva Conventions application based upon provisions in the UCMJ.813 
A plurality of justices found that “international sources confirm that the crime 
charged here is not a recognized violation of the law of war” and that neither the Geneva 
Conventions nor the Hague Conventions identify conspiracy as a violation of the law of 
war.814  The majority further disagreed with the Court of Appeals that the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to the war with al Qaeda.  The majority found that Common 
Article 3 applies to Hamdan’s case and provides minimum protections to “persons taking 
no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed hors de combat by … detention” and “requires that Hamdan 
be tried by a ‘regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.’”815  Last, a plurality of the judges 
explained that these judicial guarantees include trial protections recognized by customary 
international law, including those found in Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.816 
                                                 
811 Ibid. 
812 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 574-75 (2006); Duffy, H. (2008). Human Rights Litigation and the 
‘War on Terror’. International Review of the Red Cross. 90, p. 576. 
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While the parliamentarians’ brief was not cited in the Supreme Court’s discussion 
of specific legal issues, the broader theme of the majority decision reflected the 
parliamentarians’ emphasis on the rule of law and the applicability of international law in 
the United States.  Indeed, the majority of the United States Supreme Court ended its 
opinion explicitly emphasizing the rule of law, concluding that “in undertaking to try 
Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with 
the rule of law that prevails in this jurisdiction.”817 
David Scheffer, a former US Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues and law 
professor at Northwestern University School of Law, suggested that when the court found 
that the “‘rule of law prevails in this jurisdiction,’ they did so with the rule of 
international law foremost in their deliberations.”818  Indeed, the justices made multiple 
references to international law or the rule of law in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.819  With 
multiple briefs filed by various groups emphasizing the importance of the rule of law and 
the applicability of international law, it is not surprising that the majority of the Supreme 
Court also adopted this theme in their opinion. 
The group of United Kingdom and European Parliamentarians, however, only had 
a marginal impact in this case. If they had not filed amicus curiae briefs in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the plurality opinion of the United States Supreme Court would likely have 
been the same. The United States Supreme Court justices did not cite the 
Parliamentarians briefs, and in Hamdan’s own arguments, as well as those of other 
amicus curiae, international law and the rule of law were already emphasized.820 The 
European Parliamentarians were just one of the groups of voices helping to ensure that 
the Supreme Court recognized these greater issues in the context of the more concrete 
legal arguments. 
                                                 
817 Ibid. p. 635. 
818 Scheffer, D. (2006). Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Supreme Court Affirms International Law. Jurist. 
Retrieved from http://jurist.org/forum/2006/06/hamdan-v-rumsfeld-supreme-court.php. 
819 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 567, 603, 611, 620, 631, 633, 634, 635, 641 (2006). 
820 See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. p. 11, 14, 20. Retrieved from 
http://cja.org/downloads/Hamdan_Reply_Brief.pdf; Brief of Amici Curiae Madeleine K. Albright and 21 
Former Senior U.S. Diplomats in Support of Petitioner Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 
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Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court largely relied upon legislation, particularly the 
DTA and UCMJ, rather than the United States Constitution, as the legal basis for finding 
habeas jurisdiction and rights under the Geneva Conventions, the political branches again 
took the opportunity to pass new legislation to largely circumvent the court’s decision.  
Addressing the Supreme Court’s application of the Geneva Conventions through the 
UCMJ, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) prohibiting 
invocation of “the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or 
other civil action or proceeding” against United States agents “as a source of rights” in 
United States courts.821  The MCA also extended the DTA’s elimination of habeas corpus 
jurisdiction to all persons detained as enemy combatants or awaiting such determination, 
including to pending cases at the time of the MCA’s enactment.822  
 
 
6.1.2 Boumediene v. Bush 
 
It was not until Boumediene v. Bush in 2008 that the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the constitutional due process and habeas corpus protections of non-nationals 
held at Guantanamo Bay.823  Through the DTA and MCA, Congress provided alternative 
procedures for review of the status of detainees and denied federal courts jurisdiction 
over habeas corpus actions.824  A group of 383 current and former United Kingdom 
parliamentarians and members of the European Parliament filed an amicus curiae brief in 
the Supreme Court on the matter.  Similar to the arguments made in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
the parliamentarians argued that Europe and the United States share a common heritage 
respecting human rights and the rule of law, that human rights treaties and customary 
international law apply to the United States prosecution of the war on terror, and that the 
                                                 
821 Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 2600, sec. 5. 
822 Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 2600, sec. 7.  
823 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US 723, 732 (2008); Duffy, H. (2008). Human Rights Litigation and the ‘War 
on Terror’. International Review of the Red Cross. 90, p. 577. 
824 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US 723, 732-39 (2008). 
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Combatant Status Review Tribunal process applied to the Guantanamo detainees did not 
meet human rights standards imposed by treaties and customary international law.825 
 Like in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the United States Supreme Court did not 
specifically cite the parliamentarians’ brief, and the importance of the rule of law, despite 
the War on Terror and security threats from international terrorism, was once again an 
important underlying theme in the court’s decision.  Relying primarily on the history of 
habeas corpus and United States domestic law, the majority of the Supreme Court held 
that the petitioners do have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, that the alternate 
procedures established by Congress “are not an adequate and effective substitute for 
habeas corpus,” and that § 7 of the MCA “operates as an unconstitutional suspension of 
the writ [of habeas corpus].”826  Underscoring the importance of the rule of law, the 
majority opinion concluded: 
 
“We hold that petitioners may invoke the fundamental procedural 
protections of habeas corpus.  The laws and Constitution are designed to 
survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.  Liberty and security 
can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the 
framework of the law.  The Framers decided that habeas corpus, a right of 
first importance, must be a part of that framework, a part of that law.”827 
 
Once again, the United Kingdom and European Parliamentarians amicus curiae brief had 
a marginal impact on the overall decision of the United States Supreme Court in this case.  
Had they not filed an amicus curiae brief in the case, the majority of the court would 
likely have made the same decision. As with Hamdan, the court did not specifically 
reference the Parliamentarians brief, and petitioners and other amicus curiae already 
                                                 
825 Amicus Curiae Brief of 383 United Kingdom and European Parliamentarians in Support of Petitioners, 
2007 WL 2441594. 
826 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US 723, 732-33 (2008). 
827 Ibid. p. 798. 
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emphasized the rule of law as an overarching principle in addition to their more specific 
legal arguments.828   
 
 
6.2 Extraordinary Rendition 
 
 The practice of extraordinary rendition has also been a source of litigation in the 
United States.  The European Parliament’s report describes the CIA’s extraordinary 
rendition program as 
 
“an extra-judicial practice .  .  .  whereby an individual suspected of 
involvement in terrorism is illegally abducted, arrested and/or transferred 
into the custody of US officials and/or transported to another country for 
interrogation which, in the majority of cases, involves incommunicado 
detention and torture.”829 
 
 As previously discussed, extraordinary rendition can entail a variety of important 
human rights concerns.  The European Parliament and the Council of Europe have both 
conducted investigations into this appalling practice, with the European Parliament 
                                                 
828 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Boumediene v. Bush. p. 11, 28. Retrieved from 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/05/2007-03_SCOTUSBoumedieneCertPetition.pdf; 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Odah v. United States of America,. p. 24. Retrieved from 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/05/2007-03-05_SCOTUSAl%20OdahCertPetition.pdf; 
Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, p. 49-50. Retrieved from 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Brief%20for%20the%20Boumediene%20Petitioners.pdf; 
Brief for Petitioners Al Odah, et al. Odah v. United States of America. p. 2, 44. Retrieved from 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Brief%20for%20Petitioners%20Al%20Odah%2C%20et%20a
l..pdf; Reply Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush. p. 6, 25. Retrieved from 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/reply%20brief%20boumediene.pdf; Brief Amicus Curiae of 
Retired Military Officers in Support of Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, p. 1, 14, 19, 22, 30. Retrieved 
from 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Brief%20Amicus%20Curiae%20of%20Retired%20Military%
20Officers%20in%20Support%20of%20Petitioners.pdf; Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar 
Association in Support of Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush. Retrieved from 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Brief%20Amicus%20Curiae%20of%20the%20American%20
Bar%20Association%20In%20Support%20of%20Petitioners.pdf.  
829 European Parliament (2006). Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the 
Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners (2006/2200(INI)). p. 11. 
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calling it “enforced disappearance” when it leads to secret detention, such that the 
persons abducted do not receive protection of law nor information for themselves or their 
families.830  As enumerated by the European Parliament’s 2007 Report, extraordinary 
rendition involves several human rights violations, “in particular violations of the right to 
liberty and security, the freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
the right to an effective remedy, and, in extreme cases, the right to life.”831 
 Again, Dick Marty, rapporteur for the Council of Europe, described the CIA’s 
extraordinary rendition program as a “spider’s web” involving collaboration or tolerance 
of many countries, including in Europe, in which terrorist suspects are apprehended and 
flown between States on civilian aircraft, often to states known for torture and other 
degrading treatment or to Guantanamo Bay and other detention centers.832  The European 
Union aided in the Council of Europe’s investigation, with the Commission providing 
support in obtaining information from the European Union Satellite Centre and 
Eurocontrol.833 
 
 
6.2.1 El-Masri v. United States 
 
 Although the European Union did not file amicus curiae briefs in United States 
cases involving extraordinary rendition, the European Parliament and the Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s (with the help of the European Commission) 
investigations played a central role in a case involving Khaled El-Masri.  In his civil 
lawsuit against various CIA and private parties involved in his rendition, El-Masri, a 
German citizen of Lebanese descent that shares the same name as a member of al-
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831 European Parliament (2006). Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the 
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Qaeda,834 claimed he was detained by Macedonian law enforcement officials and then 
given to CIA operatives, who took him to a detention facility in Afghanistan before 
releasing him in Albania.835  He claimed that during his extraordinary rendition he was 
mistreated in violation of international and United States laws, “including being beaten, 
drugged, bound, and blindfolded during transport; confined in a small, unsanitary cell; 
interrogated several times; and consistently prevented from communicating with anyone 
outside the detention facility, including his family or the German government.”836 
 The US government intervened in the court case and argued for dismissal under 
the state secrets privilege because litigating the case would entail disclosure of 
information that would be detrimental to national security.837  El-Masri countered that, 
although special procedures may be needed to protect sensitive information, dismissal 
was not required because the CIA’s rendition practices had already been made public, 
including through investigations by the European Parliament, Council of Europe, as well 
as individual European countries.838  In fact, the European Parliament and Council of 
Europe reports each discussed El-Masri’s rendition specifically. 
 Despite El Masri’s arguments regarding the public availability of some of the 
information, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s dismissal of 
the entire case because fairly litigating and defending the action would require disclosure 
of sensitive information not available to the public.839  The United States Supreme Court 
later declined to review the case.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the European Union’s 
efforts were crucial to United States admissions about the existence of the extraordinary 
rendition program and in exposing information about the program.  Despite these general 
admissions and revelations, the United States has not completely disclosed all the specific 
details of its CIA operations in the War on Terror.  While the European investigations 
into the United States rendition operations helped uncover information providing fodder 
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for El-Masri’s legal arguments, they were insufficient to prevent dismissal of his civil 
lawsuit and had nil impact on the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
 
 
6.3 Overall Results and Conclusion 
 
 Although the European Union, through its cooperation with the Council of Europe 
and the European Parliamentarians’ efforts, did not have an impact on United States court 
decisions on extraordinary rendition, the European Union did have a marginal impact on 
United States Supreme Court decisions protecting the rights of individuals against 
arbitrary detention and corresponding rights to access to courts and due process 
protections.  Despite resistance by the US political branches based upon serious national 
security concerns, members of the European Parliament joined the group of voices in the 
United States Supreme Court arguing that the War on Terror does not create a legal 
“black hole” and demanding that the rule of law and basic human rights principles apply 
even during extraordinary circumstances.  The attempts by the United States political 
branches to circumvent the early Supreme Court decisions demonstrates the resolve of at 
least some in the United States government to continue with policies that potentially 
violate the human rights of detainees in the name of national security as well as the 
necessity of seeking recourse in the judicial branch for change. 
 Under Ginsberg’s framework for categorizing impact, through persuasion the 
United Kingdom and European Parliamentarians had a marginal, although short-term, 
impact in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld confirming certain due 
process protections for Guantanamo detainees.  Similarly, the parliamentarians had a 
marginal impact through persuasion in Boumediene v. Bush, which finally confirmed the 
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees, including non United 
States nationals, and that the rule of law applies even during the extraordinary times of 
the War on Terror.  The European Union, through the investigations and reports into the 
CIA’s operations, helped spread information on the secretive extraordinary rendition 
program.  This additional information was not, however, enough to persuade the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals and did not have an impact on their decision in El-Masri v. 
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United States concerning extraordinary renditions.  These overall results are summarized 
in the following table. 
 
Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanisms 
Outcome Impact 
Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld 
petition 
addressing 
arbitrary 
detention at 
Guantanamo 
Bay 
Group of European 
and UK 
parliamentarians file 
amicus curiae briefs 
Persuasion US Supreme 
Court finds 
habeas 
jurisdiction 
and 
procedural 
rights under 
the Geneva 
Conventions; 
MCA passed 
undercutting 
statutory 
basis of court 
decision 
Marginal 
Boumediene 
v. Bush 
petition 
addressing 
arbitrary 
detention at 
Guantanamo 
Bay 
Group of European 
and UK 
parliamentarians file 
amicus curiae briefs 
Persuasion US Supreme 
Court holds 
detainees 
have 
constitutional 
privilege of 
habeas corpus 
Marginal 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanisms 
Outcome Impact 
Extraordinary 
Rendition 
European Parliament 
and Council of 
Europe (with 
European 
Commission help) 
investigate and 
report on US 
extraordinary 
renditions 
(Persuasion 
attempted) 
In lawsuit, El-
Masri relies 
on European 
investigations 
to avoid 
dismissal; 
Court of 
Appeals 
dismisses 
case under 
state secrets 
doctrine 
Nil 
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7. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S IMPACT THROUGH FUNDING OF NGOs 
 
The European Union’s human rights advocacy in the United States has often been 
directed toward the political and judicial arms of the government, directly addressing the 
official makers, enforcers, and interpreters of United States federal and state law and 
policy.  While these are important channels for affecting change in United States human 
rights law, policy, behavior, and interests, the European Union has not overlooked the 
importance of non-governmental channels for pursuing their foreign policy goals.  As 
explained by Robert Whiteman, Senior Advisor in the Delegation of the European Union 
to the United States, the United States is not always receptive to listening to foreigners 
regarding the death penalty, so the European Union has provided funding to NGO’s 
working within the United States that advocate against the death penalty.840  Legislators 
are often more willing to listen to these NGO’s, whose members sometimes include 
knowledgeable and respected persons in the United States, than the European Union 
across the Atlantic.841 
The Death Penalty Information Center, for example, has become a trustworthy 
source of information for legislators and death penalty advocates, in part with the help of 
the European Union’s funding.  Likewise, members of Witness to Innocence, also funded 
by the European Union, are cited by legislators when repealing the death penalty.  
Although NGO’s are not the direct makers of human rights laws and policies in the 
United States, support of their advocacy can nonetheless provide the European Union 
with additional indirect influence over the laws, policies, behavior, and interests of the 
United States.  Unlike the human rights issues involved in the United States War on 
Terror, the European Union has provided financial support to multiple NGOs working 
specifically on death penalty issues in the United States, warranting a separate 
examination of the European Union’s impact on the United States death penalty through 
NGOs. 
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In general, advocacy groups provide support to human rights victims, make 
information available to elites as well as the public, frame issues in human rights terms to 
help shape public opinion and policy options, advocate human rights in courts, and help 
push human rights issues onto the agenda for eventual passage into law or policy.842  An 
NGO’s capacity to conduct such activities can vary based upon their size, resources, 
geographical scope of operations, political opportunity structure, and nature of issues 
addressed.843 
In its human rights advocacy, the European Union has sought to help bolster the 
economic resources of particular NGOs through grants for approved projects.  At the 
same time, the European Union’s selection of NGO projects for support takes into 
account the potential for influence on human rights.  If the European Union (indirectly) 
has an impact on United States human rights through the funding of NGO’s, then that 
adds legitimacy to the European Union spending in this area and provides the possibility 
of further support for human rights NGO’s that operate in the United States in the future.  
On the other hand, a lack of any impact could be viewed as wasteful spending providing 
fodder for critics of the European Union, particularly during difficult economic times. 
As the impact of the European Union through NGO’s is indirect, the highest level 
of impact under Ginsberg’s analytical framework will not be applicable because 
significant impact occurs only if the European Union directly influenced the United 
States.  With NGO’s acting as an intermediary that, with European Union funding, in turn 
influences the United States, this criterion is not met with such funding alone. 
A distinction must be made here between an NGO receiving funding to conduct 
its own activities and the European Union paying an organization to perform activities on 
the European Union’s behalf.  In the former case, the NGOs actions cannot be equated 
with the actions of the European Union and are only financially supported by the 
European Union, and hence the European Union may only have an indirect impact.  In 
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843 Ahmed, S. (2011). The Impact of NGOs on International Organizations: Complexities and 
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 Samuel R. Layton, Page 201
the latter case, the organization, although technically private, is in essence an extension of 
the European Union. 
For example, many NGO’s participate in court cases as part of their human rights 
advocacy.  Receiving funding alone does not make those NGO’s an extension of the 
European Union.  Any statements made by NGO’s that have received European Union 
funding are not necessarily the views of the European Union, although one would expect 
that the European Union would not provide funding to NGO’s with opposite views.  On 
the other hand, if the European Union hires private human rights attorneys to write and 
file amicus curiae briefs on the European Union’s behalf, those attorneys, at least during 
the case, are representing the European Union itself.  Although the European Union 
approved the funding for the NGOs proposals and sometimes provided feedback on the 
projects examined in this chapter, the NGO’s receiving funding for their advocacy 
against the death penalty were not under the control of the European Union and were not 
acting on the European Union’s behalf.844 
The European Union “generally prefers to adopt a ‘positive approach’ in 
promoting democracy and human rights,” and a key instrument in this regard is the 
European Union’s funding of specific projects in third countries through NGOs.845  
Funding specifically for NGOs advocating against the United States death penalty has 
come from the European Instrument/Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR).  As explained by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, “The EIDHR budget line, 
created in 1994 on the European Parliament’s initiative, has provided more flexibility by 
allowing the EC to bypass governments and work directly with other partners (such as 
NGOs and international organizations).”846 
In the 2000s, the European Union funded approximately fifty death penalty 
projects around the world with an overall budget of over 23 million Euros through the 
                                                 
844 Lowenstein, K. Personal Communications. February 7, 2013; Spillman, K. Personal Communications. 
June 20, 2013. 
845 Keukeleire, S., & MacNaughtan, J. (2008). The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. p. 226. 
846 Ibid. 
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EIDHR.847  The European Union allocated €1,306,451 in 2003 and another €2,624,395 in 
2009 under the EIDHR to organizations for purposes of abolishing the death penalty 
specifically in the United States.848  The objectives of the various funded death penalty 
projects range from influencing public opinion and strengthening abolitionist groups to 
improving legal assistance, reforming the death penalty system, and implementing a 
nationwide moratorium on the death penalty.849  The following sections discuss the 
European Union’s impact through the funding of NGO’s advocating against the death 
penalty in the United States. 
 
 
7.1 The European Union’s Impact Through Funding Murder Victim’s Families for 
Human Rights 
 
Murder Victims’ Families for Human Rights (MVFHR) is an international NGO 
based in Boston, MA whose members both oppose the death penalty and are relatives of 
murder victims or persons executed for crimes.  In 2009, MVFHR was awarded a grant 
of 495,000 euros from the EIDHR for their 30 month project “Voices of Victims Against 
the Death Penalty,” which sought to end or reduce the death penalty internationally, 
including in the US, through amplifying the voices of victims (families) that are against 
the death penalty.850  The European Union’s contribution represented 71% of the funding 
for the project,851 and the European Union’s contribution was essential to the work done 
on the project.852 
                                                 
847 European Union (2010). Compendium 2007-2010. p. 2. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm. 
848 Ibid.; European Union (2009). Promoting Democracy & Human Rights Worldwide. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm; Gardiner, N. (2011). The European Union 
Gives Millions in Taxpayers’ Money to Anti-Death Penalty Groups in America. The Telegraph. Retrieved 
from http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/nilegardiner/100078360/the-european-union-gives-millions-in-
taxpayers%E2%80%99-money-to-anti-death-penalty-groups-in-america/.  
849 European Union (2010). Compendium 2007-2010. p. 2. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm. 
850 Ibid.  
851 Ibid. 
852 Lowenstein, K. Personal Communications. February 7, 2013. 
 Samuel R. Layton, Page 203
Generally, MVFHR provides a platform for presenting the stories of the survivors 
of murder victims that are opposed to the death penalty, providing a real face to such 
family members in order to challenge the common assumption that persons who have lost 
a family member to murder support capital punishment.853  Such stories are aimed at 
reframing the debate on capital punishment towards a recognition of the death penalty as 
a violation of human rights and countering proponents of the death penalty that claim the 
death penalty is required for justice, retribution, or closure for victims’ families.854  
MVFHR members’ statements seek to “challenge the assumption that victims’ families 
universally support the death penalty…, challenge the offender-focus that the death 
penalty engenders…, and call for a deeper analysis of crime and its prevention.”855 
The overall objectives of the European Union funded project were to reduce the 
number of death sentences and eventual moratoria and abolition of the death penalty 
through “amplification of victims’ voices against the death penalty.”856  MVFHR aimed 
to achieve these objectives by seeking to 
 
“(1) ensure that victims’ voices of opposition to the death penalty are 
heard within the national and international death penalty debate;  
(2) raise awareness of the ways in which the death penalty harms victims’ 
families and the ways in which it creates a new group of victims in the 
families of the executed; [and] 
(3) draw attention to the needs of victims, including the need to prevent or 
reduce future violence, thereby simultaneously benefiting victims 
themselves and formulating a mutual agenda through which to unite with 
pro-death penalty victims’ groups.”857 
 
                                                 
853 European Union (2010). Compendium 2007-2010. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm.  
854 Cushing, R. (2005). 2005 Annual Report. Retrieved from 
http://www.mvfhr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/MVFHRAnnualReport2005.pdf. 
855 Cushing, R. (2008). Proposal of Murder Victim’s Families for Human Rights. p.3-4. 
856 Ibid. p. 1.  
857 Ibid. 
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During their project, MVFHR conducted a variety of educational, organization, 
and outreach activities.858  They trained new speakers, strengthened members’ sense of 
affiliation with MVFHR, developed alliances with other groups, and disseminated 
information regarding victims’ against the death penalty, among other activities.859  
MVFHR and its members have been quoted or featured in multiple news media, 
including CNN, Kentucky State Journal, Los Angeles Times, Associated Press, Mike 
Huckabee Radio Show, NBC News, Democracy Now, U.S. Reuters, Boston Globe, and 
Time magazine, among others.860 
While these efforts help strengthen the general movement against the death 
penalty, MVFHR has also specifically engaged lawmakers and public officials on the 
death penalty.  MVFHR gave testimony to lawmakers and public officials in Connecticut, 
New Hampshire, Kansas, Washington, California, and Maryland and distributed 
materials in multiple states,861 and during MVFHR’s project individual lawmakers in 
different states altered their positions from in favor of the death penalty to against it.862 
MVFHR played a particularly important leadership role in the repeal of the death 
penalty in Connecticut.863  Several members of MVFHR were actively involved in the 
campaign to repeal the death penalty in Connecticut and attended Governor Malloy’s 
signing ceremony for the repeal bill.864  At that ceremony, Governor Malloy explained 
the important role of MVFHR’s members in repealing the death penalty in Connecticut: 
 
“As in past years, the campaign to abolish the death penalty in 
Connecticut has been led by dozens of family members of murder victims, 
and some of them were present as I signed this legislation today.  In the 
                                                 
858 Murder Victims’ Families for Human Rights (2012). Final Narrative Report. p. 1. 
859 Ibid. p. 1-2. 
860 Ibid. p. 2; Murder Victims’ Families for Human Rights (2010). Interim Narrative Report. p. 3. 
861 Murder Victims’ Families for Human Rights (2012). Final Narrative Report. p. 4; Murder Victims’ 
Families for Human Rights (2010). Interim Narrative Report. p. 2. 
862 Murder Victims’ Families for Human Rights (2010). Interim Narrative Report. p. 4. 
863 Lowenstein, K. Personal Communications. February 7, 2013; Malloy, D. (2012); Governor Malloy 
Statement on Final Passage of Capital Punishment Repeal Legislation. Retrieved from 
http://www.governor.ct.gov/malloy/cwp/view.asp?A=4010&Q=503122. 
864 Murder Victims’ Families for Human Rights (2012). Final Narrative Report. p. 4. 
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words of one such survivor: ‘Now is the time to start the process of 
healing, a process that could have been started decades earlier with the 
finality of a life sentence.  We cannot afford to put on hold the lives of 
these secondary victims.  We need to allow them to find a way as early as 
possible to begin to live again.’ Perhaps that is the most compelling 
message of all.”865 
 
While the abolition of the death penalty in Connecticut is an important 
accomplishment, it is important to note some of the repeal’s limitations.  The repeal law 
is only forward looking, and did not apply to the 11 persons already on death row.866  
Further, Connecticut has not been a major executioner.  In the 52 years before abolition, 
only 2 death sentences were actually carried out in Connecticut, although more have been 
sentenced to death.867  As Governor Malloy explained, with “appeal after appeal,” the 
people on Connecticut’s death row may be “far more likely to die of old age than they are 
to be put to death.”868 
Nonetheless, the de jure abolition of the death penalty is a major beneficial effect 
of MVFHR’s European Union funded project.  An earlier attempt to abolish the death 
penalty in 2009 had failed in large part due to recent horrific murders of a mother and 
two daughters in a home invasion in Cheshire, CT, which then Governor Jodi Rell cited 
as a reason for not supporting repeal of the death penalty.869  Thus, while the death 
penalty was not frequently carried out in Connecticut, maintaining the death penalty as an 
available sentence in law was nonetheless a controversial issue in the state.  With one of 
                                                 
865 Governor Malloy Statement on Final Passage of Capital Punishment Repeal Legislation. Retrieved from 
http://www.governor.ct.gov/malloy/cwp/view.asp?A=4010&Q=503122. 
866 Logiurato, B. (2012). Connecticut Abolishes the Death Penalty, Not That It Actually Ever Had One. 
Business Insider. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/connecticut-abolishes-death-penalty-not-
that-it-actually-ever-had-one-2012-4. 
867 Governor Malloy Statement on Final Passage of Capital Punishment Repeal Legislation. Retrieved from 
http://www.governor.ct.gov/malloy/cwp/view.asp?A=4010&Q=503122. 
868 Ibid. 
869 Logiurato, B. (2012). Connecticut Abolishes the Death Penalty, Not That It Actually Ever Had One. 
Business Insider. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/connecticut-abolishes-death-penalty-not-
that-it-actually-ever-had-one-2012-4. 
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the assailants not sentenced (to death) until early 2012, the Cheshire Murders still 
presented a hurdle for efforts to repeal the death penalty.870 
In this regard, MVFHR’s efforts were crucial in countering arguments of 
proponents of the death penalty that victim’s families are universally in favor of the death 
penalty.871  As explained by former Governor Malloy during the repeal bill signing 
ceremony, instead of allowing victim’s families the opportunity to heal with the finality 
of a life sentence, defendants’ repeated death penalty legal appeals give “them a platform 
of public attention they don’t deserve,” a “sordid attention that rips open never-quite-
healed wounds.”872 
Although there were multiple reasons to abolish the death penalty in Connecticut, 
it is unlikely that Connecticut would have abolished the death penalty absent MVFHR’s 
efforts, which were funded in large part by the European Union.873  Specifically, in 
Governor Malloy’s statement on signing the bill repealing the death penalty in 
Connecticut, he explained that the death penalty in Connecticut had “a moral component” 
and issues with mistakes, discrimination, cost, and international trends, but Governor 
Malloy also concluded that it was “family members of murder victims” that led the 
campaign against the capital punishment in Connecticut” and that their message was “the 
most compelling message of all.”874 
The European Union, through its funding of MVFHR, thus indirectly had a 
tangible influence on the death penalty in the United States.  While much of MVFHR’s 
work was directed at strengthening the abolition movement generally, in Connecticut 
there was the major beneficial effect of de jure abolition of the death penalty in large part 
due to the persuasive efforts of MVFHR.  As such, the European Union’s impact through 
their funding of MVFHR, particularly in Connecticut, has been considerable.   
                                                 
870 Lowenstein, K. Personal Communications. February 7, 2013. 
871 Ibid. 
872 Governor Malloy Statement on Final Passage of Capital Punishment Repeal Legislation. Retrieved from 
http://www.governor.ct.gov/malloy/cwp/view.asp?A=4010&Q=503122. 
873 European Union (2010). Compendium 2007-2010. p. 2. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm; Lowenstein, K. Personal Communications. 
February 7, 2013. 
874 Governor Malloy Statement on Final Passage of Capital Punishment Repeal Legislation. Retrieved from 
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7.2 The European Union’s Impact Through Funding Reprieve 
 
Reprieve was awarded 526,816 euros beginning 2009 for its three year project, 
“Engaging Europe in the Fight for US Abolition,” also referred to as Reprieve’s “EC 
Project.”875876  For more than a decade, Reprieve has assisted British nationals facing 
death sentences in the United States and the world, helping coordinate intervention by the 
British government.877  Expanding on this experience, the project, based both in the 
United Kingdom and United States branches of Reprieve, was aimed at identifying all 
European nationals facing the death penalty in the United States and improving legal 
assistance to European nationals facing the death penalty in the United States by 
facilitating greater diplomatic assistance and influence by their home countries.878  It was 
an extensive project considering that there were 38 state and federal jurisdictions using 
the death penalty and 3,200 prisoners on death row presenting various legal issues.879  
Although the project’s focus was on persons with European ties, Reprieve’s work on the 
EC Project also allowed them to identify and link other foreign nationals with their 
governments.880 
The EC Project was aimed at foreign nationals because they are particularly 
disadvantaged when facing the complexities of the United States criminal justice system, 
especially when confronted with capital charges.881  Differences in culture and language 
                                                 
875 European Union (2010). Compendium 2007-2010. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm. 
876 In 2012, Reprieve started “EC Project 2”, which is also funded by the European Commission and works 
to identify and assist European nationals facing the death penalty in the US as well as elsewhere in the 
world, building on the first EC Project (http://www.reprieve.org.uk/investigations/ecproject/history/). 
877 Reprieve. The EC Project. Retrieved from http://reprieve.webfactional.com/investigations/ecproject/.  
878 European Union (2010). Compendium 2007-2010. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm; Reprieve (2009). Annual Report 2009. p. 
7. Retrieved from 
http://reprieve.webfactional.com/static/downloads/2010_07_30_EXT_2009_Report_web.pdf; Smith, S. 
(2010). Assisting European Citizens Facing Executions Outside the European Union. European Parliament 
Briefing Paper. p. 6. 
879 Smith, S. (2010). Assisting European Citizens Facing Executions Outside the European Union. 
European Parliament Briefing Paper. p. 6.  
880 Ibid. 
881 Reprieve (2012). Delivering Effective Assistance to Prisoners with Foreign Ties on Death Row in the 
United States. Retrieved from www.reprieve.org/uk. 
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difficulties can weaken a foreign national’s ability to navigate through the judicial 
process, and the home country can provide assistance in bridging these language and 
cultural gaps.882  As explained by Reprieve: 
 
“Consular officials perform several critical functions in a foreign 
national’s capital case, including visiting the detainee, providing welfare 
and financial assistance, making diplomatic representations, intervening 
with amicus curiae briefs, arranging translators and interpreters, attending 
Court Hearings, arranging legal representation, assisting with investigation 
and record collection in the country of origin, and where execution is 
imminent making interventions to the clemency authority.”883 
 
Article 36 of the VCCR provides detained or arrested foreign nationals with the 
right to contact their state consul and to be informed of their consular rights by the United 
States government.  However, while under the VCCR foreign nationals formally have 
certain consular notification rights upon their arrest or detention in the United States, in 
practice the foreign governments are not always informed of their nationals status, as 
demonstrated by Reprieve’s identification of European citizens on death row for decades 
without their home governments being informed,884 as well as the ICJ cases against the 
United States for violations of the VCCR, discussed in Chapters 3 and 5.   In addition to 
identifying persons already sentenced to death, Reprieve also obtained information on 
persons facing capital charges, as it is easier to prevent a death sentence if assistance is 
given from an earlier stage.885   
In their EC Project, Reprieve placed five research fellows in New Orleans, with 
support from their London office, to perform a comprehensive survey of all death row 
inmates in the United States to identify persons with foreign nationality or ties, work with 
                                                 
882 Ibid. p. 1. 
883 Ibid. 
884 Smith, S. (2010). Assisting European Citizens Facing Executions Outside the European Union. 
European Parliament Briefing Paper. p. 6. 
885 Smith, S. (2010). Assisting European Citizens Facing Executions Outside the European Union. 
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counsel of record, and facilitate ties with the inmates’ home countries.886  The EC Project 
identified 161 people with foreign nationality already on death row, including 19 
Europeans.887  When foreign nationals were identified, Reprieve has assisted the foreign 
nationals in investigation and litigation and helped coordinate intervention by European 
governments that have provided pre-trial, investigation, litigation, and clemency 
assistance, filed amicus curiae briefs, and made diplomatic representations in death 
penalty cases.888  In total, Reprieve’s EC Project provided assistance in 78 cases 
involving the death penalty in the pre-trial or post-conviction stages.889 
Foreign governments have involved themselves in the capital cases of their 
nationals in various ways at all stages of cases.  For example, Germany and its officials 
have previously provided funds for defense, appeared before a clemency board, 
recognized citizenship during post-conviction proceedings, and helped investigate a 
defendant’s background in Germany.890  The British government has written letters to 
relevant authorities and filed amicus curiae briefs in capital cases involving British 
nationals.891  In addition, the Spanish government has allocated amounts from its national 
budget to help support the defense of its nationals facing the death penalty in other 
countries.892 
Reprieve has helped ensure that governments have had an opportunity to offer 
such help to their nationals in the United States.  For example, Neil Revill, a British 
citizen charged with a double murder in California, potentially faced the death penalty for 
his alleged crimes.  Reprieve successfully worked with his defense lawyers and the 
United Kingdom government to obtain an agreement from the prosecution not to seek the 
death penalty.893 
                                                 
886 Reprieve (2012). EC Project Manual. p. 6. 
887 Reprieve (2012). Delivering Effective Assistance to Prisoners with Foreign Ties on Death Row in the 
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Although Reprieve’s EC Project has sometimes helped their clients avoid the 
death penalty,894 Reprieve’s assistance coordinating the involvement of foreign 
governments in their nationals’ capital cases has not always prevented the execution of 
the individuals involved.895  Obtaining redress late in a case or after sentencing poses 
particular challenges.  As discussed in Chapter 5, legal challenges to  undisputed VCCR 
violations have sometimes proven difficult or ineffective (particularly when raised late in 
the case), making Reprieve’s EC Project all the more crucial in ensuring foreign nationals 
facing the death penalty obtain help from their home governments at the earliest point 
possible.  As explained by Reprieve, “timing is vital.  .  .  [foreign] government 
intervention and assistance is likely to be most effective if secured during the early stages 
of criminal proceedings.”896 
Although many of Reprieve’s EC Project cases are ongoing, Reprieve has already 
helped some clients avoid the death penalty in the United States through the persuasive 
efforts of their home countries.897  Reprieve, through the funding of the European Union, 
has thus had (and is continuing to have) a tangible effect on United States behavior by 
helping to prevent executions and death sentences of persons with foreign ties.  As such, 
the European Union has (indirectly) had a considerable impact on the United States via 
its EIDHR funding of Reprieve. 
 
 
7.3 The European Union’s Impact Through Funding the Death Penalty Information 
Center 
 
 Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC), a Washington, D.C. non-profit 
organization founded in 1990, was awarded two grants from the EIDHR.  For 2003 to 
                                                 
894 Ibid.; Reprieve (2010). Reprieve 2010: A Year of Secrets Revealed. p. 4. Retrieved from 
http://reprieve.webfactional.com/static/downloads/Reprieve_2010_Annual_Report.pdf. 
895 Hardwicke (2011). The Reprieve EC Project – Part Two. Retrieved from 
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2006, DPIC was awarded 449,888 euros for a project entitled “Laying the Groundwork 
for Change: a three-year programme of intensive public education, outreach to the media, 
and assistance to death penalty organisations in the USA.”898  In 2009, DPIC was again 
awarded 193,443 euros for their project, “Changing the Course of the Death Penalty 
Debate: A Proposal for Public Opinion Research, Message Development, and 
Communications on Capital Punishment in the US.” Such funding by the European 
Union was important for DPIC’s success on these projects, representing nearly half of the 
funding for the first project and 75 percent of the funding for the second project.899 
Through the EIDHR funding, DPIC sought to campaign for media coverage of 
death penalty issues, encourage debate in education curricula about the death penalty, and 
provide advice and training to groups working on the death penalty.900  DPIC was 
involved in multiple activities, including creation of high school educational material, 
message development and media training workshops, assessments of states with the death 
penalty, and preparing reports on various death penalty topics such as innocence, 
deterrence, federal crimes, arbitrariness, and cost.901 
DPIC is often considered as an objective source of information about the death 
penalty in the United States.902  DPIC does not formally maintain to be against the death 
penalty, as doing so might alienate some in its target audience that are in favor of or 
ambivalent about the death penalty, but widely disseminates information regarding the 
use and shortcomings of the death penalty.903  DPIC specifically provides its research and 
information to state legislatures and to educational institutions as well as to the general 
                                                 
898 European Union (2009). Promoting Democracy & Human Rights Worldwide. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm. 
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public.  DPIC is often a first or early result in internet searches on the death penalty, and 
each year DPIC’s information and research are cited and discussed numerous times in the 
televised and printed news media.904   
DPIC’s website of information, reports, and testimony have been cited by death 
penalty studies commissioned by legislatures to make findings and recommendations 
regarding the death penalty in their states.905  For example, following the decision in 
People v. LaValle that struck down New York’s death penalty statute, the Assembly 
Committees on Codes, Judiciary and Correction conducted a series of hearings to 
determine what action to take on New York’s death penalty statute, as discussed in 
Chapter 3.906  DPIC provided a variety of information to respond to the Assembly 
Committees inquiries, including on the higher costs associated with maintaining the death 
penalty,907 the unreliability of capital trials,908 and racial prejudice in capital 
punishment.909  After obtaining this information from DPIC and other actors through five 
days of hearings, the New York Assembly Codes Committee voted 11 to 7 against 
legislation reinstating the New York death penalty.910   
The New Jersey legislature also established the New Jersey Death Penalty Study 
Commission to “study all aspects of the death penalty as currently administered in the 
State of New Jersey.”911  The New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission conducted 
five public hearings and reviewed written materials from various sources before 
submitting its report in January of 2007.912  In their report, the Commission 
recommended abolition of the death penalty in New Jersey and replacing it with life 
                                                 
904 See, e.g., Death Penalty Information Center (2011). DPIC’s 2011 Year End Report Media Coverage 
Summary. Retrieved from http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2011YearEndPressCoverage.pdf.  
905 See, e.g., Howard, W. (2007). New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report. State of New 
Jersey; Lentol, J. et al. (2005). The Death Penalty in New York. New York State Assembly. Retrieved from 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Codes/20050403/deathpenalty.pdf. 
906 Ibid. p. 4. 
907 Ibid. p. 7, 28. 
908 Ibid. p. 25. 
909 Ibid. p. 38. 
910 Death Penalty Information Center (2007). Legislative Activity – New York. Retrieved from 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legislative-activity-new-york. 
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imprisonment without the possibility of parole.913  This recommendation was based on its 
findings that: 
 
“(1) There is no compelling evidence that the New Jersey death penalty 
rationally serves a legitimate penological intent. 
(2) The costs of the death penalty are greater than the costs of life in 
prison without parole, but it is not possible to measure these costs with any 
degree of precision. 
(3) There is increasing evidence that the death penalty is inconsistent with 
evolving standards of decency. 
(4) The available data do not support a finding of invidious racial bias in 
the application of the death penalty in New Jersey. 
(5) Abolition of the death penalty will eliminate the risk of 
disproportionality in capital sentencing. 
(6) The penological interest in executing a small number of persons guilty 
of murder is not sufficiently compelling to justify the risk of making an 
irreversible mistake. 
(7) The alternative of life imprisonment in a maximum security institution 
without the possibility of parole would sufficiently ensure public safety 
and address other legitimate social and penological interests, including the 
interests of the families of murder victims. 
(8) Sufficient funds should be dedicated to ensure adequate services and 
advocacy for the families of murder victims.”914 
 
In this case, it was DPIC’s information in conjunction with the efforts of others 
opposed to the death penalty,915 that provided the basis for the findings of the 
Commission.916  Although it is a close case given the extensive information provided to 
                                                 
913 Ibid. p. 2.  
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the Commission, it is unlikely that the Commission would have made its findings without 
the information provided by DPIC in conjunction917 with the plethora of other sources.918  
Specifically, in discussing how they reached these findings, the Commission repeatedly 
relied on information from DPIC, including for the lack of deterrent effect of the death 
penalty ((1) above),919 the greater financial cost of having the death penalty system in 
place ((2) above),920 and national trends against the death penalty ((3) above).921    Not 
only was DPIC frequently cited on its own by the Commission as its source for such 
information, but other testimony was supported and expanded on by the Commission 
based on information from DPIC.922 Of the findings by the Commission, the financial 
cost of having the death penalty system in place was particularly important for abolition 
in New Jersey, and on this issue DPIC’s information was the only information relied 
upon other than New Jersey’s government departments and offices (the Office of the 
Public Defender, the Department of Corrections, the Administrative Office of the Courts, 
and the Office of Attorney General) which could not provide complete data that could 
lead to a precise conclusion on cost.923  Following the Commission’s recommendation, 
legislation abolishing the death penalty and replacing it with life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole was adopted on December 17, 2007.924  When Governor Corzine 
                                                 
917 See Ginsberg, H. (2001). The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. p. 54. 
918 Howard, W. (2007). New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report. State of New Jersey. 
919 Howard, W. (2007). New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report. State of New Jersey,, p. 25-
26. 
920 Ibid. p. 33. 
921 Ibid. p. 40. 
922 See, e.g., Howard, W. (2007). New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report. State of New 
Jersey, p. 25, 26, 33, 40, 98, 99, 102, 106, 112. 
923 Howard, W. (2007). New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report. State of New Jersey, p. 31-
33; p. 31-33; Solomon, N. (2006). New Jersey’s Death Penalty Moratorium. NPR. Retrieved from 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=5158551; Richburg, K. (2007). N.J. Approves Abolition 
of Death Penalty; Corzine to Sign. Washington Post. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/12/13/AR2007121301302.html; Mears, B. (2007). New Jersey Lawmakers Vote 
to Abolish the Death Penalty. CNN. Retrieved from 
www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/12/13/nj.death.penalty/index/html; Corzine, J. (2007). Governor Corzine’s 
Remarks on Eliminating Death Penalty in New Jersey. Death Penalty Information Center. Retrieved from 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2236. 
924 Death Penalty Information Center (2007). New Jersey Abolishes the Death Penalty. Retrieved from 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2231; ; Richburg, K. (2007). N.J. Approves Abolition of Death 
Penalty; Corzine to Sign. Washington Post. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/12/13/AR2007121301302.html; Mears, B. (2007). New Jersey Lawmakers Vote 
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signed the bill, he recognized the Death Penalty Study Commission’s important role in 
New Jersey’s abolition of the death penalty.925 
In practice, however, New Jersey was by no means a major executioner in the 
United States.  New Jersey reinstated the death penalty in 1982 based on Gregg v.  
Georgia.926  Despite 228 capital murder trials and 60 death sentences since reinstatement 
of the death penalty in New Jersey, most of those death sentences were overturned by the 
courts and no executions have occurred in New Jersey since 1963.927  The de jure 
abolition of the death penalty was nonetheless important, as New Jersey became the first 
state in the United States to abolish capital punishment through legislation since the 
Gregg v.  Georgia decision in 1976.928 
The European Union’s funding of DPIC has had a considerable impact on the 
United States through persuasion.  Specifically, the EIDHR funding helped DPIC to 
develop information and reports for legislatures and other audiences and has helped DPIC 
strengthen its reputation as an informational resource on the death penalty.929  The 
projects have contributed to the prominence of the debate over the death penalty and 
provided credible research and information for its opponents.930  Such information, such 
                                                                                                                                                 
to Abolish the Death Penalty. CNN. Retrieved from 
www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/12/13/nj.death.penalty/index/html. 
925 Corzine, J. (2007). Governor Corzine’s Remarks on Eliminating Death Penalty in New Jersey. Death 
Penalty Information Center. Retrieved from http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2236. 
926 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Howard, W. (2007). New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report. State 
of New Jersey. p. 6. 
927 Howard, W. (2007). New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report. State of New Jersey. p. 5, 7. 
928 Corzine, J. (2007). Governor Corzine’s Remarks on Eliminating Death Penalty in New Jersey. Death 
Penalty Information Center. Retrieved from http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2236. 
929 Robert, P. and Alberman, D. (2007). European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights Evaluation 
on the Abolition of Death Penalty Projects. EUROPAID/ 116548/C/SV. p. 81; see, e.g., Howard, W. 
(2007). New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report. State of New Jersey; Lentol, J. et al. (2005). 
The Death Penalty in New York. New York State Assembly. Retrieved from 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Codes/20050403/deathpenalty.pdf; Corzine, J. (2007). Governor 
Corzine’s Remarks on Eliminating Death Penalty in New Jersey. Death Penalty Information Center. 
Retrieved from http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2236; Death Penalty Information Center (2011). 
DPIC’s 2011 Year End Report Media Coverage Summary. Retrieved from 
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2011YearEndPressCoverage.pdf. 
930 Robert, P. and Alberman, D. (2007). European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights Evaluation 
on the Abolition of Death Penalty Projects. EUROPAID/ 116548/C/SV. p. 81; see, e.g., Howard, W. 
(2007). New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission Report. State of New Jersey; Lentol, J. et al. (2005). 
The Death Penalty in New York. New York State Assembly. Retrieved from 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Codes/20050403/deathpenalty.pdf; Corzine, J. (2007). Governor 
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as on the financial costs and lack of deterrent effects of the death penalty, have been 
important in the decisions by legislators and governors deciding whether to repeal the 
death penalty.  In essence, such information has helped persuade lawmakers that the 
death penalty should be abolished in their states.   
 
 
7.4 The European Union’s Impact Through Funding the American Bar Association 
 
 The European Union has also funded the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 
Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project (“Moratorium Project”) (later 
renamed the Death Penalty Due Process Review Project).  Calling itself “the largest 
voluntary professional organization in the world” with almost 400,000 members, the 
ABA plays an important role in the United States legal community, accrediting law 
schools, providing continuing legal education, and engaging in various programs and 
initiatives to assist lawyers and judges and improve the legal system.931 
The ABA initiated its Moratorium Project in 2001 with the goal of achieving a 
nationwide moratorium on the death penalty “unless and until problems within the 
administration of capital punishment are rectified.”932  In 2003, the European 
Commission awarded the ABA with a two year grant from the EIDHR for 856,563 euros, 
supporting the Moratorium Project in carrying out assessments of the extent to which 
death penalty systems in United States jurisdictions that retain capital punishment 
“comport with minimum standards of fairness and due process.”933  In 2009, the ABA 
was awarded a second grant of 708,162 euros from the EIDHR to carry out up to six 
                                                                                                                                                 
Corzine’s Remarks on Eliminating Death Penalty in New Jersey. Death Penalty Information Center. 
Retrieved from http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2236; Death Penalty Information Center (2011). 
DPIC’s 2011 Year End Report Media Coverage Summary. Retrieved from 
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2011YearEndPressCoverage.pdf. 
931 American Bar Association. Death Penalty Due Process Review Project. Retrieved from 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/individual_rights/projects/death_penalty_due_process_review_project.
html. 
932 Ibid. 
933 Ibid.; European Union (2009). Promoting Democracy & Human Rights Worldwide. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm. 
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assessments of states’ death penalty systems that were not examined in the previous time 
period.934 
The European Union’s financial support for the Moratorium Project does not give 
it control over how the research is conducted or its findings and conclusions.935  In 
addition, the ABA does not take a position on the death penalty per se nor call for its 
abolition as does the European Union.  The ABA does, however, seek a moratorium on 
executions until the flaws in the system are remedied so that the death penalty is 
administered fairly and accurately.936 
While the ABA does not share the European Union’s ultimate goal of abolition, 
the Moratorium Project does generally promote objectives enumerated in the European 
Union Guidelines on the Death Penalty, including the progressive restriction of the use of 
the death penalty, that the death penalty is carried out according to particular minimum 
standards, and the establishment of a moratorium on the exercise of the death penalty.  As 
such, the Moratorium Project’s aims coincide to some extent with the objectives of the 
European Union despite the neutral position of the ABA with regard to the death penalty 
itself. 
The Moratorium Project’s findings and reports have been discussed in multiple 
United States court cases.  Attorneys have argued their capital cases relying on the 
deficiencies of capital punishment elaborated on in the ABA’s state reports.937  In Maples 
v. Thomas, although not a turning point for the decision, the United States Supreme Court 
also extensively discussed Alabama’s low standards for attorney representation of capital 
defendants, relying primarily on the report on Alabama by the ABA.938  Likewise, in 
Hutchinson v. Florida, Judge Barkett of the United States Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals cited in his concurring opinion the ABA’s reports on Alabama, Georgia, and 
                                                 
934 American Bar Association. Death Penalty Due Process Review Project. Retrieved from 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/individual_rights/projects/death_penalty_due_process_review_project.
html. 
935 Ibid. 
936 Ibid. 
937 See, e.g., McCray v. State, 71 So.3d 848, 879 (Fla. 2011); Thomas v. State, 2011 WL 675936, 42 
(Tenn.Crim.App.,2011); Seibert v. State, 64 So.3d 67, 83 -84 (Fla. 2010); Raleigh v. State, 2010 WL 
832388, 1 (Fla. 2010); Austin v. Wilkinson, L 697679, 8 -9 (N.D.Ohio 2008). 
938 586 F. 3d 879 (2012). 
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Florida for the proposition that capital defendants often receive inadequate legal 
representation, although the reports did not affect the outcome of the case.939  Wiles v. 
Bagley,940 in a concurring opinion also not affecting the outcome of the case, cited the 
ABA reports for the proposition that capital defense services are underfunded, which 
disadvantages capital defendants.   
The Moratorium Project has affected the administration of the death penalty in 
Florida in particular, which entails that the European Union has had a corresponding 
indirect impact through its financial support of the project.  In the ABA’s assessment of 
Florida’s death penalty system, the ABA found significant confusion by jurors in capital 
cases when deciding whether the death sentence is appropriate and recommended 
redrafting of Florida’s jury instructions for capital punishment sentencing: 
 
“Significant Capital Juror Confusion ...Death sentences resulting from 
juror confusion or mistake are not tolerable, but research establishes that 
many Florida capital jurors do not understand their role and 
responsibilities when deciding whether to impose a death sentence.  In one 
study, over 35 percent of interviewed Florida capital jurors did not 
understand that they could consider any evidence in mitigation and 48.7 
percent believed that the defense had to prove mitigating factors beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The same study also found that over 36 percent of 
interviewed Florida capital jurors incorrectly believed that they were 
required to sentence the defendant to death if they found the defendant's 
conduct to be ‘heinous, vile, or depraved’ beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
25.2 percent believed that if they found the defendant to be a future danger 
to society, they were required by law to sentence him/her to death, despite 
the fact that future dangerousness is not a legitimate aggravating 
circumstance under Florida law.941 
                                                 
939 677 F.3d 1097 (2012). 
940 561 F.3d 636, 645 n.15 (C.A.6 2009). 
941 American Bar Association (2006).  Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in State Death Penalty Systems: 
The Florida Death Penalty Assessment Report. p. vi. Retrieved from 
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In approving amended jury instructions for capital sentencing, the Supreme Court 
of Florida was persuaded by the ABA’s findings and used it as support for some of the 
changes, including to address appropriate consideration of mitigating evidence, the belief 
by some jurors that they were required to recommend death for heinous, vile, or depraved 
conduct or if the defendant was found to be a future danger to society, and racial and 
ethnic bias.942  The approval of these amendments does not address Florida law itself943 
so much as provide a guide for lawyers and judges and, when used, the capital sentence 
determinations of jurors. 
Nonetheless, standard jury instructions are frequently proposed by lawyers and 
accepted by trial judges, or at least used as a starting point in drafting the actual jury 
instructions tailored to individual cases.  In this way, amendments to standard jury 
instructions for capital cases are important to the actual practice of lawyers and judges 
and jury sentencing.  The European Union has thus had a considerable impact on capital 
sentencing through its funding of the ABA’s Moratorium Project. 
 
 
7.5 The European Union’s Impact Through Funding Witness to Innocence 
 
 Witness to Innocence, a Philadelphia based organization, received 395,000 euros 
for their 2010 to 2012 project, “American Dream Campaign.”944  Focusing on the United 
States, the project sought to shift public opinion against the death penalty and reform, 
restrict, or repeal the death penalty in individual states, including Texas in particular.945  
Witness to Innocence provides a voice to persons exonerated from death row and 
advocates against the death penalty through public speaking, legislative testimony, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/florida/report.authch
eckdam.pdf. 
942 In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2005-2, 22 So.3d 17 (2009). 
943 Ibid. p. 23. 
944 European Union (2010). Compendium 2007-2010. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm. 
945 Ibid. 
 Samuel R. Layton, Page 220
media work aimed at enlightening the public about wrongful convictions.946  According 
to Witness to Innocence, 142 people were released from death row based on evidence of 
innocence since 1973.947  Witness to Innocence contends that: 
 
“As long as the death penalty remains a part of the American justice 
system, innocent people will continue to be sentenced to death.  Some will 
be executed.  It is inevitable.  Ultimately, the abolition of the death penalty 
is the only guaranteed protection against such tragic mistakes.”948 
 
 The EIDHR grant covered a variety of administrative and programmatic activities 
at Witness to Innocence, including staff salaries, media consultancy, outreach activities, 
and specific programs, particularly in the South where they provided speakers to other 
organizations for public events and legislative work on the death penalty.949  The EIDHR 
funding allowed Witness to Innocence “to greatly expand” its work, helping exonerees 
play an important role in successful repeals in Illinois and Maryland as well as media 
coverage, public speaking, and legislative testimony in other states.950 
The EIDHR funding helped Witness to Innocence members bring greater 
attention to the issue of innocence in death penalty debates, and the possibility of 
innocence is one of the reasons for the passage of legislation abolishing the death penalty 
in individual states, particularly in Illinois as discussed in Chapter 3 and Maryland.951 
For example, in Illinois legislative debates, Senator Kwame Raoul and House 
Representative Karen Yarbrough, both sponsors of the legislation that abolished the death 
penalty in Illinois, pointed to Randy Steidl, an exoneree and member of Witness to 
                                                 
946 Witness to Innocence. About Us. Retrieved from http://witnesstoinnocence.org/about-us.html. 
947 Witness to Innocence. About Innocence. Retrieved from http://witnesstoinnocence.org/about-
innocence.html. 
948 Ibid. 
949 Spillman, K. Personal Communications. June 20, 2013. 
950 Ibid. 
951 Ibid.; O’Malley, M. (2013). Statement from Governor Martin O’Malley on Passage of Death Penalty 
Repeal in Maryland. Retrieved from http://governor.maryland.gov/; Clutter, B. (2011). From Death Row to 
Hero: How Randy Steidl Became the Face of Capital Punishment Repeal. Illinois Times. Retrieved from 
http://illinoistimes.com/article-8263-from-death-row-to-hero.html. 
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Innocence that spoke out against capital punishment at rallies and legislative hearings.952  
Senator Raoul even closed his comments before the Illinois Senate vote by telling his 
colleagues that “before you push the button [to vote], I want you to look up in the gallery 
at Mr.  Steidl’s eyes and let me know if you would have been able to be the person to 
inject him.”953  The media in Illinois referred to Steidl as the “face of [a] broken system” 
because of his role in the debate.954 Likewise, in Maryland’s repeal of the death penalty, 
Kirk Bloodsworth, the first person on death row to be exonerated by DNA evidence in 
the United States and a member of Witness to Innocence, was referred to as “the public 
face of the flaws of the criminal justice system” and was mentioned by name repeatedly 
during Maryland’s legislative debate.955 
 The EIDHR funding allowed Witness to Innocence to expand its work and make 
innocence a main issue that helped persuade lawmakers to repeal the death penalty in 
Maryland and Illinois.956  As such, the European Union has had a considerable impact 
through its funding of Witness to Innocence. 
 
 
7.6 The European Union’s Impact Through Funding The National Coalition to 
Abolish the Death Penalty 
 
 The National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (NCADP), based in 
Washington, D.C., received 305,974 euros for their Intensive Assistance Program 
beginning 2009.957  Focusing on the United States, the NCADP’s Intensive Assistance 
                                                 
952 Ibid. 
953 Ibid. 
954 Ibid.; Spillman, K. Personal Communications. June 20, 2013. 
955 Wagner, J. (2013). As Maryland Votes on Death Penalty Repeal, Exonerated Man Becomes a Living 
Reminder. Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/as-
maryland-votes-on-death-penalty-repeal-exonerated-man-becomes-a-living-
reminder/2013/03/14/8fb87e84-8ca8-11e2-9838-d62f083ba93f_story.html; Dresser, M. and Cox, E. 
(2013). House Votes to Repeal Death Penalty. The Baltimore Sun. Retrieved from 
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956 Ibid.; Spillman, K. Personal Communications. June 20, 2013. 
957 European Union (2010). Compendium 2007-2010. p. 8. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm. 
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Program’s aim was to help strengthen groups in “key” states (states with high rates of 
executions) that were working to abolish the death penalty.958  The European Union 
contribution represented sixty percent of the Intensive Assistance Program’s funding for 
two years. 
 With the help of the European Union, the NCADP was able to hire two additional 
full-time organizers to focus on some of the states, such as Texas and Virginia that have 
executed the most people since the death penalty was reinstituted in the United States in 
1976.959  With the European Union’s funding, the NCADP provided assistance to other 
organizations in order to try to expand their capacity and membership bases.960  
NCADP’s Intensive Assistance Program provided its affiliated abolitionist organizations 
“organizing assistance, helps to schedule and staff letter writing events and phone banks, 
advises on how best to evaluate their staffing needs, assists them in targeting new 
constituencies and helps them build their core organizational structure”961  In Virginia, 
for example, NCADP provided support to such organizations through fundraising efforts, 
purchasing new software that allowed for targeted alerts, newsletters, and meeting 
invitations to be sent to (potential) supporters of abolition of the death penalty, upgrading 
websites, and a multimedia project of video testimonies of persons opposed to the death 
penalty, including religious leaders and murder victim’s family members.962 
 While the NCADP has had some success in its other projects focusing on states 
with lower execution rates, the NCADP’s Intensive Assistance Project’s focus on “key” 
states has not yet been able to affect those major executioners’ laws, policies, interests, or 
behavior, including in abolition, stays of executions, or clemencies.963  In those states, 
NCADP and its support for its affiliates has “not yet reached the critical tipping point” in 
                                                 
958 Ibid. 
959 Stone, M. (2012). Building Capacity and Expanding Our Base. Catholic Mobilizing Network. Retrieved 
from http://catholicsmobilizing.org/5163/building-capacity-and-expanding-our-base/. 
960 Ibid. 
961 National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (2015). General Information. Guidestar. Retrieved from 
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962 Stone, M. (2012). Building Capacity and Expanding Our Base. Catholic Mobilizing Network. Retrieved 
from http://catholicsmobilizing.org/5163/building-capacity-and-expanding-our-base/. 
963 National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (2015). GuideStar Exchange Charting Impact Report. 
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terms of creating a “groundswell of support for abolition.”964  As a result, the European 
Union has had nil impact on the United States with regard to its funding of NCADP. 
 
 
7.7 Overall Results and Conclusion 
 
Except for the funding of NCADP, a particularly challenging project focusing on 
major executioners, the European Union’s impact through its EIDHR funding of NGO’s 
has consistently resulted in a considerable impact on the United States with regard to the 
death penalty.  With regard to the funding of NCADP, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan’s 
comments on funding by the European Union may be relevant: 
 
“Adopting such a ‘grass-roots’ approach has been understood as valuable 
in terms of strengthening an indigenous basis for democracy and human 
rights promotion in third countries.  However, given that the scope of 
projects has generally been too limited to strengthen the grass-roots 
momentum for change in the countries concerned, this approach has at 
times made EU policy look more symbolic than substantive and more 
aimed at identity objectives than external objectives.”965 
 
Despite these concerns, with regard to the United States, other NGOs have played a 
major role in abolishing the death penalty, and they were able to do so in part because of 
the funding received by the European Union.966 
 
 
 
                                                 
964 Ibid. p. 4. 
965 Keukeleire, S., & MacNaughtan, J. (2008). The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. p. 226-227. 
966 Lowenstein, K. Personal Communications. February 7, 2013. 
 Samuel R. Layton, Page 224
Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanisms 
Outcome Impact 
US views that 
victim’s families 
support death 
penalty 
EIDHR 
funding of 
Murder 
Victims’ 
Families for 
Human 
Rights 
Persuasion General 
strengthening of US 
abolitionist 
movement; 
Connecticut 
abolished death 
penalty 
Considerable 
European nationals 
facing US death 
penalty 
EIDHR 
funding of 
Reprieve 
Persuasion Reduction of 
persons sentenced to 
death penalty 
Considerable 
Availability of 
research/information 
regarding US death 
penalty 
EIDHR 
funding of 
Death 
Penalty 
Information 
Center 
Persuasion Individual states 
abolish death 
penalty relying on 
DPIC 
information/research 
 
Considerable 
Fairness and due 
process in US death 
penalty 
EIDHR 
funding of 
American 
Bar 
Association 
Persuasion Judges concerned 
with ABA findings; 
Florida jury 
instructions changed 
Considerable 
Innocence EIDHR 
funding of 
Witness to 
Innocence 
Persuasion Individual states 
abolish death 
penalty 
Considerable 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanisms 
Outcome Impact 
States with high 
execution rates 
EIDHR 
funding of 
National 
Coalition to 
Abolish the 
Death 
Penalty 
(Persuasion 
attempted) 
Insufficient support 
remains in high 
execution states 
Nil 
 
 
With regard to the United States specifically, the financial support from the 
EIDHR has provided NGO’s with the ability to expand their work and persuade 
legislators, governors, judges, and other officials in the United States in individual cases 
as well as statewide repeals of the death penalty.  Interviews with the NGO 
representatives have confirmed the great importance of the European Union funding to 
their work.  Some of the European Union funded NGO’s have focused their advocacy on 
specific issues or areas, such as potential innocence (Witness to Innocence), problems in 
the legal and judicial process (ABA and Reprieve), and considerations involving victim’s 
families (MVFHR), while DPIC and NCADP have taken a broader approach.  By 
addressing all of these issues, the separately funded projects complement each other, 
particularly considering that when legislators, governors, and judges have made decisions 
regarding the United States death penalty those decisions were often based on a variety of 
death penalty problems and issues. 
As a whole, the NGO projects funded by the European Union have helped bring 
the issue of the death penalty to the forefront and created a more informed debate on the 
death penalty in the political and judicial branches of government in the United States.967  
For each of the NGO projects the European Union’s financial support was very important 
to their success, with a substantial portion of the funding for the projects coming from the 
                                                 
967 Robert, P. and Alberman, D. (2007). European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights Evaluation 
on the Abolition of Death Penalty Projects. EUROPAID/ 116548/C/SV. p. 21. 
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European Union, ranging from nearly half of the funding to 80 percent of the funding, 
and representatives from the NGO’s emphasizing the importance of the European 
Union’s support.968 The impact of each of the funded projects was accomplished through 
persuasion, whether by changing the rhetoric on death penalty issues, argumentation 
against the death penalty, or spreading information on the death penalty that convinced 
lawmakers, judges, or other officials. 
                                                 
968 European Union (2010). Compendium 2007-2010. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm; European Union. EIDHR: European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 2000-2006. p. 4-5. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/publication-compendium-promoting-human-rights-
worldwide-2000-2006_en_0.pdf; Robert, P. and Alberman, D. (2007). European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights Evaluation on the Abolition of Death Penalty Projects. EUROPAID/ 116548/C/SV. p. 
81; Lowenstein, K. Personal Communications. February 7, 2013; Spillman, K. Personal Communications. 
June 20, 2013. 
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8. OVERALL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research has sought to answer the following question: To what extent does the 
European Union have impact on the United States on human rights issues? Based on the 
23 examples summarized in the overall results chart below, the European Union has had 
largely mixed results, with the caveat that the European Union’s efforts in individual 
cases of commutation have been combined based on their combined impact. 
Some of the results from previous chapters have also been combined when 
appropriate in the chart below.  Sometimes a European Union output had an impact on 
more than one actor within the United States.  For instance, the impact of the abolition of 
the death penalty in EU member States was separated in the discussions of the political 
branches and United States judiciary, but the impact on these separate branches relates 
back to the same European Union output, and thus have been combined in the summary 
chart.  Likewise, the European Union’s impact on individual death penalty commutations, 
as summarized in the Specific Cases Table in Chapter 3, has been combined as this 
repeated effort has a combined outcome of reducing the number of persons sentenced to 
death and consuming federal diplomats’ time responding to the repeated challenges. 
The European Union had the highest level of impact on only three instances.  Two of 
these instances of significant (but temporary) impact involved the death penalty, 
particularly with the European Union limiting the export of drugs used in lethal injection 
and in securing an extradition treaty requiring assurances regarding non-application of 
the death penalty.  The European Union also had a significant impact on the general 
policy of secrecy for the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program.  While total disclosure 
has not occurred, some information has been exposed and the United States has 
acknowledged the existence of the program because of the European Union’s efforts. 
In several cases, the European Union has had a considerable impact on the United 
States.  The European Union had a considerable impact in eight out of the 23 instances 
summarized below.  The European Union could not be considered to have had a 
significant impact in those cases as its influence was in conjunction with several other 
actors or was not directly and primarily responsible for changes in United States policies, 
laws, interests, or behavior.  Most of the instances of considerable impact involved the 
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European Union’s funding of different NGO’s that promoted abolition by pointing to 
different problems with the practice, from innocence to financial cost to lack of support 
from murder victim’s families.  As discussed in Chapter 7, the European Union’s 
financial support was very important to the projects for each of the NGO’s, with a 
substantial portion of the funding for the projects coming from the European Union.969 
In twelve of the instances summarized below the European Union had only marginal 
or nil impact.  Again, the instances of marginal and nil impact occurred both with regard 
to the death penalty and the human rights issues involved in the War on Terror.  The 
relative infrequency at which the European Union had nil impact is particularly 
noteworthy.  Despite some doubts amongst scholars regarding whether the European 
Union could meaningfully challenge the United States on such controversial issues, the 
European Union has demonstrated that it matters in many instances.  The overall results 
of the extent of the European Union’s impact on the United States with regard to the 
death penalty and human rights issues in the War on Terror are as follows: 
 
Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Lethal injection EU restricts export of drugs 
used in lethal injection 
Coercion US states change lethal 
injection protocols, 
seek alternative drugs, 
and delay executions  
Significant 
                                                 
969 European Union (2010). Compendium 2007-2010. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm; European Union. EIDHR: European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 2000-2006. p. 4-5. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/publication-compendium-promoting-human-rights-
worldwide-2000-2006_en_0.pdf; Robert, P. and Alberman, D. (2007). European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights Evaluation on the Abolition of Death Penalty Projects. EUROPAID/ 116548/C/SV. p. 
81; Lowenstein, K. Personal Communications. February 7, 2013; Spillman, K. Personal Communications. 
June 20, 2013. 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Extradition Extradition where there is a 
risk of death penalty banned 
under Charter of Fundamental 
Rights; EU seeks provision in 
EU-US extradition treaty 
requiring non-application of 
death penalty 
Persuasion; 
Coercion 
US and EU enter 
extradition treaty with 
provision requiring 
assurances regarding 
non-application of 
death penalty 
Significant 
Extraordinary 
rendition 
EU investigates, reports, and 
criticizes extraordinary 
rendition program through 
communications with US, 
supporting Council of 
Europe’s investigation, and 
European Parliament’s 
investigation 
Persuasion US acknowledges 
extraordinary rendition 
program and 
information about 
program exposed, thus 
reducing policy of 
secrecy about program; 
Court of Appeals 
dismisses El-Masri 
case under state secrets 
doctrine 
Significant 
US death penalty 
generally 
EU’s combined repeated 
pressure on US to abolish the 
death penalty970  
Persuasion Federal diplomats 
consumed with 
responding to repeated 
challenges to death 
penalty; some 
sentences commuted 
Considerable 
US views that 
victim’s families 
support death 
penalty 
EIDHR funding of Murder 
Victims’ Families for Human 
Rights 
Persuasion General strengthening 
of US abolitionist 
movement; Connecticut 
abolished death penalty 
Considerable 
European 
nationals facing 
US death penalty 
EIDHR funding of Reprieve Persuasion Reduction of persons 
sentenced to death 
penalty 
Considerable 
                                                 
970 For separate impact in individual cases, see Specific Cases Table. 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Availability of 
research/informa
tion regarding 
US death penalty 
EIDHR funding of Death 
Penalty Information Center 
Persuasion Individual states 
abolish death penalty 
relying on DPIC 
information/research 
 
Considerable 
Fairness and due 
process in US 
death penalty 
EIDHR funding of American 
Bar Association 
Persuasion Judges concerned with 
ABA findings; Florida 
jury instructions 
changed 
Considerable 
Innocence EIDHR funding of Witness to 
Innocence 
Persuasion Individual states 
abolish death penalty 
Considerable 
Arbitrary 
detention 
Creation of framework for 
transfer of Guantanamo 
detainees to EU member states 
Persuasion; 
coercion 
Dozens of detainees 
transferred and settled 
in EU member states, 
reducing detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay 
Considerable 
Arbitrary 
detention 
EU seeks closure of 
Guantanamo Bay and legal 
protections for detainees by 
European Parliament 
resolutions and 
communications with US and 
public 
Persuasion Obama administration 
seeks closure of black 
sites and Guantanamo 
Bay and reduces 
number of persons 
detained 
Considerable 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
US death penalty 
generally 
Death penalty abolished 
throughout EU; EU seeks 
worldwide abolition 
Setting an 
example 
US increasingly 
isolated on world stage; 
Confirming role in 
abolition of death 
penalty in individual 
US states and concern 
by judges971 
Marginal 
Death Penalty 
for Mentally 
Retarded Persons 
EU files amicus curiae briefs 
in US Supreme Court cases 
Persuasion; 
setting an 
example 
US Supreme Court 
majority opinion relies 
on EU brief and EU & 
world example to 
confirm ruling that 
death penalty for 
mentally retarded 
persons is 
unconstitutional  
Marginal 
Death Penalty 
for Juveniles 
EU files amicus curiae briefs 
in US Supreme Court cases 
Persuasion; 
setting an 
example 
US Supreme Court 
majority opinion relies 
on EU brief and EU & 
world example to 
confirm ruling that 
juvenile death penalty 
is unconstitutional 
Marginal 
                                                 
971 In combination with amicus curiae briefs filed in cases involving mentally retarded persons and 
juveniles, the European Union example also played a confirming role in elimination of the death penalty for 
those persons in the United States. 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld petition 
addressing 
arbitrary 
detention at 
Guantanamo Bay 
Group of European and UK 
parliamentarians file amicus 
curiae briefs 
Persuasion US Supreme Court 
finds habeas 
jurisdiction and 
procedural rights under 
the Geneva 
Conventions; MCA 
passed undercutting 
statutory basis of court 
decision 
Marginal 
Boumediene v. 
Bush petition 
addressing 
arbitrary 
detention at 
Guantanamo Bay 
Group of European and UK 
parliamentarians file amicus 
curiae briefs 
Persuasion US Supreme Court 
holds detainees have 
constitutional privilege 
of habeas corpus 
Marginal 
Torture and ill 
treatment 
EU criticizes US treatment of 
terrorist suspects in 
communications and European 
Parliament resolutions 
Persuasion Bush administration 
ignores and rejects 
criticisms; Obama 
administration 
disapproves of 
interrogation methods 
used under Bush 
Marginal 
Consular access 
rights 
EU pressures US executives 
for enforcement of consular 
access rights in US death 
penalty cases 
Persuasion US federal 
administration 
supportive of (failed) 
attempts to comply 
with VCCR obligations 
Marginal 
Death penalty 
world-wide 
EU sponsors UN resolutions 
calling for world-wide 
moratorium on the death 
penalty 
Persuasion 
(of third 
nations) 
Passage of resolutions 
in UN, increasing 
isolation of US on 
world stage. 
Marginal 
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Input/Issue Output Diffusion 
Mechanism 
Outcome Impact 
Drone killings General inaction from EU, but 
some criticism from European 
Parliament and other officials 
General 
inaction, 
some 
persuasion 
US continues drone 
program with little 
resistance 
Marginal 
Consular Access 
Rights 
EU files amicus curiae briefs 
in US Supreme Court cases 
(Persuasion 
attempted) 
US Supreme Court 
does not rely on EU for 
its decisions 
Nil 
War on Terror, 
generally 
Inconsistency within EU Setting an 
example 
None Nil 
States with high 
execution rates 
EIDHR funding of National 
Coalition to Abolish the Death 
Penalty 
(Persuasion 
attempted) 
Insufficient support 
remains in high 
execution states 
Nil 
 
 
The examination of the European Union’s impact in the United States has 
revealed some major obstacles confronted by the European Union, including 
internalization and acceptance of norms by the United States, conflicts between 
democracy and human rights, and problems involving the structure of government in the 
United States.  First, the internalization of norms promoted by the European Union is 
important to their acceptance by the United States.  As discussed in Chapter 3, former 
Texas Governor Rick Perry rejected the relevance of European viewpoints on the death 
penalty.  Similarly, in the dissents in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, Justices 
Scalia and Rehnquist rejected the notion that foreign views were relevant to the meaning 
of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Although politicians and judges have not in every instance been completely 
receptive to the external views of the European Union, it has had an impact where the 
views are linked to American values, whether through the funding of important 
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organizations within the United States with overlapping agenda’s, such as with the ABA 
discussed in Chapter 7, or through affirmation of shared values. 
Illustrating the latter, the United States Supreme Court’s majority opinion in 
Roper v. Simmons explained: 
 
“Over time, from one generation to the next, the Constitution has come to 
earn the high respect and even, as Madison dared to hope, the veneration 
of the American people.  The document sets forth, and rests upon, 
innovative principles original to the American experience, such as 
federalism; a proven balance in political mechanisms through separation 
of powers; specific guarantees for the accused in criminal cases; and broad 
provisions to secure individual freedom and preserve human dignity.  
These doctrines and guarantees are central to the American experience 
and remain essential to our present-day self-definition and national 
identity.  Not the least of the reasons we honor the Constitution, then, is 
because we know it to be our own.  It does not lessen our fidelity to the 
Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express 
affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples 
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own 
heritage of freedom.”972 
 
The United States Supreme Court clearly struggles with the very notion of consulting 
foreign views in making its decisions.  Linking these foreign views with the traditions 
and norms already a part of the United States is important to the internalization and 
ultimate acceptance of those foreign views. 
The European Union has often emphasized its shared values with the United 
States in its advocacy with regard to the death penalty and the War on Terror.  Such 
emphasis has, for example, played out in the majority of the United States Supreme Court 
with regard to the international context and its relation to the traditions and norms in the 
                                                 
972 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (emphasis added) (citing The Federalist No. 49, p. 314 (C. 
Rossiter ed.1961)). 
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United States and the long-term change in the elimination of the death penalty for 
juveniles and mentally retarded persons as well as the issue of arbitrary detention in the 
War on Terror.   
 Another obstacle faced by the European Union has been persuading United States 
politicians and judges that the death penalty is primarily a human rights issue rather than 
a democracy issue.  The federal administration often responded to the European Union’s 
efforts by noting that the death penalty in the United States was the result of democratic 
processes.  The European Union promotes both human rights and democracy, and opens 
its amicus curiae briefs in death penalty and Guantanamo Bay court cases with a 
statement of its commitment to principles such as “liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.”973 
While an ideal democracy may also protect individual and human rights, the will 
of the majority and democratic institutions do not always produce such results.  As a 
result, the conflict between human rights and democracy presents problems for the 
European Union in its opposition to the United States.  The European Union is an 
external entity attempting to persuade the United States to change its laws, policies, and 
behavior including in instances where they resulted from democratic processes in the 
promotion of human rights. 
Adding insult to injury, the European Union’s abolition of the death penalty 
within its own borders is perceived as inconsistent with democratic principles.  In both 
Roper v. Simmons and Kansas v. Marsh, Justice Scalia has emphasized that the European 
Union did not abolish the death penalty by popular vote and that some public opinion 
polls in Europe indicate support for the death penalty.974  Justice Scalia explained: 
 
“It is commonly recognized that ‘[m]any European countries ...  abolished 
the death penalty in spite of public opinion rather than because of it.’  
Abolishing the death penalty has been made a condition of joining the 
                                                 
973 Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International Community in Support of 
Respondent, 2004 WL 1619203 p. 1; Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Union in Support of the 
Petitioner, 2001 WL 648609 p. 1. 
974 Roper v. Simmons, 2004 WL 2387647 p. 11-12 (transcript of oral argument); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 
163, 187 n.3 (2006). 
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Council of Europe, which is in turn a condition of obtaining the economic 
benefits of joining the European Union.”975 
 
Despite Justice Scalia’s dissenting views, in Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia this 
democracy issue was circumvented by the majority of the Supreme Court by placing a 
confirmatory role on the views and practices of the European Union and the world.  The 
democracy issue, at least insofar as it is based on resistance to direct persuasion by a 
foreign entity, is also avoided with the European Union’s funding of various NGOs, 
including the Moratorium Project, with the ABA being an important United States legal 
organization persuading courts. 
A third obstacle faced by the European Union is the federal structure of 
government and separation of powers in the United States, as well as the corresponding 
(perceived) roles of judges in the United States system.  In Roper v. Simmons, for 
example, Justice O’Connor agreed with the majority opinion that foreign and 
international law are relevant but did not give the international context a confirmatory 
role because she did not agree that there was a national consensus against the juvenile 
death penalty nor that the majority’s categorical rule against the juvenile death penalty 
was otherwise justified by the Court.976 
This was not a personal disagreement with the majority about the acceptability of 
the juvenile death penalty, but rather it was based upon Justice O’Connor’s views about 
her role as a judge and not a legislator.  Justice O’Connor made it explicit that if she was 
“a legislator, rather than a judge, then [she], too, would be inclined to support legislation 
setting a minimum age of 18” for the death penalty.977  In essence, even if judges are 
persuaded by the European Union that the death penalty is inappropriate in particular 
                                                 
975 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 187 n.3 (2006) (citing Bibas, Transparency and Participation in 
Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 911, 931–932 (2006), Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The 
Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L.J. 487, 
525 (2005), and Demleitner, Is There a Future for Leniency in the U.S. Criminal Justice System? 103 Mich. 
L.Rev. 1231, 1256, and n. 88 (2005)). 
976 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604 (2005). 
977 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607 (2005). 
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circumstances, judges must also be persuaded that there is a legal basis and it is within 
their appropriate exercise of power as judges for making a change. 
Similarly, The Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles responded to the 
European Union’s requests for commutations by redirecting the European Union “to any 
public debate which may occur in Connecticut’s legislative body, the General 
Assembly.”978  With regard to Connecticut, the European Union did influence the passage 
of legislation abolishing the death penalty through the funding of NGOs, as discussed in 
Chapters 7. 
The separation of powers and federal structure of government was particularly 
prevalent for the issue of consular access rights of capital defendants, which involved 
international treaties violated by officials from state governments leading to international, 
federal, and state court cases, and requests for and attempts at compliance in different 
branches of government at the state and federal level.  In this context, although the 
European Union had a marginal impact on the federal administration, the European 
Union also needed but failed to persuade the United States Supreme Court not only of the 
appropriate remedy for consular access violations, but also that the United States 
Supreme Court was the appropriate level and branch of government to create that 
remedy. 
The European Union has also faced both internal and external challenges to 
having an impact on human rights in the United States.  Internally, the European Union 
has not provided a clear, consistent example on the human rights issues involved in 
combating terrorism.  While United States human rights practices have been condemned 
at various times within the European Union, the separate approaches to combating 
terrorism taken by member states have sometimes followed the United States problematic 
human rights practices. 
The European Parliament’s condemnation of the involvement of officials from 
European Union member states in CIA extraordinary renditions is a glaring example 
already discussed.  While some member states condemned United States human rights 
                                                 
978 Everett, G. (2004). Connecticut Board of Pardon and Parole Response. Retrieved from 
http://www.euintheus.org/what-we-do/policy-areas/democracy-and-human-rights/torture-and-capital-
punishment/death-penalty/death-penalty-archive-2004/. 
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practices, the United Kingdom was itself carrying out similar practices of detaining 
suspects without an opportunity to effectively challenge that detention, which the 
European Court of Human Rights found to be in violation of Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.979  Comparatively, the European Union has presented a 
relatively united front against the death penalty in the United States, with every European 
Union member state abolishing the practice.  Internal differences make it more difficult 
for the European Union to lead by setting an example on the War on Terror issues and 
may explain why individual United Kingdom and European parliamentarians, rather than 
the European Union as a whole, joined in amicus curiae briefs in United States arbitrary 
detention cases. 
Externally, the United States government was resistant to changing its human 
rights practices, as demonstrated by the government’s passing of new legislation in light 
of adverse court decisions concerning Guantanamo Bay.  Taking the matter to court is an 
alternative method for affecting change.  Due in part to judicial restraint, it took six years 
before the United States Supreme Court decided whether the constitutional privilege of 
habeas corpus applied to Guantanamo detainees.980  Addressing this problem, the 
parliamentarians’ briefs in Hamdan and Boumediene were careful to discuss the common 
heritage of Europe and the US in respecting human rights and the rule of law. 
The European Union’s ability to have an impact in multiple instances despite 
these various obstacles is not inconsequential.  In the face of multiple serious challenges, 
the European Union has at least sometimes been able to confront a world power 
involving vital issues of human rights, democracy, justice, and national security. 
 
 
8.1 The European Union’s Outputs and Diffusion Mechanisms 
 
This research has also revealed the instances where the European Union has had 
the most impact on the United States, particularly with regard to the outputs and diffusion 
                                                 
979 A and Others v. United Kingdom, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29 (2009).  
980 Duffy, H. (2008). Human Rights Litigation and the ‘War on Terror’. International Review of the Red 
Cross. 90. 
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mechanisms used towards the United States and the level of their impact.  Probably the 
most consistent with previous views about the European Union’s influence, economic 
restrictions were only used by the European Union in one of the instances examined, 
export restrictions on drugs used in lethal injections, and had a significant impact. 
Of the different outputs of the European Union, some sorts of outputs produced 
fairly consistent results.  The funding of NGOs, which in turn were working in the United 
States towards abolition of the death penalty through argumentation and spreading of 
information regarding issues and problems with the practice, consistently produced a 
considerable impact in all but one case.  Likewise, amicus curiae briefs filed in United 
States courts by the European Union resulted in a marginal impact the majority of the 
time for both the death penalty and War on Terror issues, with four out of five situations 
having a marginal impact.  United States judges are sometimes recognizing these “friend 
of the court” briefs filed by the European Union in cases related to human rights issues.  
This also highlights the importance of expanding Ginsberg’s analytical approach to 
include laws and other branches of government.  The European Union has specifically 
aimed to change the laws and their application in the United States, including in the 
United States judiciary.  With this expansion, a more complete understanding of the 
European Union’s impact on the United States has been possible.   
Demarches, public statements, European Parliament resolutions, and other 
communications with the United States had somewhat varying results.  With regard to 
separate individual cases in which the European Union sought commutations of an 
individual sentenced to death in the United States, the European Union had nil impact the 
majority of the time.  Combined, however, these statements and communications in 
individual cases nonetheless had a considerable impact.  Aside from these examples, the 
European Union’s impact using such outputs ranged from significant to marginal for the 
death penalty and War on Terror human rights issues.  The European Union’s 
sponsorship of UN resolutions also had a marginal impact. 
With regard to diffusion mechanisms, coercion, persuasion, and setting an 
example were all utilized by the European Union for the death penalty and in advocacy 
concerning human rights issues in the United States War on Terror.  Not surprisingly, 
coercion was more rarely used in the European Union’s efforts to influence the United 
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States on the human rights issues involved in the War on Terror and the death penalty.  
Despite its relatively less frequent use, coercion consistently produced the highest levels 
of impact by the European Union, including two instances of significant impact and one 
instance of considerable impact.  The European Union’s restrictions to the United States 
on the export of drugs used in lethal injections and the extraditions of persons potentially 
subject to the death penalty in the United States as well as facilitating the transfer and 
resettlement of Guantanamo Bay detainees each involved coercion as the diffusion 
mechanism.  These results suggest that, when desired or necessary, coercion is a potential 
option for the European Union to achieve an impact on the United States, although if 
used too frequently the European Union may need to be careful not to damage its general 
relations with the United States. 
By far, persuasion was the most frequent diffusion mechanisms for the European 
Union’s impact on the United States in the 2000s, with twenty instances involving 
persuasion to some degree.  Persuasion involved somewhat mixed results.  All except two 
of these instances, the attempts to persuade the United States Supreme Court regarding 
consular access rights of capital defendants and the funding of NCADP, had at least some 
impact on the United States.  Two out of three of the instances of significant impact 
involved persuasion as a relevant diffusion mechanism. 
Otherwise, persuasion consistently provided either a considerable or marginal 
impact by the European Union on the United States for the death penalty and the War on 
Terror.  While this persuasion often took the form of arguments directly made by the 
European Union for ending practices or policies connected with the death penalty and 
War on Terror, it also occurred indirectly through the funding of NGOs operating in the 
United States in these areas.  With the support of the European Union’s EIDHR funding, 
NGOs have helped persuade lawmakers in the United States to abolish the death penalty, 
through arguments and the distribution of information and research.  All but one case of 
the European Union’s NGO funding examined involved persuasion as the diffusion 
mechanism and resulted in a considerable impact, as the European Union’s efforts in this 
regard were indirect and were generally part of broader efforts by multiple actors. 
For the European Union, setting an example with regard to the death penalty led 
to a marginal impact on the United States in three instances, but setting an example (or 
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lack thereof) had nil impact on the United States with regard to the War on Terror.  With 
regard to the death penalty, the European Union’s example was clear and consistent: the 
European Union and its member states abolished the death penalty and the European 
Union and its member states were actively seeking to end or reduce the death penalty 
worldwide.  The isolation of the United States in continuing the death penalty generally 
played a confirmatory role in individual states’ decisions to abolish the death penalty.  In 
addition, the United States Supreme Court looked to the example set by the European 
Union and the world in confirming its decisions ending the death penalty for juveniles 
and mentally retarded persons in the United States. 
With regard to human rights and the War on Terror, the European Union and its 
member states have struggled more to have the same degree of consistency as with the 
death penalty.  Some European Union member states helped the United States in its 
questionable policies while others condemned the United States.  This example (or lack 
thereof) did not lead to a change in United States laws, policies or behavior and had nil 
impact on the United States. 
 
 
8.2 Conclusion 
 
 The European Union has had mixed results with regard to its impact on the United 
States, generally indicating that (at least sometimes) it matters even when confronting the 
United States on the death penalty and War on Terror human rights issues, issues which 
are contentious and controversial for the United States, a world power.  The European 
Union’s demonstrated ability in several cases to have high levels (significant or 
considerable) of impact under such circumstances indicates that it is important to or taken 
seriously by the different branches and levels of government in the United States at least 
some of the time.   
This research has found that all three diffusion mechanisms are relevant and can be 
useful in the European Union’s relations with the United States, but coercion produced 
the highest impact.  Coercion as a diffusion mechanism, although producing the highest 
levels of impact, was only infrequently used.  Persuasion was frequently used and had 
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varying degrees of impact for both the death penalty and War on Terror.  Setting an 
example generally produced a marginal impact for the death penalty but nil impact with 
regard to the War on Terror. 
European Union foreign policy outputs such as the funding of NGO’s working 
towards abolition of the death penalty in the United States generally led to a considerable 
impact on the United States while filing amicus curiae briefs in United States court cases 
involving the death penalty or War on Terror human rights issues generally led to a 
marginal impact on the United States.  European Union foreign policy outputs such as 
demarches, European Parliament resolutions, public statements, and other 
communications with the United States produced more varied results.  Lending support to 
the idea that the European Union is an economic power, the European Union’s export 
restrictions on drugs used in lethal injections in the United States produced one of the 
three examples of significant impact by the European Union. 
At its beginning, this research sought to examine some important questions 
regarding the European Union’s efforts to influence the United States.  Focusing on 
human rights issues within the War on Terror and the death penalty within the United 
States, this research endeavored to examine the following issues: Does the United States 
take the European Union seriously in its human rights policy?  Is the European Union 
able to have significant impact on a world power like the United States?  To what extent 
has the European Union had impact on the United States on human rights issues? 
 As explained in Chapter 1, while scholars have debated the European Union in the 
world, disagreement has remained over the European Union’s ability to influence a world 
power such as the United States in particular.  This has been particularly true with regard 
to the human rights issues relating to the death penalty and War on Terror.  Previous 
scholarship mentioning the European Union’s influence on the United States with regard 
to the death penalty has varied from raising doubts regarding the European Union’s 
potential success in this regard981 to greater optimism regarding the potential of the 
European Union to influence the United States.982 
                                                 
981 See, e.g., Ginsberg, H. (2001). The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. p. 255; Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A 
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This research has made clear that, while the European Union has not had an 
impact in every instance, the European Union’s efforts with regard to the death penalty 
have resulted in significant or considerable impact on multiple occasions.  While 
certainly not a perfect track record, these results demonstrate that at least sometimes the 
United States has taken the European Union seriously in its human rights policy and that 
the European Union is not only capable but in some instances actually has had a 
significant impact on the United States in this area.  This can be particularly important for 
encouraging further European Union foreign policy activity given the priority the 
European Union has given toward abolishing the death penalty worldwide, especially in 
the United States. 
 The European Union has not provided the same clear, united front against the 
United States with regard to human rights and the War on Terror as it has for the death 
penalty.  With this background, scholarly articles have generally focused more on how 
the European Union and its member states have or should react to the War on Terror than 
on the resulting degree of influence on the United States.983  This research has 
demonstrated that, although the European Union and its member states were themselves 
struggling with the balance between security and human rights protections, the European 
Union has had a significant or considerable impact in some instances.  As with the death 
penalty, with mixed results, this research again has demonstrated that the United States 
has taken the European Union seriously and that even on vital issues affecting national 
security and human rights the European Union has been able to have a significant or 
considerable impact in some instances. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies. 40(2), p. 248; Dieter, R. (2003). International 
Influence on the Death Penalty in the U.S. Foreign Service Journal. October 2003, p. 31, 38. 
982 See, e.g., Demleitner, N. (2002). The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead? 
Oregon Law Review. 81, p. 131; Trail, R. (2002). The Future of Capital Punishment in the United States: 
Effects of the International Trend Towards Abolition of the Death Penalty. Suffolk Transnational Law 
Review. 26, p. 125-126. 
983 See, e.g., Duffy, H. (2008). Human Rights Litigation and the ‘War on Terror’. International Review of 
the Red Cross. 90; Winkler, M. (2008). When “Extraordinary” Means Illegal: International Law and 
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 These results are important, as there were not only early doubts among some 
scholars but some United States officials have rejected the idea that the European Union 
should matter for the policies within the United States.  Former Texas Governor Rick 
Perry’s response to the European Union’s efforts concerning the death penalty illustrate 
this point, in which he pointed out that “our forefathers fought a war to throw off the 
yoke of a European monarch” and that “Texans are doing just fine governing Texas.”984  
As explained by McCormick, the majority view has been that the European Union is not 
able to challenge the United States on anything but economic matters.985 
 This research has thus contributed to a better understanding in several ways 
important to both scholars and practitioners involved in the areas of human rights, foreign 
policy, international relations, political science, and law generally and European Union-
United States relations, the death penalty, and the War on Terror specifically.  First, this 
research has expanded upon Ginsberg’s analytical framework to explicitly include 
examination of different branches and levels of government in the receiving country, the 
United States, and demonstrated that the European Union’s efforts have had an impact 
beyond the United States federal administration as the ordinary recipient of the European 
Union’s foreign policy.  Second, this research has explicitly included diffusion 
mechanisms in the analysis of the European Union’s impact on the United States, which 
has provided a more complete understanding of the means by which the European Union 
has achieved its impact.  Third, the European Union’s impact on laws, including their 
interpretation, has been explicitly included, reflecting the reality that the political efforts 
of the European Union extend to them, especially in the area of human rights. 
Fourth, this research has provided an empirically based foundation for the 
continuing debates regarding the European Union in the world. As explained in Chapter 
1, scholars such as Schunz, Smith, and Neimann and Bretherton have indicated concerns 
that at times this debate has been “insufficiently grounded in empirical findings,”986  
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Retrieved fromhttp://jurist.org/paperchase/2007/08/texas-governor-rejects-eu-request-to.php. 
985 McCormick, J. (2007). The European Super Power. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. p. 2. 
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sometimes insufficiently addresses the effects of the European Union’s actions,987 and is 
still “in the process of attaining a more systematic empirical focus.”988 Although practical 
concerns limit the scope of any research endeavor, the modified Ginsburg framework 
could potentially be applied to other policy areas and other receiving countries. The 
empirical results of this research (and similar research relating to other policy areas and 
countries) could, for example, possibly be a useful basis for further research exploring 
various conceptions of the European Union’s power (e.g. civilian power,989 normative 
power,990 structural power,991 superpower,992 and small power,993 among others).  The 
modified Ginsburg framework could also potentially be applied to other countries or 
entities, such as the Council of Europe, to examine their impact in the same or other 
policy areas.994 Such further research could also provide interesting points for comparison 
or contrast.  
Last and importantly, the results of this research demonstrate that not only can the 
European Union sometimes have the highest levels (significant or considerable) of 
impact on the United States but it can do so in areas involving human rights and 
challenges to United States views on national security, democracy, and justice.  In using 
the modified Ginsberg framework, this research focused on the external impact on the 
United States rather than goal achievement of the European Union, a departure from what 
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Jorgensen, Oberthur, and Shahin suggest many studies of the European Union often have 
done,995 as described in Chapter 1. 
The results of this research suggest that the European Union’s importance, even in 
relations with the United States, should not be underestimated.  As discussed in Chapter 
1, the European Union faced particular challenges in confronting the United States in the 
context of the War on Terror, including with regard to the United States approach and 
internal division within the European Union.996  As already mentioned, the demands and 
challenges placed by the United States and the Islamic world have to some degree made 
it more difficult for the development of consensus within the European Union and its 
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member states,997 and the reaction to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks could be 
considered a continuation of the debate within the European Union and its member states 
with regard to aligning with or separating further from the United States’ positions.998 
More broadly, scholars have previously disagreed on the extent to which the 
European Union can challenge the United States in the world, particularly outside of the 
economic arena.999 With regard to human rights in particular, the European Union has 
been criticized by some “that it promotes [human rights] when it is easy or cost free, but 
is far less willing and/or able to do so when faced with powerful states that have the 
potential to impose high costs on the EU.”1000   
Generally in line with the combined literature of other studies of the European 
Union’s human rights efforts,1001 this research found mixed results of the European 
Union’s external impact on the United States.  Nonetheless, the European Union’s 
sometimes high levels of impact in these areas suggests that the European Union is not 
always the weaker partner or a follower in European Union-United States relations, but 
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has the demonstrated ability to influence the United States on human rights issues at least 
some of the time.  Although there generally was variation in the levels of impact for the 
European Union’s efforts, some outputs and diffusion mechanisms produced somewhat 
consistent results. Specifically, the cases in which the European Union funded NGO’s 
efforts in the United States and the cases involving coercion often provided the highest 
levels (considerable or significant) of impact.  On the other hand, the European Union’s 
use of amicus curiae briefs and setting an example often resulted in the lowest levels 
(marginal or nil) of impact.  Future research into the European Union’s external impact 
on the United States in other policy areas could be useful in confirming (or not 
confirming) these tendencies.  In sum, this research suggests that even on some of the 
most contentious and controversial issues against a world power such as the United 
States, the European Union can at least sometimes matter greatly. 
